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 Resumen 
 
Los tres capítulos (dejando a un lado el capítulo introductorio) que 
componen la presente tesis analizan el impacto de la crisis económica en las 
transiciones individuales del empleo y desempleo en España desde una 
perspectiva microeconómica. La Gran Recesión ha generado importantes 
ajustes en el mercado laboral de la mayoría de los países desarrollados y ha 
afectado drásticamente al mercado laboral español1, que presenta las mayores 
tasas de destrucción de empleo y los menores índices de creación de empleo 
entre los países europeos. Según la encuesta de población activa (EPA), la tasa 
de desempleo en España ha sufrido un crecimiento drástico  desde un 8,5% en 
2006 a un 25% en 2012. En esta tesis, exploramos los flujos individuales del 
mercado laboral español y sus determinantes para entender mejor el 
comportamiento de la tasa de paro a lo largo del ciclo económico actual. 
La crisis financiera precipitó el estallido de la burbuja inmobiliaria2, que 
afectó especialmente al sector de la construcción, que presentaba un perfil 
profesional caracterizado por una alta concentración de hombres, con un bajo 
nivel educativo, un elevado porcentaje de trabajadores inmigrantes y el 
predominio de contratos de carácter temporal. Como consecuencia de ello, 
durante la crisis hubo una reasignación implícita de recursos hacia sectores 
comercializables. Además, la crisis financiera provocó la contracción del crédito, 
la reducción de la financiación del sector privado y la obstaculización a la 
                                                        
1 Jaumotte (2011) analiza  las diferencias en las instituciones del mercado laboral  y en las políticas 
laborales entre España y otros países de la UE15. 
2 La caída acumulada del precio de la vivienda entre el tercer trimestre de 2007 y  el primer trimestre de 
2014 asciende a un 36,2%. 
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creación y supervivencia de las empresas, afectando de esta forma a otros 
sectores. 
En una primera etapa de la crisis, la proporción del empleo temporal 
disminuyó, debido al ajuste del mercado de trabajo vía despidos de 
trabajadores con contratos temporales. Sin embargo, en la segunda etapa de la 
crisis, la proporción de contratos temporales y a tiempo parcial han registrado 
un aumento3, debido al incremento en el uso de este tipo de contratos en las 
nuevas contrataciones y al despido de trabajadores con contratos indefinidos. 
Además, los flujos migratorios netos previos a la crisis mostraron un crecimiento 
sostenido4, sin embargo, al iniciarse la recisión se registró  un descenso y desde 
el año 2010 presentan un saldo negativo. 
Por otro lado, el incremento de la competitividad derivada de una 
moderación de los salarios y de los precios y la tendencia a la exportación de 
productos de calidad media y media-baja durante el periodo de crisis,  han 
permitido alcanzar unos resultados de exportación positivos (y mejores que en 
otros países europeos) por parte de las grandes empresas españolas. Además, la 
pequeña empresa5 española (habitualmente menos productiva) ha aumentado 
su presencia en los mercados extranjeros durante la crisis, aunque presenta 
resultados inferiores a la media de la UE en términos de innovación de 
producto/proceso según el indicador europeo de la Innovación de la Comisión 
Europea de 2014. 
Con el objetivo de reducir la alta tasa de paro, se han aprobado  dos 
reformas del mercado de trabajo en los últimos años. La reforma del mercado 
de trabajo del año 2010 aborda la falta de flexibilidad interna y externa. Esta 
reforma tiene como objetivo aumentar la flexibilidad externa a través de la 
                                                        
3 Según las estadísticas de la OCDE en el año 2013 el 66% de los trabajadores con contrato a tiempo 
parcial declara que lo hace de forma involuntaria. 
4 La migración neta es el número total anual de inmigrantes menos el número anual de emigrantes. 
5 De acuerdo con los datos de la Comisión Europea (2015) más del 90% de las empresas en España son 
microempresas (menos de 9 empleados). Más de la mitad de los trabajadores en España están 
empleados en pequeñas empresas (menos de 50 empleados). Esta cifra es muy superior a la de otros 
países europeos como Alemania (23%) y Francia (32%.) 
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reducción de la dualidad del mercado de trabajo. Para ello, establece límites a la 
duración de los contratos por obra o servicio y al uso de los contratos 
temporales consecutivos, amplía las posibilidades de conversión de contratos 
temporales en indefinidos, incrementa la indemnización por la finalización de 
contratos temporales y se reduce para los nuevos contratos indefinidos, 
facilitando que el despido de los contratos indefinidos sea menos costoso y más 
asequible para los empleadores. Para aumentar la flexibilidad interna, la 
reforma prevé la posibilidad de ignorar los convenios colectivos en las empresas 
con dificultades económicas, incentiva los ajustes de horas de trabajo, la 
suspensión temporal de contratos y la movilidad geográfica. 
La reforma de 20126 tiene como objetivo aumentar la flexibilidad del 
mercado de trabajo para impulsar nuevas contrataciones, principalmente entre 
los jóvenes y desempleados de larga duración. Esta reforma pretende 
incrementar el número de trabajadores empleados, en línea con la reforma del 
año 2010, al hacer el despido más sencillo y menos costoso, y facilitando la 
modificación de las condiciones de trabajo, tales como las horas de trabajo, los 
salarios y la movilidad geográfica y profesional. Esta última medida, puede 
desarrollarse gracias a la posibilidad de ignorar los convenios colectivos (con 
menos restricciones que con la reforma de 2010) y de tomar decisiones 
unilaterales por parte de los empleadores, siempre que estén justificadas por 
motivos de productividad u organización técnica. Entre las medidas destinadas a 
impulsar las nuevas contrataciones se encuentran: la posibilidad de encadenar 
contratos de aprendizaje para los trabajadores menores de 30 años, descuentos 
en la contratación de jóvenes y parados de larga duración, y una mayor 
flexibilidad en los empleos a tiempo parcial. 
                                                        
6 Un estudio preliminar (OCDE, 2014) muestra los efectos preliminares de la reforma de 2012 sobre los 
flujos de desempleo. Los resultados revelan una reducción de la duración de los períodos de desempleo, 
esencialmente debido a una transición más rápida hacia un contrato indefinido (concentrado en las 
empresas pequeñas y medianas) y una reducción en las finalizaciones de relaciones laborales, en 
particular de los empleos  temporales. 
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En este contexto, la presente tesis aborda cuestiones de investigación 
relevantes para las políticas de empleo y de igualdad de género, en línea con los 
objetivos de la Estrategia Europa 2020.  El segundo capítulo se centra en las 
salidas de los episodios de desempleo (con prestación de desempleo) iniciados 
antes y durante la crisis, por la vía de encontrar un trabajo. El tercer capítulo 
analiza los cambios en la naturaleza y estabilidad de los nuevos contratos 
iniciados en dos períodos económicos diferentes. Finalmente, el  cuarto capítulo 
muestra las diferencias de género en: las salidas del desempleo y del 
consecutivo empleo y los salarios iniciales (percibidos tras un periodo de 
desempleo) a lo largo del período 2002-2013. La base de datos utilizada y el 
marco econométrico son comunes en estos tres capítulos. 
Un ingrediente importante de este estudio es el uso de una base de datos 
administrativa, la Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) 7 , con 
información de la Seguridad Social española (SS). Los datos de la MCVL se 
recogen anualmente desde el año 2004 y contienen información sobre una 
muestra aleatoria del cuatro por ciento de la población, que ha tenido alguna 
relación con la SS durante el período muestral8. Ésta es representativa del año 
de la muestra en cuestión. Cuenta con aproximadamente un millón de 
individuos. Los individuos de la MCVL de 2004 permanecen en la muestra 
siempre y cuando tengan una relación con la SS. Contiene información personal 
como el sexo, la edad, la nacionalidad, el nivel educativo, etc., e información 
acerca de la historia laboral9, de la población que alguna vez ha trabajado, como 
las fechas exactas de inicio y finalización de los episodios de empleo y 
desempleo (con prestación), características de la empresa donde ha trabajado, 
tipo de contrato, etc. Desde el año 2004 en adelante están disponibles los 
salarios anuales para la mayor parte de los trabajadores. El diseño longitudinal 
de esta base de datos y la riqueza de información que contiene nos permiten 
                                                        
7 Rebollo (2012) señala que el uso de una base de datos administrativa, para este tipo de análisis, evita 
los sesgos asociados con el uso de información inexacta sobre las transiciones. 
8 Como consecuencia de esto, los funcionarios públicos no están incluidos en la muestra. 
9 La información histórica es fiable desde el año 1990. 
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estudiar con precisión las transiciones del empleo y el desempleo y sus 
determinantes a lo largo del tiempo. Para asegurar la representatividad de 
nuestras muestras en cada año del período de estudio unimos las MCVL 
correspondientes. Como los datos de la MCVL únicamente incluyen a las 
personas con algún tipo de vinculación con la SS, no podemos distinguir 
desempleo sin prestación y no participación.  Con el fin de evitar hacer 
supuestos que podrían sesgar los resultados, al estudiar las duraciones del 
desempleo nos centramos en los episodios con prestación de desempleo 
(contributiva o no contributiva). El importe de las prestaciones por desempleo y 
los períodos de derecho a la misma no están disponibles en esta base de datos, 
aunque podrían aproximarse. Los trabajadores del sector agrícola quedan 
excluidos del estudio, al tratarse de un sector regido por unas reglas diferentes. 
Por otra parte, para evitar la censura por la izquierda consideramos los 
episodios de empleo o de desempleo que empiezan en un período específico. Es 
importante señalar que las muestras seleccionadas para cada capítulo no 
cubren a toda la población, pero sí ciertos grupos de individuos, tales como los 
trabajadores que comienzan un nuevo empleo o los trabajadores que cayeron 
en desempleo con prestación en un año específico. Por lo tanto, esta tesis no 
proporciona una visión completa de la totalidad de la fuerza de trabajo. 
Para analizar la duración de los episodios de empleo y desempleo y sus 
patrones y determinantes, utilizamos modelos de duración continua gracias a la 
información precisa de la fecha de inicio y finalización de los episodios10. 
Estimamos un modelo mixto de riesgos proporcionales (MPHM) con 
heterogeneidad no observada compartida (shared frailty) para un único riesgo 
(cualquier salida) y con heterogeneidad no observada potencialmente 
correlacionada con distribución discreta para riesgos en competencia 
(distinguiendo por tipo de salida). La distribución discreta (mass points) 
proporciona una forma computacionalmente atractiva de considerar la 
                                                        
10 Royalty (1998) destaca que una ventaja de los modelos de duración continua es el hecho de que los 
resultados son independientes del intervalo de tiempo considerado. 
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correlación entre los términos de la heterogeneidad no observada de las  
diferentes salidas. Las variables explicativas incluyen las características 
individuales y de empleo, así como la tasa de paro regional. Con el fin de captar 
el efecto del ciclo económico, en el segundo y tercer capítulo, estimamos un 
modelo para cada período económico. En el Capítulo 4, incluimos variables 
ficticias (dummies) para cada año, asumiendo que el riesgo base (baseline 
hazard) y que los coeficientes de las características son constantes en el tiempo. 
En el segundo y tercer capítulo aplicamos la descomposición no lineal de tipo 
Oaxaca-Blinder con el fin de descomponer las diferencias en las duraciones de 
desempleo o  empleo en dos periodos económicos  en: diferencias debidas a la 
composición de la muestra y los cambios residuales inducidos por el cambio de 
las condiciones económicas. Análogamente, el cuarto capítulo incluye una 
descomposición de las diferencias de género de los eventos analizados para dos 
períodos económicos. 
El objetivo de empleo de la Estrategia Europa 2020: "El 75% de la 
población de entre 20 y 64 años de edad debe estar empleada" enfatiza la  
necesidad de analizar el desempleo a lo largo del tiempo. Para entender la tasa 
de desempleo es importante considerar tanto la entrada como la salida del 
desempleo. En el segundo capítulo (con A. van Soest), nos centramos en el 
estudio de las salidas de los episodios de desempleo con prestación iniciados 
antes y durante la crisis mediante la vía de encontrar un trabajo, ya que las 
probabilidades de re-emplearse determinan la duración del desempleo. El 
desempleo de larga duración es especialmente preocupante, ya que implica una 
pérdida de capital humano, una reducción del nivel de bienestar y un aumento 
del riesgo de exclusión social11. El desempleo también tiene consecuencias 
importantes para la sostenibilidad de la Seguridad Social. En concreto, 
analizamos el impacto de la recesión actual en la duración del desempleo y sus 
determinantes mediante la comparación de las estimaciones de los episodios de 
                                                        
11 La reducción de la pobreza y la desigualdad social también están en la agenda de la Estrategia Europa 
2020. 
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desempleo iniciados en dos períodos económicos diferentes. Esto proporciona 
una información más completa que la de los estudios anteriores que capturaban 
el efecto del ciclo económico incluyendo un indicador macroeconómico. En 
línea con la fuerte dualidad  del mercado de trabajo español (empleo primario 
versus secundario), distinguimos salidas basadas en la distinción tradicional por 
tipo de contrato (temporal versus indefinido) y de forma alternativa e 
innovadora, basada en la duración ex-post del empleo   (estable versus 
inestable). Esta última distinción está motivada por el hecho de que la distinción 
por tipo de contrato podría no ser muy informativa del mercado laboral español 
actualmente, mientras que la duración del empleo es un indicador adecuado 
para operacionalizar el concepto de puesto de trabajo primario y secundario, 
dado que la duración del empleo es un indicador de la calidad del empleo. 
Los resultados muestran una reducción en la probabilidad de salir del 
desempleo para las diferentes salidas durante la crisis, particularmente fuerte 
en el primer año de desempleo, y no compensada por unas mayores tasas de 
salida después de doce meses. Existe una relación negativa de dependencia 
entre la duración y la tasa de salida del desempleo, particularmente llamativa 
en los puestos de trabajo estables y durante el período de expansión, hasta que 
la prestación por desempleo está a punto de agotarse. La descomposición 
revela que la mayor parte de las reducciones en las probabilidades de salida son 
motivadas por los efectos del ciclo económico que afecta a los trabajadores 
desempleados con determinadas características e historias en el mercado de 
trabajo. Además, hemos identificado los grupos más afectados por la crisis: 
trabajadores jóvenes, inmigrantes y las personas con baja cualificación. Durante 
la crisis, debido a la escasez de puestos de trabajo primarios, los desempleados 
con más oportunidades para trabajar en empleos primarios son más propensos 
a encontrar empleos secundarios. 
El tercer capítulo (con A. van Soest), inspirado en el objetivo de la 
Estrategia Europa 2020 "para crear más y mejores puestos de trabajo", explora  
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los cambios en la naturaleza y estabilidad de los nuevos empleos (desde el 
punto de vista del trabajador) iniciados en el periodo de auge económico (en 
2005), y en el periodo de recesión (en 2009). Con el estudio de los cambios en 
las características descriptivas (individuales, de la empresa y del puesto de 
trabajo) de los nuevos empleos, destacamos las tendencias de la oferta y la 
demanda laboral. Mediante la comparación de las estimaciones de las 
duraciones de nuevos puestos de trabajo iniciados en dos años diferentes y 
considerando diferentes estados de destino (otro empleo, el desempleo u otras 
salidas), contribuimos a la escasa literatura que estudia la naturaleza de las 
probabilidades de salida y sus determinantes en diferentes contextos 
macroeconómicos. Se presta especial atención al papel del tamaño de la 
empresa en la estabilidad laboral, dando respuesta al debate político existente 
en España sobre la necesidad de aumentar el número de empresas de mayor 
tamaño12, con el objetivo de incrementar la productividad agregada, el empleo 
estable y la penetración en los mercados extranjeros. 
El análisis descriptivo muestra una variación sustancial en las 
características de los trabajadores y de los puestos de trabajo en los nuevos 
empleos. Ambos están en línea con los desarrollos macroeconómicos antes 
mencionados. La duración de los nuevos empleos se mantiene constante a lo 
largo del ciclo económico. Esto oculta dos fuerzas opuestas que se compensan: 
por un lado la prociclicidad de las transiciones empleo-empleo y empleo-no-
empleo y el carácter anticíclico de las salidas al desempleo. A pesar de los 
cambios sustanciales en las características de los trabajadores que inician un 
nuevo empleo entre dos períodos económicos diferentes, el análisis de 
descomposición revela que la mayor parte de la variación en los patrones de 
salida del empleo (a otros empleos o al desempleo con prestación) es debido a 
los efectos del ciclo económico. 
                                                        
12 Véase, por ejemplo, Comisión Europea (2015) y el Consejo Económico Empresarial (2014). 
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Los trabajadores que inician un nuevo empleo con una mayor 
probabilidad de perder el empleo durante la crisis son: hombres jóvenes, que 
viven en regiones con altas tasas de desempleo, con baja cualificación y 
trabajando en ocupaciones manuales (principalmente en el sector de la 
construcción) e inmigrantes (principalmente hispano-hablantes). Los 
trabajadores que tienen empleos más estables son aquellos que desempeñan su 
actividad en las grandes empresas, especialmente durante la crisis. Esto 
confirma la necesidad de estimular el crecimiento del tamaño de las empresas 
españolas para aumentar la productividad y la estabilidad en el empleo. La 
asociación positiva entre la estabilidad en el empleo y trabajar en una empresa 
con una importante inversión en tecnología, también apoya las actuales 
propuestas políticas dirigidas a impulsar a las empresas a entrar en los sectores 
emergentes. 
Mientras que el segundo y tercer capítulo analizan el impacto de la crisis 
sobre el patrón y los determinantes de la duración del desempleo y la 
estabilidad en el empleo para hombres y mujeres de forma conjunta13, el cuarto 
capítulo se centra en el carácter cíclico de las tasas de riesgo de salida del 
empleo y desempleo, para hombres y mujeres por separado. 
El cuarto capítulo está motivado por la dimensión de género de la 
Estrategia Europa 202014. A pesar de las políticas de igualdad de género 
implementadas por los gobiernos en las últimas décadas en España, todavía 
existen diferencias de género.  Aquí se examinan las diferencias entre hombres 
y mujeres desempleados en: sus probabilidades de encontrar un empleo, los 
salarios iniciales (después del desempleo) y la probabilidad de volver a  la 
situación de desempleo, a lo largo del último ciclo económico. La evolución de la 
tasa de paro de hombres y mujeres muestra diferencias persistentes en el 
                                                        
13 Asumimos que el patrón de riesgo para los hombres y las mujeres son similares. Sin embargo el nivel 
es diferente (capturado por una variable ficticia). 
14 Europa 2020 reconoce un efecto nocivo de la desigualdad de género en el crecimiento económico y 
establece la igualdad de género en el trabajo y en la vida, en términos generales, como un tema 
prioritario. 
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período de expansión que caen fuertemente durante la reciente crisis 
económica. Aquí, se intenta  discernir si esta caída se debe a la convergencia de 
las probabilidades de desempleo y/o re-empleo durante la crisis y si ésta se 
acompaña de una reducción en la brecha salarial entre los hombres y mujeres 
desempleados que han encontrado un empleo. Estas diferencias de género se 
descomponen en la variación en la composición de la muestra y en los cambios 
residuales inducidos por las diferentes retribuciones a las características de los 
individuos. Pocos estudios han analizado la relación entre género y mercado de 
trabajo y sus patrones cíclicos a excepción de salarios y participación laboral. 
Contribuyo a esta literatura, identificando los flujos del mercado de trabajo que 
explican la brecha de género; explorando los cambios en las desigualdades de 
género en el mercado laboral a lo largo del ciclo económico actual; y 
determinando los factores que propician una mayor desigualdad de género. 
Tanto los flujos del desempleo al empleo como los del empleo al 
desempleo juegan un papel importante para explicar las diferencias en la tasa 
de desempleo en función del género. Las diferencias de género en el mercado 
laboral son pro-cíclicas, probablemente debido a la naturaleza pro-cíclica de las 
ocupaciones típicamente masculinas. Mientras que un mayor nivel educativo 
protege especialmente a las mujeres del desempleo, tener hijos dificulta a las 
mujeres el acceso al empleo y repercute negativamente en sus salarios iniciales 
(tras el desempleo). Existen menores diferencias de género en el sector público, 
donde las mujeres tienden a ocupar trabajos que requieren una alta 
cualificación profesional, y en las empresas de base tecnológica. La 
descomposición evidencia que las divergencias de género no se pueden explicar 
por las diferencias en la composición de la muestra, sino por las diferencias en 
la retribución de las características individuales. De hecho, si las mujeres 
presentaran características similares a los hombres, las diferencias en función 
del género serían mayores. 
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Para concluir, tanto los flujos de salida como de entrada al desempleo 
ayudan a explicar la evolución de la tasa de desempleo y sus diferencias de 
género. Como consecuencia de la crisis (no por los cambios en la composición 
de la muestra) la probabilidad de salir del desempleo al empleo se redujo 
sustancialmente durante el primer año de desempleo (en un promedio de 12 
puntos porcentuales), apreciándose una mayor movilidad entre el empleo 
primario y secundario. Además, la probabilidad de caer en desempleo aumenta 
significativamente, en promedio 17 puntos porcentuales después de un año en 
el puesto de trabajo. Otra consecuencia de la crisis es la convergencia de las 
tasas de desempleo por género, que eran típicamente más altas para las 
mujeres, debido tanto a las mayores duraciones de sus episodios de desempleo 
como a las menores duraciones de sus episodios de empleo. Esta convergencia 
parece tener su origen en el hecho de que los hombres están más concentrados 
en ocupaciones más procíclicas, lo que explica que  las caídas en las tasas de 
salida del desempleo y los aumentos en las tasas de salida del empleo sean más 
pronunciados para los hombres que para las mujeres. 
A pesar de la convergencia en las tasas de paro, las diferencias de género en 
la duración de los episodios de desempleo y en la calidad del empleo 
(aproximado mediante la duración de los episodio de trabajo y los salarios) 
siguen existiendo. Estas diferencias no se pueden atribuir a diferencias en las 
características observadas entre hombres y mujeres, sino posiblemente a las 
diferencias en las características no observadas de los trabajadores 
(productividad, motivación, intensidad en la  búsqueda de empleo) o de los 
empleadores (discriminación, discriminación estadística), que 
desafortunadamente no podemos analizar con la base de datos utilizada. 
Algunas características de las mujeres, como el nivel educativo o el tamaño de la 
empresa, contribuyen a reducir la disparidad de género en vez de a explicarla. 
Las personas más afectadas (en términos relativos) por la crisis 
financiera, aquellas que han sufrido una mayor caída en las probabilidades de 
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salir del desempleo y un mayor aumento en las probabilidades de perder el 
empleo son: los que viven en regiones con mayores tasas de desempleo, los 
hombres, los jóvenes y los trabajadores mayores, las personas con bajo nivel 
educativo, los inmigrantes (principalmente procedentes de países de habla 
hispana), los trabajadores de ocupaciones manuales, y los trabajadores del 
sector de la construcción, en línea con el carácter sectorial de esta recesión. 
Entre los factores que influyen en la incidencia del desempleo y la 
estabilidad laboral, es importante destacar que el nivel educativo protege frente 
el desempleo, sobre todo durante la recesión económica y a las mujeres. Tener 
hijos afecta negativamente al empleo y los salarios de las mujeres, teniendo un 
efecto contrario en los hombres. Entre los nuevos empleos iniciados por los 
trabajadores, aquellos en las grandes empresas son  más estables y con 
mayores salarios, y este efecto es más pronunciado durante la recesión y para 
los hombres. Lo mismo sucede con los empleos en las empresas de alta 
tecnología, aunque en este caso el efecto es más pronunciado (en términos 
relativos) para las mujeres. 
Los principales cambios encontrados en el mercado de trabajo español 
en los últimos años revelan que España se está alejando de los objetivos de 
empleo, de lucha contra la pobreza y  desigualdad social, y de calidad de los 
nuevos puestos de trabajo planteados en Europa 2020. Esto sugiere la 
necesidad de aplicar medidas correctoras. 
Europa 2020 predice una tendencia creciente en la demanda de 
trabajadores altamente cualificados y decreciente en la demanda de 
trabajadores poco cualificados, lo que deja a estos últimos en una clara posición 
de desventaja, especialmente en el periodo de recesión económica. Esto sugiere 
la necesidad de implementar políticas activas del mercado de trabajo, ajustadas 
a la situación económica, tales como programas de capacitación laboral o de 
formación en ocupaciones con alta demanda laboral. Es necesario llevar a cabo 
estas políticas con una atención especial a la participación de las mujeres, de los 
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trabajadores de más edad y de los inmigrantes para acercar la economía 
española a los objetivos de Europa 2020. 
La dimensión de género de la Estrategia Europa 2020 y la evidencia 
encontrada en cuanto a las desigualdades de género en el mercado laboral 
español también sugieren la necesidad de medidas políticas dirigidas a su 
reducción. 
Este estudio también arroja luz sobre el actual debate político en España 
relativo a la necesidad de estimular el crecimiento del tamaño de las empresas, 
para aumentar la productividad y la estabilidad laboral, e incentivar a las 
empresas a entrar en nuevos sectores emergentes, en línea con la Estrategia de 
Europa 2020 de un crecimiento sostenible. En base a la asociación positiva entre 
el tamaño de la empresa y la estabilidad laboral, las políticas no sólo deben 
centrarse en la creación de nuevas (y pequeñas) empresas sino también en 
estimular a estas empresas a crecer y estabilizarse. Sin embargo, las grandes 
empresas también muestran mayores diferencias de género en la estabilidad 
laboral y los salarios, por lo que los incentivos para que las empresas crezcan en 
tamaño deben de ir acompañados de políticas de igualdad de género. Políticas 
potenciales (dada la limitación en la distinción entre oferta y demanda) 
consistirían en incentivar la participación de más mujeres en puestos de 
responsabilidad, ofrecerles formación continua en la empresa, y aplicar políticas 
dirigidas a conciliar el trabajo y la familia , como un horario de trabajo flexible , 
trabajar desde casa y  mejorar los condiciones de los contratos a tiempo parcial. 
Nuestros resultados también refuerzan el objetivo de impulsar a las 
empresas a entrar en nuevos sectores emergentes y aumentar la 
representación de las mujeres en sectores TIC en línea con la dimensión de 
género de Europa 2020. Otras políticas en esta dirección serían necesarias, tales 
como  incentivar a los solicitantes de empleo a entrar en los sectores 
emergentes, especialmente a las mujeres, mejorar la formación en las TIC de 
  
24 
acuerdo a las demandas de las empresas y apoyar la innovación y las 
inversiones en TIC de las PYMES. 
Desde el punto de vista de las políticas, este estudio tiene la limitación de 
que los factores de demanda y de oferta no se pueden identificar. Como 
consecuencia, no siempre podemos distinguir las razones que hay detrás de los 
procesos de búsqueda y pérdida del empleo. Un análisis más estructural sería 
necesario, probablemente, incorporando información sobre la búsqueda de 
empleo (que no está disponible en nuestros registros administrativos), con el fin 
de sugerir medidas políticas más específicas. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
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1. Introduction 
 
The three essays in this dissertation deal with the impact of the Great 
Recession on individual employment and unemployment transitions in Spain 
from a microeconomic perspective. The Great Recession has led to important 
adjustments in the labour market of most developed countries and has 
dramatically affected the labour market in Spain15, which exhibits higher job 
destruction and lower job creation rates than other European countries. 
According to the Spanish Labour Force Survey, the Spanish unemployment rate 
has increased drastically from 8.5% in 2006 to 25% in 2012. Here, we explore 
individual labour market flows and their determinants to better understand the 
unemployment rate in the current business cycle.  
The financial crisis precipitated the burst of the housing bubble16, and 
consequently hit hardest the construction sector, characterized by a high 
concentration of men, low educated workers, many immigrants, and many 
temporary contracts. As a consequence, during the crisis there was an implicit 
reallocation of resources towards tradable sectors. Moreover, the financial crisis 
caused a credit contraction, reducing the funding of the private sector and 
hindering the creation and survival of businesses, also affecting other industries.  
In a first stage of the crisis, the share of temporary employment 
decreased, due to labour market adjustment via firing workers with fixed-term 
contracts. However, in a second stage of the crisis, the share of temporary 
                                                        
15 See Jaumotte (2011) for differences in labour market institutions and policies between Spain and 
other EU15 countries. 
16 The cumulative fall in housing prices between Q3-2007 and Q1-2014 amounted to 36.2%. 
  
28 
contracts and part time employment17 has broadened, because of new hirings 
via fixed-term contracts and layoffs of permanent workers. Moreover, the net 
migration flows18 exhibited a sustained increase, but during the recession they 
decreased and from 2010 they turned negative.  
On the other hand, the competitiveness gains derived from price and 
wage moderation and a trend towards exports of products of medium and 
medium low quality during the crisis, lead to a positive (and better than in other 
European countries) export performance of large Spanish firms. Moreover, the 
presence of small Spanish firms19 (typically less productive) in foreign markets 
increased during the crisis, but small and medium size enterprises (SME’s) 
performed below the EU average in terms of product/process innovation 
according to the European Commission 2014 Innovation Union Scoreboard.  
Attempting to reduce the high unemployment rate, two relevant labour 
market reforms were approved in the last years. The 2010 labour market reform 
deals with the lack of internal and external flexibility. This reform aims to 
increase the external flexibility via reducing the labour market duality. 
Establishing limits to the duration of fixed-term contracts for a specific project 
or service (“contrato por obra o servicio”) and the use of consecutive fixed-term 
contracts, it extends the possibilities of conversion of fixed-term contracts into 
permanent contracts, increases the severance payment for the termination of 
fixed-term contracts and reduces it for new permanent contracts, and makes 
dismissal of permanent contracts less costly and more affordable for employers. 
To increase the internal flexibility, the reform provides the possibility to ignore 
the collective agreements of firms in economic difficulties and boosts working 
hours adjustments and temporary suspension of contracts as well as geographic 
mobility.   
                                                        
17 66% of part-time workers declared to be involuntary in 2013 OECD Statistics. 
18 Net migration is the total annual number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants 
19 According to European Commission (2015) over 90% of firms in Spain are micro-firms (less than 9 
employees). More than half of workers in Spain are employed in small companies (below 50 employees) 
compared to 23% in Germany and 32% in France.  
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The 2012 reform20 aims to increase the labour market flexibility and to 
boost new hires mainly among youth and the long term unemployed. This 
reform attempts to increase labour, in line with the 2010 reform, by making 
economic dismissals easier and less costly, and by making working conditions, 
such as working hours, wages, and geographical and professional mobility, 
easier to modify. The latter is addressed through the possibility of ignoring the 
collective agreements (less restrictions than with 2010 reform) and by unilateral 
decisions of employers justified by productivity or technical organization. 
Among the measures focused on boosting new hires we find: the possibility of 
using consecutive apprenticeship contracts for workers younger than 30 years 
old, hiring discounts for youth and long-term unemployed, and more flexibility 
into part-time jobs. 
In this context, this thesis addresses relevant research questions for 
policymakers in line with the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy, both in 
terms of employment and gender equality. Chapter 2 focuses on exits from 
unemployment benefit spells starting before and during the crisis via finding a 
job. Chapter 3 analyses the shifts in the nature and stability of new job matches 
starting in two different economic periods. Finally, chapter 4 shows gender 
differences in unemployment exits and re-entries and initial wages after an 
unemployment spell over the period 2002-2013. The dataset used and the 
econometric framework are common for these three chapters.  
An important ingredient of this study is the use of an administrative 
dataset, the Longitudinal Working Lives Sample21 (LWLS), from the Spanish 
Social Security Administration (SSA). LWLS is collected annually since 2004 and 
contains information on a four percent random sample of the population who 
                                                        
20 A preliminary study (OECD, 2014) shows the preliminary effects of the reform 2012 on unemployment 
flows. The results reveal a reduction of the duration of unemployment spells, essentially due to faster 
transitions towards a permanent contract (concentrated in small and medium sized firms) and a 
reduction in separations, particularly for temporary workers.  
21 Rebollo (2012) points out that the use of an administrative dataset in this type of analysis avoids the 
seam bias associated with misreported transitions. 
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ever had any relationship with the SSA in the sample period 22 . It is 
representative of the year of the sample. It has approximately one million 
people. Individuals in the 2004 LWLS remain in the sample as long as they have 
a relationship with SSA. It contains personal information, such as gender, age, 
nationality, level of education, etc. and information on labour market histories23 
of the population who have ever worked, such as exact dates of entry and exit 
from employment and from unemployment with benefits, firm characteristics, 
type of contract, etc. From 2004 onward annual wages are available for most 
workers. Thus, the longitudinal design of this dataset and the rich information 
that it contains allow us to study accurately employment and unemployment 
transitions and their determinants over time. To ensure the representativeness 
of our samples for each year of the period under study, we merge the 
corresponding LWLS. Since the LWLS only includes individuals with some 
relationship with SSA, we cannot distinguish unemployment without benefits 
and non-participation, so in order to avoid making assumptions that might bias 
the results, for studying unemployment durations we focus on the spells with 
unemployment benefits (contributory or not). The amount of unemployment 
benefits and the entitlement periods are not available in this dataset, although 
they could be approximated. We do not consider workers from the agriculture 
sector because of the deviating rules in this sector. Moreover, to avoid left 
censoring we consider the employment or unemployment spells starting in a 
specific period. It is important to note that the selected samples for each 
chapter do not cover the whole population, but certain groups of individuals, 
such as workers starting a new job or workers becoming unemployed with 
unemployment benefits in a specific year. Therefore this dissertation does not 
provide a complete picture of the whole workforce. 
                                                        
22 As a consequence, civil servants are not included. 
23 Historical information is reliable since 1990. 
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To analyse the durations of the employment and unemployment spells 
and their patterns and determinants, we use continuous duration models24 
thanks to the precise information on the starting and ending dates of the spells. 
We estimate a Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPHM) Model with shared frailty for 
a single risk (any exit) and for competing risks (distinguishing by type of exit) 
with potentially correlated frailties under a discrete distribution. Discrete mass 
points provides a computationally attractive way to consider correlation 
between unobserved heterogeneity terms of different exits. The explanatory 
variables include individual and job characteristics and the regional 
unemployment rate. In order to capture the business cycle effect, in the second 
and third chapter, we estimate a model for each economic period. In Chapter 4, 
we include time dummies, assuming that the baseline hazard and the returns to 
the characteristics are constant over time. In the second and third chapter we 
apply non-linear decompositions of Oaxaca-Blinder type to disentangle 
differences in unemployment or job duration in their sample composition and 
residual changes induced by changing economic conditions. Analogously, the 
fourth chapter includes a decomposition of gender differences in the events 
analysed for two economic periods.  
The objective of employment of the Europe 2020 Strategy: “75% of the 
population aged 20-64 should be employed” emphasizes the necessity of 
analysing unemployment over time. In order to understand the unemployment 
rate it is important to consider both entry into and exit out of unemployment. In 
the second chapter (with A. van Soest), we focus on exits of unemployment 
benefit spells starting before and during the crisis via finding a job, since the re-
employment probabilities determine the duration of unemployment. Long 
unemployment spells are especially worrying since they imply a loss of human 
capital, reducing welfare and increasing the risk of social exclusion 25 . 
                                                        
24 Royalty (1998) points out as an advantage of the continuous duration models the fact that the results 
do not depend on the considered time interval. 
25 The reduction of poverty and social inequality is also in the agenda of Europe 2020 Strategy. 
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Unemployment also has important consequences for Social Security 
sustainability. Specifically, we analyse the impact of the current recession on 
unemployment duration spells and their determinants by comparing the 
estimations of unemployment spells starting in two different economic periods. 
This provides a richer insight than previous studies capturing the business cycle 
effect just including a macroeconomic indicator. In line with the duality (primary 
vs. secondary) of the Spanish labour market, we distinguish exits based on the 
traditional exit by type of contract (temporary vs. permanent jobs) and 
alternatively and in an innovative way, based on ex-post job duration, to stable 
and unstable jobs. The latter is motivated by the fact that the distinction by type 
of contract might not be so informative in the Spanish labour market anymore 
and job duration is a good proxy to operationalize the concept of primary and 
secondary jobs since job duration is a proxy for job quality. 
The results show a reduction in the unemployment hazard for different 
exits in the downturn, particularly strong in the first year of the spell and not 
compensated by higher hazard rates after twelve months. Negative duration 
dependence of the hazard is found particularly for stable jobs in the expansion 
period, until the unemployment benefit is about to expire. Decompositions 
reveal that most of the reductions in exit probabilities are business cycle effects 
applying to unemployed individuals with given characteristics and labour 
market histories. In addition, we identify the groups most affected by the crisis, 
such as young workers, immigrants and individuals with low qualifications. 
During the crisis, because of the scarcity of primary jobs, unemployed with 
more chances to work in core jobs also become more likely to exit into 
secondary jobs. 
The third chapter (with A. van Soest), inspired by the goal of Europe 2020 
Strategy “to create more and better jobs”, explores shifts in the nature and 
stability of new job matches (from the point of view of the worker) starting 
during the economic boom in 2005, and during the recession in 2009. By 
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studying the changes in the descriptive (individual, firm and job) characteristics 
of those new job matches, we point out the trends in the labour supply and 
demand. By comparing the estimations of new jobs’ durations starting in two 
different years and considering different destination states (other job, 
unemployment and other exits), we contribute to the scarce literature on the 
nature of job exit probabilities and their determinants in different macro-
economic contexts. Special attention is given to the role of firm size on job 
stability responding to the current policy debate in Spain on the necessity of 
larger firms26 to increase aggregate productivity, stable employment, and the 
penetration in foreign markets.  
The descriptive analysis reveals substantial variation in the characteristics 
of both workers and jobs in new job matches. They are in line with the 
macroeconomic developments aforementioned. The duration of new jobs 
remains steady over the business cycle. This hides two opposite forces that 
cancel out: the pro-cyclicality of job turnover and job-to-non-employment 
transitions, and the counter-cyclical nature of exits into unemployment. In spite 
of the substantial changes in the characteristics of job starters between two 
different economic periods, the decomposition analysis reveals that most of the 
variation in job exit patterns (to other jobs or unemployment with benefits) is 
due to business cycle effects.  
 Job starters who suffer most from the increase in the probability to 
become unemployed during the economic crisis tend to be young males, living 
in regions with high unemployment rates, with low qualifications and working in 
manual occupations (particularly construction), and (especially Spanish 
speaking) immigrants. New job starters have more stable jobs in large firms, 
especially during the downturn. This confirms the necessity of stimulating the 
growth of Spanish firm size to increase productivity and employment stability. 
The positive association between job stability and working in a high technology 
                                                        
26 See for instance, European Commission (2015) and Consejo Económico Empresarial (2014). 
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firm also supports the current policy proposals aimed at boosting firms to enter 
into new emerging sectors. 
While the second and third chapter analyse the impact of the crisis on 
the pattern and determinants of unemployment duration and job stability for 
men and women jointly27, the fourth chapter focuses on the cyclicality of 
unemployment and employment hazard rates, for men and women separately. 
The fourth chapter is motivated by the gender dimension in the Europe 
2020 Strategy28.  In spite of gender equality policy measures implemented by 
governments in the last decades in Spain, gender differences still exist. I 
examine differences between unemployed men and women in: their 
probabilities to find a job, the initial wages they reach, and the likelihood to fall 
back into unemployment over the business cycle. The evolution of gender 
differentials in the unemployment rate shows persistent differences in the 
expansion period that decline strongly during the recent economic crisis. I try to 
disentangle whether this decline stems from the convergence of unemployment 
and/or re-employment probabilities during the crisis and analyse if this is 
accompanied by a reduction in the gender gap in the initial wages of the 
unemployed who have found a job. These gender differences are decomposed 
into variation in the sample composition and residual changes induced by 
different returns to the characteristics. Few studies have analysed the 
relationship between gender and labour market outcomes and their cyclical 
patterns other than wages and labour market participation. I contribute to this 
literature by identifying the labour market flows accounting for the gender gap; 
exploring the changes of gender inequalities in the labour market outcomes 
over the current business cycle; and finding the factors that contribute to more 
gender inequality.  
                                                        
27  We assume that the pattern of the hazard for men and women are similar but the level is different 
(captured by the male dummy). 
28 Europe 2020 recognises the detrimental effect of gender inequality on economic growth and 
establish gender equality in work and life as a priority issue. 
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Both the flows from unemployment to employment and vice versa play a 
role in explaining the gender gaps in the unemployment rate. Gender 
differentials in labour market outcomes are pro-cyclical, probably due to the 
pro-cyclical nature of typically male occupations. While a higher level of 
education protects specially women from unemployment, having children 
hampers women’s employment and initial wages after unemployment. There 
are lower gender gaps in the public sector, where women tend to be more 
concentrated in jobs requiring high qualifications, and in firms intensive in high 
technology. Decompositions show that the gender gaps are not explained at all 
by differences in sample composition but in their returns. Indeed if women had 
similar characteristics to men, the gender gap would be even wider. 
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Chapter 2 
Unemployment Exits Before and During the Crisis 
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2.  Unemployment Exits Before and During the Crisis 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The current economic recession in Spain has led to important 
adjustments in the labour market, with a reduction of working hours and the 
dismissal of many workers. The case of Spain is particularly dramatic compared 
to many other countries that suffered from the crisis. According to the Spanish 
Labour Force Survey (SLFS), the Spanish unemployment rate has increased from 
8.5% in 2006 to 25% in 2012. Young workers are specially affected, with the 
youth unemployment rate reaching 55% by the end of 2012. The long-term 
unemployment rate rose from 2% in 2006 to 14% by the end of 2012. This is 
specifically worrying since long-term unemployment implies a loss of human 
capital, reducing welfare and increasing the risk of social exclusion. 
Unemployment also has important consequences for Social Security 
sustainability, reducing contributions and increasing the amount of benefits to 
be paid. 
In order to understand the unemployment rate it is important to consider 
both entry into and exit out of unemployment. In this study we focus on exits 
from unemployment benefit spells via finding a job before and during the crisis, 
since the re-employment probability determines the duration of unemployment 
benefit spells. This fits with many micro-economic studies on how changes in 
the business cycle affect re-employment probabilities, mainly analysing the 
determinants of the length of individual unemployment spells. Such studies 
usually control for the business cycle by including the current local 
unemployment rate as an explanatory variable (see van den Berg, 2001, for a 
review). Arulampalam and Stewart (1995), on the other hand, look at the 
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impact of the business cycle in a comparative analysis using two inflow cohorts 
at very different points in time.  
Job search theory gives an ambiguous prediction of the relationship 
between the business cycle and the duration of unemployment. Increases in 
unemployment will reduce the reservation wage but also the probability of 
receiving a job offer. Lynch (1989) and Dynarski and Sheffrin (1990) found that 
higher unemployment results in lower re-employment probabilities. On the 
other hand, the models of Meyer (1990) and Solon (1985) suggest that the 
average duration of unemployment falls in a recession.   
The Spanish labour market is characterized by strong duality: There is an 
important gap between an insider group of workers with stable permanent 
(‘primary’) jobs and an outsider group of workers with unstable non-permanent 
(‘secondary’) jobs, with poorer working conditions and lower dismissals costs 
(Alba, 1998; Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 2011). 
This duality started with a reform in 1984 that introduced flexibility in hiring 
through fixed-term contracts without modifying the regulation of secure 
permanent employment (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994).  
Traditionally, labour market duality has been identified with the type of 
contract - either permanent or fixed-term. Indeed, Bover and Gómez (2004) 
investigate the determinants of exit rates from unemployment to permanent 
and temporary jobs and find important differences between the two exit 
patterns. Arranz et al. (2010) use a competing risk model to analyse the exit 
from unemployment to permanent jobs, temporary jobs, self-employment and 
inactivity. This distinction, however, may not be so informative anymore in the 
Spanish context.  On the one hand, recent regulations, particularly related to 
bonuses in Social Security quotas to promote permanent contracts are 
undermining the concept of a permanent contract. Toharia and Cebrian (2007) 
show that 41% of new permanent contracts in 2004 had already ended by 
October 1, 2005. García-Serrano (2004) found that firms use temporary 
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contracts to reduce production costs of permanent activities. In spite of this, 
there are still reasons to expect important differences between jobs that last 
only a short period and jobs that ex post appear to be permanent. Boockmann 
and Steffes (2005), using German data, found segmentation within companies 
based on job duration, with significantly shorter job durations for lower 
qualified workers.  Toharia and Malo (2009) argue that large firms in Spain 
segment workers depending on the worker productivity. Firms try to retain the 
more productive workers, whose working conditions tend to be better.  
In this study, we therefore not only distinguish between jobs with 
temporary and permanent contracts, but also define primary and secondary 
jobs on the basis of job duration, distinguishing “stable” jobs with a duration of 
three months or longer and “unstable” jobs that last less than three months. 
This means the type of job is defined ex post, in line with existing studies by 
Cockx and Picchio (2012) for Belgium and Albert et al. (2008) and Casquero et al. 
(2010) for Spain. When an individual accepts a job, the characteristics of that 
job determine the likelihood that it ends within three months. Ideally, the 
distinction between primary and secondary jobs would be based upon these 
characteristics, but many of these are not observed (perhaps not even to the 
worker). Still, we expect that operationalizing the concept of primary and 
secondary jobs through job duration is useful, since job quality and duration will 
be positively correlated. The threshold of three months gives approximately 
equal numbers of spells ending in stable and unstable jobs.29  
We compare unemployment duration patterns and their determinants in 
two time periods, a period of expansion (2005-2007) and the recent recession 
(2009-2011). We focus on exploring the factors that determine the hazards of 
unemployment exits to permanent and temporary job and to stable and 
unstable jobs, where we consider personal characteristics, characteristics of the 
                                                        
29 Cockx and Picchio (2012) consider the case of Belgium during a time period when jobs typically lasted 
much longer, and used a duration cut-off of one year.  Casquero et al. (2010) and Albert el al. (2008) 
analyse the influence of education on the probability of finding a significant job, defined by Eurostat as a 
job of at least 20 hours per week and at least 6 months. 
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previous employment relation, and macroeconomic conditions. This will show 
which groups of unemployed suffered most from the crisis in terms of reduced 
re-employment probabilities, groups that can then potentially be targeted by 
Workers’ Protection systems and active labour market policies.   
The data we used come from the Longitudinal Working Lives Sample, 
based upon administrative records from the Spanish Social Security 
Administration. It contains detailed information on employment and 
unemployment transitions, individual and job characteristics. We construct two 
separate samples that include all the unemployment benefit spells (including 
multiple spells of the same individuals following Imbens and Lynch, 2006) that 
started in the calendar years 2005 and 2009, and we observe the individuals 
who enter unemployment in these years until the exit of their unemployment 
benefit spell or the end of the observation period - 30 September 2011 for the 
2009 data and, to increase comparability, 30 September 2007 for the 2005 data. 
Thus we avoid left-censoring, but do have a limited number of long right 
censored unemployment spells. 
For both samples, we estimate Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) Models 
with shared frailty for a single risk (exit to any job) and for competing risks 
(permanent versus temporary, and stable versus unstable) with potentially 
correlated frailties. The explanatory variables include individual characteristics, 
variables that relate to the individual’s labour market history, and the regional 
unemployment rate.  
The average characteristics of workers who become unemployed in 2005 
and 2009 differ significantly, but a decomposition analysis on the basis of the 
competing risks models shows that this does not explain the changes in hazard 
rates and unemployment durations. Instead, groups of unemployed individuals 
with given characteristics have become less likely to find a job. Comparing the 
parameter estimates for the two data sets shows for which groups the 
probabilities to find a given type of job has fallen.  
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly 
explains the main characteristics of the unemployment benefit system in Spain. 
Section 3  describes the data. In section 4 we present the econometric 
framework of unemployment durations. Section 5 provides the main results. 
Conclusions are drawn in section 6. 
 
2.2 The Unemployment Benefit System in Spain 
Since we consider individuals receiving unemployment benefits, it is 
relevant to summarize the main aspects of Spanish unemployment benefits (not 
considering agricultural workers who have a different arrangement) for the 
period under study, 2005-2011.30  The system provides coverage to wage 
workers (excluding civil servants and domestic employees) who lost their job, 
are willing to work, and have a minimum period of contributions to the Social 
Security System. There are two levels of protection: contributory 
(Unemployment Insurance Benefit, UIB) and assistance (Unemployment 
Assistance Benefit, UAB). UIB is based on the actuarial and financial principles 
and covers unemployed workers who contributed for at least 12 months in the 
last six years preceding unemployment. On the other hand, UAB is a means-
tested benefit available to unemployed workers who are not entitled to UIB, 
because they do not satisfy the requirements or because their UIB period has 
expired. The minimum period of contribution required in this case is three 
months in the last six years. UIB duration increases with the contribution 
record, with approximately one month of benefits for three months of 
contributions and a minimum of four and a maximum of 24 months. The UIB 
amount includes contributions to old age pensions (largely paid by the Public 
Employment Service, SPEE) and is equal to 70% (during the first 180 days) or 
60% (from the 181st day) of the average daily contributory base, calculated on 
contributions made during the 180 days prior to unemployment. The amount of 
                                                        
30 The main legislation reference for the period under study is the Royal Legislative Decree No 1/1994 of 
20 June.   
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benefits is related to the wage level prior to unemployment, with maximum and 
minimum amounts that depend on the number of dependants below age 26. 
For instance, the monthly UIB amount in 2005 was between €438.48 (no 
dependent children) and €1,233.23 (two or more dependent children). The 
amount of the UAB is not related to the previous wage; it was €376 in 2005. The 
benefit duration depends on the family responsibilities, the age of the recipient, 
and the length of the contributory period in the last six years. 
Table 1 summarizes the unemployment benefit duration for both UIB and 
UAB. For instance, the unemployment benefit duration is between 3 and 60 
months for an unemployed worker more than 44 years old with family 
responsibilities. If the unemployed worker is older than 52 years old and 
entitled to an old age pension, the unemployment benefit may last until the age 
of retirement.31 
 
Table 1: Duration of unemployment benefits  (UIB and UAB)  
N. of months 
contributed in 
the last six years 
(tenure) 
Contributory 
Unemployment 
Benefits (months) 
Assistance Benefits 
With family responsibilities  Without family responsibilities 
Younger than 
45 years old 
Older than 
44 years old 
Younger than 
45 years old 
Older than 
44 years old 
3 - 3 3 - - 
4 - 4 4 - - 
5 - 5 5 - - 
6-11 - 21 21 6 6 
12-17 4 18 24 - 6 
18-71 
2 x 
integer(tenure/6)= 
6,8,10…22 
24 30 - 6 
72 24 24 36 - 6 
Older 52 years - Until the age of retirement 
Others (*) - 6, 12  or 18 
Source: Own elaboration from Toharia et al. (2010)  
(*) returning emigrants, released from prison,  disabled but able to work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
31 Several changes were made in the reform of July 2012 (after our observation window), making the 
system less generous.   
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2.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
The data we use come from the Longitudinal Working Lives Sample32 (LWLS) 
based upon administrative records from the Spanish Social Security 
Administration (SSA). The LWLS is collected annually since 2004 and contains 
information on a four percent random sample of the population who ever had 
any relationship with the SSA in the sample period, paying contributions or 
receiving benefits. It has approximately one million people. Individuals in the 
2004 LWLS remain in the sample as long as they have a relationship with SSA. It 
contains information on the labour market histories of the part of the adult 
population who have ever worked. This database is useful for our study because 
of its longitudinal design and the rich information on employment and 
unemployment transitions, individual characteristics, and job characteristics.  
LWLS provides information on individual characteristics such as gender, age, 
and nationality, firm and job attributes such as firm size, sector of activity, and 
type of contract, as well as information related to contributory and non-
contributory benefits. It therefore allows us to analyse how the probabilities 
that jobseekers find work correlate with individual characteristics, benefit 
receipt, and characteristics of the job that preceded the unemployment spell. 
To compare the durations of unemployment spells in an expansion and a 
recession period, we construct two samples that include all the unemployment 
spells with any kind of benefits (including multiple spells of the same 
individuals) that started in 2005 and in 2009, observing them until either 
benefits expire or the observation period ends. The latter is 30 September 2011 
for the 2009 data and, to increase comparability, set to 30 September 2007 for 
the 2005 data.  
We apply several filters to our samples, described in detail in Appendix Table 
A1. For instance, we remove individuals with incomplete information and drop 
overlapping spells. In addition, we do not consider workers from the agricultural 
                                                        
32 For a detailed description of this data set, see Duran (2007), García-Perez (2008) and Lapuerta (2010). 
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sector, because of specific benefit arrangements in this sector (the “Agrarian 
Special Regime”).  
As explained in Section 1, we distinguish between unemployment exits to 
jobs with temporary and permanent contracts and between exits to stable and 
unstable jobs, where we define a stable job as a job that lasts for at least three 
months with the same company, including self-employment. In LWLS, about 
40% of all new contracts starting in 2005 or 2009 have a duration shorter than 
three months, suggesting that there is a significant flow of workers with high job 
turnover and unstable careers.  
Our definition of unemployment spell is restricted to spells with receipt of 
benefits. Given that LWLS does not include information on spells of individuals 
without relationship with SSA, we cannot identify activity or inactivity when 
benefits are exhausted and the individual has not found a job. The length of the 
unemployment benefit spell is measured as the difference (in days) between 
the date of entry into unemployment and the transition from unemployment to 
employment. If at the end of the observation period the worker is still receiving 
unemployment benefits, the spell is right-censored. Any exit other than finding 
a job is also treated as right-censoring. 
 
2.3.1 Descriptive analysis  
Our samples consist of 75,817 individuals with 91,787 unemployment 
spells in 2005, and 124,486 individuals with 158,363 unemployment spells in 
2009. The difference between the two years reflects the large increase of the 
number of transitions into unemployment between 2005 and 2009. The Kaplan 
Meier survival functions in Figure 1 show the probability of not having found a 
job as a function of spell duration t for men and women. During the crisis the 
median unemployment duration has increased, from 110 days in 2005 to 240 
days in 2009 for males, and from 150 to 240 days for females.  
Figure 2 shows Kaplan Meier survival functions for exits to stable and 
unstable jobs by gender (treating transitions to the other type of job as right-
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censored). Exits to stable as well as unstable jobs are less likely in 2009 than in 
2005 for both men and women. The largest difference is found for stable jobs of 
men. For example, the probability that an unemployed man found a stable job 
within a year fell from 61% in 2005 to 45% in 2009. For an unemployed woman, 
the same probability fell from about 52% to about 45%. Thus women had lower 
chances than men to find a stable job before the crisis but similar chances 
during the crisis. The probability to find an unstable job within a year fell less 
dramatically,  from 45% to 39% for men and from 37% to 31% for women.  
 
Figure 1: Kaplan Meier Survival estimates; exits from unemployment to any 
job. 2005 and 2009 samples. Durations in days.  
 
Source: Own elaboration from LWLS. 
 
Figure 2: Kaplan Meier Survival estimates; exits from unemployment to stable 
and unstable jobs by gender. 2005 and 2009 samples.  Durations in days.  
Source: Own elaboration from LWLS. 
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The Kaplan-Meier Survival estimates by type of contract in Figure 3 show 
that exits to fixed-term contracts are much more likely than exits to jobs with 
permanent contracts, both in the expansion and recession periods. This implies 
that the shape of the overall  survival function is largely determined by exits to 
fixed-term contracts. In both samples, females are more likely to find a 
permanent job than males, but males have better chances to get a job with a 
fixed-term contract.  
 
Figure 3: Survival Function estimates; exits from unemployment to temporary 
and permanent jobs 
 
Source: Own elaboration from LWLS; Kaplan Meier estimates 
 
The estimated hazard rates corresponding to these survival functions are 
sketched in Figures 4, 5 and 6. The estimates use the Kernel smoothing method; 
the empirical hazard rate at time t is the proportion of individuals unemployed 
for t days that find a job on day t+1. Figure 4 shows that the highest impact of 
the crisis on unemployment exits is found for males, particularly in the first year 
of the spell. The hazard in Figure 4 is the sum of the hazards to stable and  
unstable jobs in Figure 5, which confirms that the largest effect of the crisis is 
for males’ transitions to stable jobs. There is a negative association between 
each hazard rate and the duration of the spell in all cases, and it is stronger for 
transitions to stable jobs in 2005 (particularly for men). An exception is the peak 
in the hazard after two years of unemployment, which corresponds to the 
maximum duration of contributory unemployment benefits (see section 2). The 
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negative associations may reflect genuine negative state dependence or 
spurious negative state dependence due to heterogeneity and the changing 
nature of the pool of unemployed over time. These explanations will be 
disentangled in the econometric model.  The negative association between 
unemployment benefits duration and hazard rates is also observed in the 
hazards of exits to permanent and temporary jobs, and it is particularly 
pronounced in exits to temporary jobs in 2005. The largest effect of the crisis is 
for males in exits to temporary jobs during the first year. Changes in the exit 
hazards to temporary as well as permanent jobs are larger for males than for 
females. 
 
Figure 4: Kaplan-Meier kernel smoothed hazard functions by gender; exits 
from unemployment to any job; 2005 and 2009 samples.  
 
Source: Own elaboration from LWLS. 
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Figure 5: Kaplan-Meier kernel smoothed hazard functions by gender; exits 
from unemployment to stable and unstable jobs, 2005 and 2009 samples.  
Source: Own elaboration from LWLS. 
Note: Durations in days. 
 
Figure 6: Kaplan-Meier kernel smoothed hazard functions by gender; exits 
from unemployment to temporary and permanent jobs, 2005 and 2009 
samples.  
 
Source: Own elaboration from LWLS. 
Note: Durations in days. 
 
According to job search theory, the probability to exit from 
unemployment into employment depends, on the one hand, on variables 
affecting the probability of receiving a job offer, such as the local 
unemployment rate  and the level of education, and on the other hand on 
variables driving the probability to accept an offer, such as family 
circumstances. We therefore consider several types of explanatory variables: 
personal characteristics, regional unemployment rates, and previous job and 
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labour market history variables. The (quarterly) regional unemployment rate 
comes from the Spanish Labour Force Survey; all other variables come from 
LWLS. Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
in both samples. For all these variables, the sample means in the two samples 
are significantly different from each other.  
The average age at the time of becoming unemployed is about 37 years 
in both samples. During our observation window unemployed workers older 
than 51 years who satisfy all the requirements for a retirement pension were 
elegible to receive UAB until rement age. We therefore expect a lower 
probability to find a job for this group. Only 26% of the samples have dependent 
children.  Most unemployed workers have Spanish nationality - 92% in the 2005 
sample and 83% in the 2009 sample. The proportion of non-Spanish-speaking 
unemployed immigrants increased from 5% in 2005 to 11% in 2009, while the 
fraction of Spanish-speaking immigrants increased from 3% to 6%. 
While many other studies analyze men only (for example Arulampalam 
and Stewart, 1995, and Jenkins and Garcia-Serrano, 2004), we also analyze how 
the probability of finding a job differs by gender. In 2005, about 51% of the 
sample were males, but in 2009 this proportion had risen to 57%, reflecting the 
larger growth in unemployment of males compared to females due to the crisis. 
We do not have information on formal education but use job category 
based upon the required level of skills for the job registered in the data for each 
worker, corresponding to the highest level of qualification required along their 
careers. Following Arranz and García-Serrano (2011), we create three categories 
(High-Medium-Low), defined separately for manual and non-manual 
occupations. The distribution of the workers by job category is similar in both 
samples; the largest group is medium-skilled (36%). The fraction of unemployed 
coming from a non-manual occupation rose from 55% in the 2005 sample to 
58% in the 2009 sample. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the 2005 and 2009 samples.  
  2005 2009 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Unemployment rate (quarterly) 0.096 0.043 0.2 0.054 
Male unemployment rate  (quarterly) 0.072 0.023 0.194 0.052 
Female unemployment rate of  (quarterly) 0.118 0.046 0.199 0.057 
Inhabitants>40,000 0.48 0.499 0.516 0.5 
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Male  0.51 0.5 0.57 0.5 
Age at the year of starting the unemployment spell 36.81 10.87 37.07 10.67 
Spanish native 0.92 0.27 0.83 0.38 
Spanish speaking immigrants 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.24 
Non-Spanish speaking immigrants 0.05 0.22 0.11 0.32 
Dummy dependent children 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.44 
High skilled 0.34 0.47 0.36 0.48 
Medium skilled 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 
Low skilled 0.3 0.46 0.27 0.45 
Non-manual occupation 0.55 0.5 0.58 0.49 
PREVIOUS JOB AND LABOUR MARKET HISTORY 
Construction 0.17 0.37 0.23 0.42 
Manufacturing 0.18 0.39 0.14 0.35 
Services 0.65 0.48 0.62 0.48 
Dummy previous contract was temporary 0.68 0.47 0.65 0.48 
Dummy previous contract was on-call temporary  0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 
Dummy previous contract was open-ended   0.08 0.28 0.07 0.25 
Dummy previous contract was permanent 0.16 0.36 0.21 0.41 
Dummy previous contract was part-time  0.14 0.34 0.17 0.38 
Duration of previous contract (days) 374.81 820.19 403.26 866.99 
Dummy firm size missing 0.24 0.43 0.36 0.48 
Size_1_9 in previous firm 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.4 
Size_10_19 in  previous firm 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26 
Size_20_49 in previous firm 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.29 
Size_50-249 in previous firm 0.17 0.38 0.14 0.35 
Size_250 in previous firm 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.35 
Past use of Unemployment Benefits 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.13 
Source: Own calculations using LWLS and the Economically Active Population Survey.  
Note: Variable definitions are given in Table A2 in the Appendix  
 
To account for the regional economic conditions we use the quarterly 
unemployment rate by region and gender. The average unemployment rate in 
the crisis period (20%) is on average twice that during the expansion (10%). 
Moreover, unemployment rates show important differences by region. Degree 
of urbanization is captured by a dummy for living in a larger municipality. 
Around 50% of workers live in a municipality with more than 40,000 inhabitants. 
The remaining variables refer to the unemployed worker’s last job or the 
complete labour market history. The sector of activity assigned is based on the 
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sector in which the individual has been working longest. Sectors are grouped 
into construction, services and manufacturing. Most of the workers who 
became unemployed in 2005 are from the services sector (65%). The proportion 
from the construction sector rose from 17% in the 2005 sample to 23% in the 
2009 sample - the crisis hit particularly hard in that sector, due to the burst of 
the property bubble. 
Information on the size of the firm (number of employees) is not always 
available, and we include a dummy for a missing value.33 Duration and type of 
previous contract influence how long an unemployed worker is entitled to 
benefits, but might also proxy unobserved worker characteristics affecting 
worker productivity. For example, workers with shorter contracts may be more 
likely to be less productive. The average duration of the contract in the former 
job increased from 374.8 in 2005 to 403.3 days in 2009.  
Since their introduction in 1984, fixed-term contracts are used 
extensively, representing over 25% of all employment contracts in recent years. 
Firing costs are lower for workers on fixed-term contracts than for permanent 
hires. The majority of the workers in our samples had a temporary contract 
before becoming unemployed - 84% in 2005 and 79% in 2009. Open-ended 
contracts are especially used for seasonal activities, allowing for interruptions of 
the labour relation. This type of contract is found in about 8% of the former 
jobs. The proportion of part time jobs is lower than the European average. The 
average number of former part time contracts is 14% in the 2005 sample and 
17% in the 2009 sample. 
The final variable, the past use of Unemployment Benefits, is the ratio of 
the number of days on unemployment benefits and the number of days the 
individual contributed to the unemployment benefits system. It fell from 14% in 
2005 to 12% in 2009, implying that the unemployed in the 2009 sample had 
more stable working careers.  
                                                        
33 The main reason is that the information on firm size in the LWLS of a given year is based upon 
administrative records collected in March of the next year and some firms no longer exist at that time. 
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2.4 Econometric framework 
To analyse the determinants of unemployment durations, we use both a 
single risk model (exits from an unemployment benefit spell to any job) and a 
competing risk model (distinguishing between exits to jobs with a permanent or 
a temporary contract, or between stable and unstable jobs).   
 
2.4.1 Single risk model 
Since unemployment durations are measured in days, we consider the 
duration of each unemployment spell as a continuous random variable. The 
unemployment hazard rate at duration t is the probability of leaving 
unemployment at spell length t conditional on not leaving unemployment 
earlier. Formally the hazard rate is defined as: 
h(t)=f(t)/S(t)            (1) 
Here f(t) represents the density function of the unemployment durations 
and S(t) is the survival function given by S(t)=1-F(t), where F(t) is the cumulative 
density function of the durations. The interpretation of this continuous time 
hazard rate is that the conditional probability of leaving unemployment in the 
short time interval  (t, t+Δ) is approximately h(t)Δ.  
We specify the hazard using the multiple-spell data  extension of the 
Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) model, using gap time representation: time is 
reset to zero after each event (see, e.g., van den Berg, 2001). The conditional 
hazard function evaluated at spell duration t for spell s of individual i is given by 
the product of the baseline hazard, ℎ(), an observed heterogeneity factor, 
()′	, including time-varying covariates (and excluding the intercept, as a 
normalization needed to identify the model) and an unobserved heterogeneity 
(“frailty”) component 
: 
 ℎ(|(), 
) = 
 ∙ ℎ() ∙ exp (()	)    (2) 
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We assume that the baseline hazard (ℎ()) follows an exponential 
distribution with piecewise constant duration dependence, using (mainly 
quarterly) cut-points ,  = 0, … , :  
ℎ() = ℎ,  ∈ (, ),  = 1, … ,      (3) 
This baseline hazard specification has the advantage of not imposing a 
particular functional form, thus allowing for a flexible shape of duration 
dependence.  
The main parameters of interest are in the vector 	 indicating how the 
hazard varies with observed individual characteristics and labour market history 
variables. A positive coefficient of a covariate implies that, other things being 
equal (other covariates and unobserved heterogeneity), an increase in the 
covariate increases the probability to find a job. A way to interpret the size of 
the coefficients is through the percentage change in the hazard produced by a 
one unit change in the covariate, obtained as ( − 1) ∙ 100.  
The proportional hazard assumption implies that the shape of the 
duration dependence is the same for all individuals, but so the level of the 
hazard may vary across individuals.  
We assume that all the spells of the same individual share the same 
frailty. In other words, unobserved heterogeneity is at the level of person i: 

 = 
 . Conditional on observed heterogeneity ()  and unobserved 
heterogeneity 
, different durations of the same individual are independent. 
We assume that the distribution of the frailty term 
  is Inverse-
Gaussian34 with mean normalized to 1 and finite variance . The parameter  
indicates the amount of unobserved heterogeneity and (since frailty is constant 
across spells of the same individual) may also be interpreted as a measure of 
correlation between recurrent events of the same  individuals. The choice of 
this frailty distribution is justified by the fact that it gives a higher maximum 
                                                        
34 The density is: (; ) = (2)−0.5−1.5−(−1)2/(2) 
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likelihood than other common frailty distributions. 35  Ignoring unobserved 
heterogeneity may lead to biases in the coefficients on X and would make the 
estimated duration dependence more negative (Nickell, 1979). The flexible 
baseline hazard and the inclusion of frailty in the model make it possible to 
analyse genuine duration dependence before and during the crisis. The model 
can be estimated by maximum likelihood, using standard Stata commands.  
 
2.4.2 Multiple exits: Competing risks model      
To analyse the unemployment duration pattern and the determinants of 
transitions out of unemployment into stable and unstable jobs or into 
temporary and permanent contracts, we extend the single risk model using a 
competing risks framework (see, e.g., Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002, Chapter 8). 
An unemployment spell can end with a transition to a type 1 job (j=1, say a 
stable job) or a job of type 2 (j=2, say unstable). This gives a total hazard 
   ℎ() = ℎ() + ℎ()            (4) 
Here ℎ() is the hazard to exit to any job at unemployment duration t,  
and h1(t) and h2(t) are the hazards for exits to the two competing types of jobs. 
Conditional on observed and unobserved heterogeneity, the competing risks are 
assumed to be independent. We specify the following Multivariate Mixed 
Proportional Hazard (MMPH) model with gap-time representation with hazards 
ℎ (|(), 
) for the two types of transitions j=1,2, of individual i conditional 
on observed and unobserved characteristics: 
ℎ (|(), 
) = ℎ
() ∙ exp (()	) ∙ exp(
)     (5) 
The baseline hazard for the transitions j=1,2,  ℎ
(), is specified as 
piecewise constant with mainly quarterly cut points (as for the single risk 
model). Analogous to the single risk model, the parameters of main interest are 
the vectors 	,  = 1,2, which determine how the two hazards vary with the 
                                                        
35 Estimations assuming shared frailty heterogeneity fit better than estimations under unshared frailty 
for different distributions of the unobserved heterogeneity.  
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individual characteristics. A positive coefficient of a covariate implies that, 
keeping other observed variables and the unobserved heterogeneity constant, 
an increase in the covariate raises the probability to find a type 1 (j=1) or type 2 
(j=2) job.  
The unobserved heterogeneity terms are 
. Following Heckman and 
Singer (1984), we use discrete frailty and allow   and  to be correlated. This 
discrete distribution is computationally easier than continuous distributions. 
Moreover, it is very common in the literature on labour market transitions; see, 
for instance, Bover, Arellano and Bentolila (2002), Rebollo-Sanz (2012), Arranz 
et al. (2010), or Bijwaard and Wahba (2014). 
Under a discrete frailty distribution, the population consists of several 
subpopulations with different risks. For instance, one group of motivated 
individuals could have higher exit probabilities for all types of jobs, another 
group might have very low chances of finding a job of type 1 but good prospects 
for a job of type 2, etc. The group to which an individual belongs, however, is 
never observed. The population fractions of the groups are unknown 
parameters pk.36 The number of groups is denoted by K, with ; K is also 
the number of mass points of the distribution of (, ).    
We assume that unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time (within 
and across spells of the same individual). For identification, we also assume it is 
independent of observed characteristics, the standard assumption in this kind of 
models (van den Berg, 2001). Moreover, since we do not impose a 
normalization on the baseline hazard or on ()	 , we need to impose 
E(Vj)=0:  for j=1,2 .  
                                                        
36 To ensure the probability is between zero and one we assume  =
!"# ($%)
(&∑ !"# ($*))
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The parameters are estimated jointly by Maximum Likelihood. The 
likelihood function is, under the independence assumption, the product of the 
Likelihood function of all the individuals (i), 7 = ∏ 7 . The likelihood 
contribution 7 of individual i for two competing risks (j=1,2) can be written as 
the expected value of the conditional likelihood given (, ):     7 = ∑ 9:< ⋅
7(), where  7() is the conditional likelihood contribution given  (, ) 
is equal to the kth mass point  = (, ) . This conditional likelihood 
contribution is a standard likelihood contribution in a model without 
unobserved heterogeneity; it includes the conditional density function for the 
observed exits of the completed spells and the conditional survival function for 
right-censored spells at each competing risks (j):  
7() = ∏ ∏ ℎ
?
< (|(@), 
)AB,C,D< ∙  E
FG(@), 
H (6) 
Here s=1,…,S are the spells of individual i, and I,,  is a dummy  that is 1 if spell 
s ends in a transition of type  j and 0 otherwise. Our estimates are inspired on 
the Stata code of Bijwaard (2014).  
 
2.5 Estimation results 
We estimated several specifications of the single and competing risk 
models. Tables 3, 4 and 5 present the results for our benchmark models. 
Estimates for some alternative specifications are presented in the appendix. The 
single risk benchmark model in Table 3 has a flexible piecewise constant 
baseline hazard and a shared inverse Gaussian distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity, since this specification gave a better likelihood than several 
alternatives (such as unshared distributions or a shared gamma distribution). 
For the competing risks models in Tables 4 and 5, the best likelihood is obtained 
using a discrete unobserved heterogeneity distribution with three mass 
points.37  
                                                        
37 The model with three mass points is significantly better than the model with two mass points. For the 
correlated competing risks model with four mass points we did not obtain convergence. 
  
59 
2.5.1 Coefficients on the covariates 
One of the main determinants of unemployment durations is the 
(quarterly) local unemployment rate. As expected, Table 3 shows that in a 
region with a higher unemployment rate, the probability of finding a job is 
smaller, implying longer unemployment durations. This is consistent with other 
findings for Spain like Arranz and Muro (2004), Alba et al. (2012), Arranz et al. 
(2010) and Bover et al. (2002). Other than in the UK study of Arulampalam and 
Stewart (1995), the coefficient of the unemployment rate in the single risk 
model is lower in absolute value for the recession period than during the 
expansion. Still, since unemployment rates are much higher during the 
economic downturn (Table 2), the corresponding elasticity of the hazard for the 
local unemployment rate increases in absolute value, from -0.25 in the 
expansion period to -0.39 in the downturn.  
The exit hazards to stable (Table 4) or permanent jobs (Table 5) are very 
sensitive to the regional unemployment rate, particularly in the 2005 sample, 
suggesting that during the crisis the unemployed are more willing to look for a 
primary (stable or permanent) job outside their own region. The effect of the 
local unemployment rate is smaller for the hazards to unstable and temporary 
jobs. Probably the demand side effect that there is more competition for fewer 
jobs is partly compensated by the fact that if unemployment is high, the 
willingness to accept a secondary (unstable or temporary) job is higher.38  
In line with Figure 2, men have larger hazard rates than women, 
particularly in the expansion period. An exit to any job is 30% more likely for a 
man than for an otherwise similar woman during the expansion period, and only 
17% in the recession. Similar results are found by Arranz and Muro (2004), 
Arranz et al. (2010) and in Alba et al. (2012) for exits to new jobs (not recalls). 
Tables 4 and 5 show that the difference is mainly due to larger probabilities for 
                                                        
38 The result that the hazard to a permanent job is more sensitive to local unemployment than the 
hazard to a temporary job is in line with what Arranz et al. (2010) find for females (but not for males) 
and with the findings of Bover and Goméz (2004) using sectoral unemployment and GDP growth instead 
of regional unemployment. 
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men to get a secondary (temporary or unstable) job, and that this advantage 
has fallen substantially during the recession. 
Age patterns are similar for both types of jobs except perhaps for the 
youngest age groups, who have a relatively higher probability of finding an 
unstable or temporary job. Compared to the reference group (ages 52-60), 
workers of ages 20-51 have higher exit probabilities (that rise with age), while 
the unemployed older than 61 are much less likely to find a job of whatever 
type. The lower exit rates for the 52 and older group are in line with the 
literature (Bover and Gómez, 2004; Arranz et al. 2010; Bover et al., 2002). They 
may have higher reservation wages due to accumulated labour experience 
(Folmer and van Dijk, 1988) and more difficulties to adapt to a new job 
(Narendranathan and Nickell, 1985). In addition, there may be a disincentive 
effect of the special subsidy for older unemployed until retirement age. During 
the economic crisis, the age differences are smaller, those with the highest exit 
rates - ages 16-24 and 40-51 - suffer most from the crisis. Table 5 suggests this is 
mainly due to the effect of the recession on temporary jobs – the age pattern 
for permanent jobs remains virtually the same.  
Unemployed immigrants suffer much more from the crisis than Spanish 
natives. In the expansion period Spanish speaking immigrants and particularly 
non-Spanish speaking immigrants already had lower exit  probabilities than 
comparable native workers, but during the downturn, the differences increased 
substantially. Accordingly, Arranz and Muñoz-Bullón (2013) find that non-
Spanish unemployed workers have a lower probability of being recalled. On the 
other hand, Rebollo-Sanz (2012, table A1) finds that the hazard of re-
employment is higher for immigrants. Unemployed Spanish speaking 
immigrants have similar probabilities to find an unstable job as otherwise 
similar natives in both periods, but their probability to find a stable job fell much 
more than for comparable natives. Non-Spanish speaking immigrants always 
had lower exit rates for all types of jobs, and in particular found it much harder 
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to get a temporary job during the crisis, probably because of more competition 
with other unemployed workers.      
 
Table 3: Estimation results of models with single risk (exit to any job); 2005 
and 2009 samples.  
2005 sample 2009 sample 
  Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Unemployment  rate -2.499*** (0.151) -1.973*** (0.0879) 
Male 0.262*** (0.0144) 0.159*** (0.0112) 
Aged_16_19 0.117 (0.0755) -0.0159 (0.0695) 
Aged_20_24 0.295*** (0.0276) 0.154*** (0.0232) 
Aged_25_29 0.377*** (0.0239) 0.326*** (0.0197) 
Aged_30_34 0.379*** (0.0235) 0.333*** (0.0191) 
Aged_35_39 0.401*** (0.0241) 0.315*** (0.0194) 
Aged_40_44 0.442*** (0.0248) 0.313*** (0.0201) 
Aged_45_51 0.410*** (0.0245) 0.273*** (0.0195) 
Older61 -0.699*** (0.0360) -0.546*** (0.0295) 
Spanish speaking immigrants -0.0664* (0.0341) -0.207*** (0.0206) 
Non Spanish speaking immigrants -0.236*** (0.0271) -0.447*** (0.0162) 
Dependent children 0.141*** (0.0129) 0.180*** (0.0107) 
Inhabitants>40,000 0.00215 (0.0114) -0.129*** (0.00942) 
High skilled 0.126*** (0.0153) 0.271*** (0.0134) 
Medium skilled -0.0113 (0.0138) 0.0995*** (0.0120) 
Non manual 0.0284** (0.0135) 0.0774*** (0.0120) 
Construction 0.221*** (0.0173) 0.0763*** (0.0135) 
Manufacturing 0.0806*** (0.0153) 0.113*** (0.0141) 
Firm size missing 0.0625*** (0.0163) 0.0554*** (0.0128) 
Size_10_19 0.110*** (0.0215) 0.0867*** (0.0195) 
Size_20_49 0.206*** (0.0195) 0.170*** (0.0178) 
Size_50_249 0.251*** (0.0177) 0.286*** (0.0158) 
Size_250 0.315*** (0.0189) 0.462*** (0.0167) 
Open-ended contract 1.675*** (0.0263) 1.894*** (0.0218) 
Temporary contract 0.722*** (0.0190) 0.748*** (0.0136) 
On-call contract 1.346*** (0.0273) 1.410*** (0.0209) 
Duration_1*1000 -0.17*** (9.79e-06) -0.134*** (7.02e-06) 
Part time coefficient_1 0.290*** (0.0350) 0.0947*** (0.0252) 
Past use of UB -0.499*** (0.0440) -0.977*** (0.0399) 
ln Theta -0.0343 (0.0278) 0.297*** (0.0211) 
Number of individuals 75,817 124,486 
Number of exits  58,435 93,808 
Total number of  spells 91,787 158,363 
Log Likelihood -124,903       -212,372  
Theta (parameter of inverse Gaussian) 0.97   1.35   
Notes: Single risk estimation: piecewise baseline and shared frailty assuming inverse Gaussian 
distribution for unobserved heterogeneity. Both in 2005 and 2009 LR test show that frailty is significant 
(p-value=0.000).References categories: female, low skilled level, manual occupation, Aged_52_61, 
services sector, size_1_9, permanent contract, Native Spanish. Age and quarterly unemployment rate are 
time-varying variables. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Estimation results of models with single risk (exit to any job) and 
correlated competing risks (exit to stable and unstable jobs); 2005 and 2009 
samples.  
2005 sample 2009 sample 
Stable Unstable Stable Unstable 
  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Unemployment  rate -3.781*** (0.174) -0.238 (0.220) -1.792*** (0.0922) -1.496*** (0.120) 
Male 0.176*** (0.0150) 0.329*** (0.0215) 0.111*** (0.0112) 0.123*** (0.0154) 
Aged_16_19 0.000839 (0.0923) 0.295*** (0.106) -0.103 (0.0870) 0.159* (0.0934) 
Aged_20_24 0.249*** (0.0297) 0.340*** (0.0409) 0.0948*** (0.0250) 0.275*** (0.0318) 
Aged_25_29 0.359*** (0.0250) 0.343*** (0.0356) 0.253*** (0.0207) 0.398*** (0.0272) 
Aged_30_34 0.358*** (0.0244) 0.331*** (0.0352) 0.297*** (0.0196) 0.366*** (0.0264) 
Aged_35_39 0.372*** (0.0251) 0.378*** (0.0361) 0.297*** (0.0199) 0.329*** (0.0270) 
Aged_40_44 0.387*** (0.0257) 0.436*** (0.0371) 0.299*** (0.0205) 0.340*** (0.0279) 
Aged_45_51 0.369*** (0.0254) 0.372*** (0.0370) 0.281*** (0.0199) 0.28*** (0.0274) 
Older61 -0.605*** (0.0385) -0.66*** (0.0582) -0.496*** (0.0307) -0.58*** (0.0456) 
Spanish speaking imm. -0.105*** (0.0369) 0.0593 (0.0497) -0.325*** (0.0233) -0.0320 (0.0267) 
Non Spanish speaking 
imm. -0.224*** (0.0290) -0.16*** (0.0405) -0.429*** (0.0174) -0.42*** (0.0219) 
Dependent children 0.138*** (0.0131) 0.094*** (0.0191) 0.163*** (0.0107) 0.133*** (0.0145) 
Inhabitants>40,000 -0.000919 (0.0119) 0.00258 (0.0168) -0.117*** (0.00968) -0.110*** (0.0128) 
High skilled 0.180*** (0.0160) 0.0427* (0.0224) 0.273*** (0.0140) 0.173*** (0.0182) 
Medium skilled 0.0259* (0.0146) -0.0393* (0.0203) 0.083*** (0.0126) 0.077*** (0.0162) 
Non manual 0.069*** (0.0140) -0.0134 (0.0201) 0.099*** (0.0122) 0.030* (0.0165) 
Construction 0.184*** (0.0180) 0.211*** (0.0250) -0.043*** (0.0141) 0.243*** (0.0181) 
Manufacturing 0.0273* (0.0159) 0.123*** (0.0227) -0.00922 (0.0143) 0.217*** (0.0193) 
Firm size missing -0.0110 (0.0173) 0.154*** (0.0244) -0.040*** (0.0135) 0.162*** (0.0178) 
Size_10_19 0.083*** (0.0226) 0.117*** (0.0323) 0.059*** (0.0205) 0.108*** (0.0276) 
Size_20_49 0.164*** (0.0204) 0.223*** (0.0296) 0.107*** (0.0184) 0.210*** (0.0248) 
Size_50_249 0.184*** (0.0186) 0.297*** (0.0268) 0.205*** (0.0162) 0.315*** (0.0220) 
Size_250 0.198*** (0.0199) 0.442*** (0.0279) 0.298*** (0.0171) 0.510*** (0.0229) 
Open-ended contract 1.775*** (0.0265) 0.663*** (0.0486) 1.984*** (0.0205) 1.039*** (0.0355) 
Temporary contract 0.523*** (0.0193) 0.674*** (0.0330) 0.484*** (0.0140) 0.742*** (0.0215) 
On-call contract 0.927*** (0.0292) 1.386*** (0.0422) 0.870*** (0.0224) 1.505*** (0.0291) 
Duration_1*1000 -0.055*** (8.42e-06) -0.76*** (2.79e-05) -0.047*** (6.28e-06) -0.58*** (1.74e-05) 
Part time coefficient_1 -0.0224 (0.0357) 0.809*** (0.0573) -0.0443* (0.0254) 0.678*** (0.0389) 
Past use of UB -0.638*** (0.0467) -0.106* (0.0622) -1.186*** (0.0423) -0.382*** (0.0525) 
V1  0.373*** (0.0346) 1.637*** (0.0332) 0.545*** (0.0217) 1.620*** (0.0214) 
V2  2.180*** (0.0471) 1.020*** (0.141) 3.386*** (0.0483) 0.344 (0.232) 
a1 -1.372*** (0.0753)     -1.205*** (0.0431)     
a2 -3.424*** (0.106)     -4.496*** (0.0722)     
Number of individuals 75,817     124,486     
Number of exits  34,918  23,517  52,111  41,697  
Total number of spells 91,787    158,363    
Log Likelihood -398,732    -145,054    
Note1: Correlated Competing risks estimation: piecewise baseline and discrete distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity with three mass points.E[V]=0 for both samples and two destination states. 
Note 2: For 2005 estimation, Pr(Type I)= 20%; Pr(Type II)=2%; Pr(Type III)= 78%; V3(stable)=-0.17; 
V3(unstable)=-0.45; Rho=0.68. For 2009 estimation, Pr(Type I)= 23%; Pr(Type II)=1%; Pr(Type III)=76%; 
V3(stable)=-0.2; V3(unstable)=-0.49; Rho=0.73. 
Note 3: For the reference category, see table 3.     
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Estimation results of models with correlated competing risks (exits to 
temporary and permanent jobs); 2005 and 2009 samples 
 
2005 sample 2009 sample 
Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary 
  Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Unemployment  rate -5.192*** (0.287) -1.527*** (0.168) -2.755*** (0.159) -1.494*** (0.0966) 
Male -0.0382 (0.0239) 0.358*** (0.0162) -0.0100 (0.0176) 0.182*** (0.0124) 
Aged_16_19 -0.406** (0.182) 0.276*** (0.0795) -0.0416 (0.129) 0.155** (0.0685) 
Aged_20_24 0.0680 (0.0490) 0.388*** (0.0308) -0.00882 (0.0404) 0.311*** (0.0258) 
Aged_25_29 0.208*** (0.0387) 0.449*** (0.0271) 0.179*** (0.0324) 0.444*** (0.0226) 
Aged_30_34 0.182*** (0.0373) 0.445*** (0.0267) 0.184*** (0.0308) 0.433*** (0.0221) 
Aged_35_39 0.249*** (0.0380) 0.460*** (0.0274) 0.229*** (0.0309) 0.396*** (0.0227) 
Aged_40_44 0.253*** (0.0384) 0.510*** (0.0283) 0.239*** (0.0318) 0.413*** (0.0235) 
Aged_45_51 0.266*** (0.0370) 0.451*** (0.0282) 0.257*** (0.0301) 0.325*** (0.0233) 
Older61 -0.512*** (0.0549) -0.725*** (0.0427) -0.477*** (0.0476) -0.447*** (0.0372) 
Spanish speaking  imm. -0.182*** (0.0653) -0.0205 (0.0370) -0.356*** (0.0401) -0.145*** (0.0220) 
Non Spanish speaking imm. -0.352*** (0.0521) -0.173*** (0.0293) -0.390*** (0.0291) -0.419*** (0.0176) 
Dependent children 0.150*** (0.0212) 0.125*** (0.0143) 0.168*** (0.0171) 0.172*** (0.0117) 
Inhabitants>40,000 0.125*** (0.0199) -0.0392*** (0.0125) 0.0601*** (0.0159) -0.171*** (0.0103) 
High skilled 0.0329 (0.0267) 0.176*** (0.0169) 0.174*** (0.0224) 0.290*** (0.0146) 
Medium skilled 0.00396 (0.0230) 0.00370 (0.0154) 0.0797*** (0.0192) 0.103*** (0.0132) 
Non manual 0.0473** (0.0225) 0.0553*** (0.0151) 0.0910*** (0.0190) 0.0781*** (0.0133) 
Construction -0.532*** (0.0422) 0.312*** (0.0184) -0.511*** (0.0290) 0.182*** (0.0145) 
Manufacturing 0.0315 (0.0249) 0.0584*** (0.0172) 0.0160 (0.0223) 0.110*** (0.0157) 
Firm size missing 0.0272 (0.0298) 0.0527*** (0.0179) -0.0345 (0.0230) 0.0678*** (0.0139) 
Size_10_19 0.178*** (0.0387) 0.0648*** (0.0236) 0.101*** (0.0324) 0.0735*** (0.0216) 
Size_20_49 0.270*** (0.0341) 0.154*** (0.0217) 0.196*** (0.0287) 0.152*** (0.0197) 
Size_50_249 0.237*** (0.0307) 0.209*** (0.0199) 0.246*** (0.0256) 0.262*** (0.0176) 
Size_250 0.183*** (0.0332) 0.339*** (0.0210) 0.211*** (0.0280) 0.482*** (0.0184) 
Open-ended contract 2.827*** (0.0369) -0.668*** (0.0505) 2.881*** (0.0273) -0.590*** (0.0468) 
Temporary contract 0.0472 (0.0307) 0.835*** (0.0225) -0.162*** (0.0243) 0.911*** (0.0158) 
On-call contract -0.0976 (0.0612) 1.509*** (0.0308) -0.340*** (0.0511) 1.639*** (0.0229) 
Duration_1*1000 -0.027** (1.17e-05) -0.286*** (1.36e-05) -0.088*** (1.05e-05) -0.163*** (8.42e-06) 
Part time coefficient_1 -0.0206 (0.0547) 0.336*** (0.0402) 0.0741* (0.0385) 0.0913*** (0.0288) 
Past use of UB -1.228*** (0.0810) -0.215*** (0.0482) -1.597*** (0.0723) -0.718*** (0.0438) 
V1  -0.266*** (0.0497) 0.730***  (0.0291)  -0.166*** (0.039) 0.781*** (0.0244) 
V2  2.042*** (0.0427) 1.675***  (0.0555)  1.876*** (0.0565) 2.969*** (0.0586) 
a1 -0.148* (0.0754)     0.265*** (0.046)     
a2 -2.365*** (0.0979)     -3.494*** (0.097)     
Number of individuals 74,957 74,957 122,861 122,861 
Number of exits 12,987 44,317 18,241 72,869 
Total number of  spells 90,733   155,897   
Log Likelihood -377,101.00       -631,028       
Note 1: see Note 1 from Table 4. 
Note 2: For 2005 estimation, Pr(Type I)=44%; Pr(Type II)=5%; Pr(Type III)= 51%; V3(permanent)=0.04; 
V3(temporary)=-0.79; Rho=0.16. For 2009 estimation, Pr(Type I)=56%; Pr(Type II)=1%; Pr(Type III)=43%; 
V3(stable)=0.16; V3(unstable)=-0.93; Rho=0.85. 
Note 3: For the reference category, see Table 3.    
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The influence of the level of skills on the probability of finding a job is 
ambiguous. Search theory implies that a higher level of education is associated 
with more productivity (Toharia and Cebrián, 2007), implying a higher arrival 
rate but also a higher reservation wage. Arranz and Muro (2004) find no 
significant effect of education, while according to Bover and Gómez (2004) 
having a university degree reduces the hazard to a temporary job but increases 
the hazard to a permanent job. Surprisingly, we find that higher skills have a 
stronger positive effect for temporary than for permanent jobs (Table 5). 
We find that a higher level of skills increases the probability of getting a 
job for both periods under study, but particularly during the crisis (Table 3). For 
stable jobs, the positive effects of higher skills are stronger in the crisis period 
than before the crisis (Table 4), showing that employers exploit the larger 
supply to hire more skilled workers for primary jobs. For exits to unstable jobs, 
skill level is of minor importance during the expansion, perhaps since skilled 
workers were often not willing to accept this type of jobs. In contrast, during 
the downturn, higher skills also increase the chances to get an unstable job, 
suggesting that higher skilled workers substitute low skilled workers in unstable 
jobs. These results are therefore in line with the notion that during the 
recession, job seekers reduce their requirements of the type of job they are 
willing to accept, while employers are able to select more on skills. As a 
consequence, the low skilled unemployed suffer more from the crisis than those 
with higher skills. Accordingly, skill differentials increase in the hazards to 
temporary as well as permanent jobs. Similarly, unemployed workers from non-
manual occupations experience higher exit rates than otherwise similar workers 
in manual occupations, particularly to stable jobs during the downturn.   
Living in a municipality with more than 40,000 inhabitants is associated 
with less chances of finding a temporary, stable or unstable job in the recession 
period, suggesting that the crisis hits hardest in urbanized areas. The advantage 
of the unemployed in larger towns concerning exits to permanent jobs also 
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disappeared during the crisis. Having dependent children implies higher hazard 
rates in both years and for all types of jobs, in line with Bover et al. (2002).  
To interpret the coefficients of the labour market history variables, it 
should be noted that these may capture causal effects but also (time-persistent) 
heterogeneity. Employers may also use this type of information as a signal to 
hire someone or not. Bover et al. (2002), considering a complete business cycle, 
found that hazard rates to any job in Spain are ordered as agriculture (highest), 
construction, services and manufacturing (lowest). Alba et al. (2012) found for 
2000-2002 that workers from services have the highest chances finding a new 
job, but not for recall. These studies do not show the effect of the crisis on the 
differences in the hazard rates across industries. We find that the industry in 
which someone worked longest has different effects at different stages of the 
business cycle. The crisis reduces the probability of finding a stable job most 
strongly in the construction sector. In 2005, an employee from the construction 
sector had a 20% higher probability of exiting to a stable job than an otherwise 
similar unemployed worker in the services sector, but in 2009, this changed to 
4% lower. This is mainly due to a reduction on the probability to find a stable 
job with a temporary contract - unemployed construction workers sector rarely 
find a permanent job in either period. In contrast, the unemployed construction 
workers retained their higher exit rates to unstable jobs. The unemployed from 
the manufacturing sector caught up in this respect during the crisis – in 2009, 
their exit rates to unstable jobs were similar to those of construction workers.  
The larger the size of the firm where the unemployed had the previous 
job, the higher the reemployment hazards, particularly during the crisis and for 
unstable and temporary jobs. Working at a larger company may signal a larger 
productivity to potential employers. On the other hand, larger companies more 
often recall workers, alternating between temporary contracts and temporary 
layoffs. Moreover, unemployment spells could be shorter in large firms because 
of the larger effectiveness of workers’ representatives (Jimeno and Toharia, 
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1993). Alba et al. (2012) also found that the unemployed from larger firms have 
higher hazard rates, both for recalls and for new jobs. During the crisis, the size 
effects increase, perhaps because the probability of recall grows mostly for 
larger companies. 
The type of contract in the previous job is associated with the duration of 
the unemployment spells. Workers who lost a job with a permanent contract 
(the omitted category), other things equal, have longer unemployment spells, 
and this pattern is further aggravated by the economic crisis. These results are 
largely in line with the existing literature. Alba et al. (2012) and Arranz et al. 
(2010) also found higher hazard rates in temporary and open-ended contracts. 
On the other hand, as other studies show (e.g., Bover et al., 2002), workers with 
temporary contracts are also more likely to become unemployed. Table 5 shows 
that the type of contract has very different effects for the hazards to permanent 
and temporary jobs and this does not change with the business cycle.   
The duration of the former job has a negative and significant coefficient 
in all hazards, but its  magnitude is much higher in the transitions to unstable 
and temporary jobs. For instance, in 2005 a one year longer contract duration 
was associated with a 1.8% (24.2%) smaller probability of an exit to a stable 
(unstable) job. If we interpret this variable as a proxy of the benefit entitlement 
period, this effect is similar to previous findings and reflects that longer benefit 
entitlements make the unemployed more selective in accepting jobs (Arranz 
and Muro, 2004), particularly secondary (unstable or temporary) jobs. The crisis 
reduces the magnitudes of the coefficients, suggesting that the crisis makes the 
unemployed with longer benefit entitlements less reluctant to accept a 
secondary job. 
The past use of unemployment benefits has a strong negative association 
with exits to stable and permanent  jobs for both periods, implying that workers 
with less stable employment careers have fewer exit  opportunities to primary 
jobs. This effect might be explained by the loss of skills while unemployed or 
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may reflect time-persistent unobserved heterogeneity (Lockwood, 1991; 
Blanchard and Diamond 1994). The effect increases with the crisis, in line with 
the results of Arranz and Muro (2004) for unemployment durations of Spanish 
youth.  
The higher the part time coefficient in the previous job, the higher the 
exit probability to an unstable or a temporary job. This could be because 
(keeping benefits and other variables constant) the negative utility of 
unemployment is higher for  full time workers than for part-time employees. 
 
2.5.2 Unobserved heterogeneity 
In the single risk specifications, unobserved heterogeneity is significant 
according to likelihood ratio tests, and higher in the recession period (variance 
1.35) than before that (variance 0.97). This is in line with the fact that the pool 
of workers who become unemployed is larger and more diverse in 2009.  In the 
competing risks estimations, frailty is also significant in both periods. Moreover, 
the correlation between the two unobserved heterogeneity terms is 
significantly positive (0.68 in 2005 and 0.73 in 2009 for stable and unstable; 0.16 
in 2005 and 0.85 in 2009 for temporary and permanent), implying that someone 
who is likely to find a primary job also has better chances of getting a secondary 
job.  
 
2.5.3 Baseline Hazards 
Figure 7 shows the survival functions and hazards of the competing risk 
model for stable and unstable jobs for a benchmark person.  The top panel 
shows, for example, that in the benchmark group in 2005, 65% would get a 
stable job within 1 year, and 61% would get an unstable job, so that the 
probability of finding any job (stable or unstable) would be 86% ((1-
0.35*0.39)*100%). In 2009, the probabilities to find stable or unstable jobs have 
both fallen (by about 11 and 14%-points respectively), so that the benchmark 
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group’s probability to find any job within a year has fallen to 75%. 
Correspondingly, the median unemployment durations (assuming stable or 
unstable jobs are the only exits) increased from 7 to 11 months for stable jobs 
and from 8 to 13 months for unstable jobs.39 
 
Figure 7. Survival functions (top panel) and hazard rates (bottom panel) 
benchmark person for stable and unstable jobs; 2005 and 2009 samples; 
competing risks model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration.  
Notes: Durations in months. Benchmark man: age group 35 - 39, medium skill level, non-manual 
occupation. services sector, municipality with more than 40.000 inhabitants, Spanish, without dependent 
children, previous contract temporary, at small business; average values of the other (continuous) 
variables.  
 
The bottom panel shows the corresponding hazard rates. Since observed 
and unobserved heterogeneity are controlled for, the negative slopes can be 
interpreted as true negative state dependence (Heckman and Singer, 1984). 
                                                        
39 For the model with exits to permanent and temporary jobs, the differences between the 2005 and 
2009 hazards for the benchmark group are much less salient. For example, the probability to find a 
permanent (temporary) job falls from 21% (85% to 15% (79%). Details are available upon request from 
the authors.    
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unemployed before the crisis. This stigma disappears during the crisis when also 
more productive workers remain unemployed. This result is in line with a 
theoretical study of Lockwood (1991), arguing that negative duration 
dependence is weaker the higher the unemployment rate, whereas Blanchard 
and Diamond (1994) get the opposite result. Kalwij (2010), controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity, finds no evidence in favour of either of these 
theories.  On the other hand, during the downturn employment becomes 
demand driven and the scarcity of job offers makes individuals unable to find a 
job even though their unemployment benefit is about to expire. 
 
2.5.4 Sensitivity analysis 
In Tables A3 and A4, we compare the results for our benchmark 
definition of the distinction between stable and unstable jobs (more or less than 
90 days) with the results based upon two alternative definitions using cut offs of 
60 and 180 days. The model specification is the same as for the benchmark 
model (Table 4). Obviously, the proportions of exits to stable and unstable jobs 
change with the cut off. In 2005 and 2009, 43% and 38% of unemployment 
spells end in jobs that last more than 60 days and 20% and 21% in jobs lasting 
less than 60 days, respectively; 28% and 23% of unemployment spells end in 
jobs that last more than 180 days in 2005 and 2009, and 36% end in jobs lasting 
less than 180 days in both samples.  
Most of the effects of the explanatory variables on the re-employment 
hazards are qualitatively similar for the three thresholds. But some coefficients 
change in size, significance, or even sign. For instance, the coefficient on the 
unemployment rate in the hazard to an unstable job becomes signficantly 
negative in the 2005 sample when the cut off is 180 days. This suggests that 
during the expansion period the chances to find a job that lasts between 90 and 
180 days are particularly sensitive to the unemployment rate. Nevertheless, the 
qualitative conclusion remains unchanged that during the expansion period 
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regional unemployment differences mainly influence the exit rates to stable and 
permanent jobs, while during the downturn the regional unemployment rate 
affects primary and secondary job finding rates in a more similar way.   
Differences in the influence of some explanatory variables over the re-
employment probability for different job durations, specifically from 90 to 180 
days would justify splitting into three destination states. However, this would 
make estimation and interpretation more complex and computationally 
burdensome.  
  
2.5.5 Decompositions 
Table 11 shows the results of decompositions of the difference between 
the survival probabilities after 360 days in the periods before and during the 
crisis, in the spirit of, for example, Rosholm (2001) or Verho (2014). The first 
rows give the average survival probabilities for the two samples according to 
the model estimates and the difference between these two. For example, 
according to the competing risk model with exits to temporary and permanent 
jobs, the average probability of not finding a permanent job (assuming no other 
exit possibilities) was 74.5 percent, which increased to 82.0 percent in the 2009 
sample, a difference of 7.5 percentage points. 
The remaining rows show the decomposition of these differences. First, 
we take the 2005 estimates and the 2005 regional unemployment rates, but 
compute the average probabilities for the unemployed individuals in the 2009 
sample. Comparing with the 2005 probabilities in row 3 gives the composition 
effect: the difference explained by the fact that individual characteristics and 
labour market histories in the 2009 and 2005 samples are different. This 
explains about one third of the reduction in the probability to find a permanent 
job (2.4 out of the 7.5 percentage points). The other composition effects in the 
competing hazard models are much smaller. In particular, composition effects 
explain virtually nothing of the substantial reduction in the probability of an exit 
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to a stable job. Surprisingly, the single risk model leads to a larger estimate of 
the composition effect than any of the competing risks. Perhaps this is due to 
misspecification of the single risk model which is not as rich as the competing 
risk models that allow for different effects of the covariates on different types 
of exits. 
The remaining part of the 2005 – 2009 changes, the business cycle effect, 
can be further split up into a part captured by the change in regional 
unemployment rates and a residual part captured by changes in the 
coefficients. The results suggest that the regional unemployment rates capture 
the business cycle effects on exits to primary (stable or permanent) jobs, but 
not on exits to temporary or unstable jobs. This corresponds to the finding that 
the hazards to temporary and unstable jobs hardly respond to regional 
unemployment (Tables 4 and 5).              
 
Table 11 Decomposition analysis for single and competing risks exits 
  Any job Stable Job Unstable Job Permanent Job Temporary Job 
Total Effect: Difference between: 12.05% 100% 13.64% 100% 7.12% 100% 7.52% 100% 11.38% 100% 
S09 09 38.51% 54.08% 63.26% 81.98% 48.54% 
S05 05 26.46% 40.45% 56.14% 74.46% 37.16% 
Composition effects 4.21% 35% 0.24% 2% 1.09% 15% 2.38% 31.6% 1.49% 13.1% 
Business cycle effects 7.83% 65% 13.40% 98% 6.03% 85% 5.15% 68.4% 9.90% 86.9% 
Regional unemployment rate changes 6.85% 56.8% 13.34% 97.8% 0.61% 8.5% 7.77% 103% 4.07% 35.8% 
Changes in the coefficients 0.99% 8.2% 0.06% 0.4% 5.43% 76.2% -2.63% -35% 5.82% 51.2% 
Note: For composition effects we take the estimates of the model for 2005; for the business cycle effect we use the 
2009 sample 
 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
We have analysed transitions out of unemployment during an expansion 
(2005-2007) and during the recent recession (2009-2011), distinguishing exits to 
different types of jobs. We estimated single and competing risk models using a 
large administrative data set from the Spanish Social Security Administration. In 
line with the notion of a segmented labour market, we found large differences 
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between the hazards to primary jobs (stable jobs, or jobs with a permanent 
contract) and the hazards to secondary jobs (unstable or temporary).  
Comparing unemployment exits before and during the crisis, we find that 
the chances to find a job within the first twelve months are strongly reduced, 
and this is not compensated by higher hazards after the first twelve months. 
Exits to both primary and secondary jobs are much less likely during the crisis 
than in the expansion period during the first year of an unemployment spell. 
Negative duration dependence of the hazard is found particularly for stable jobs 
in the expansion period, until the unemployment benefit is about to expire.  
A decomposition analysis shows that changing characteristics of the pool 
of unemployed explain a limited part of the reduction in exit probabilties, 
particularly of exits to permanent jobs. Most of the reductions, however, are 
business cycle effects applying to unemployed individuals with given 
characteristics and labour market histories. While the business cycle effects for 
permanent and stable jobs are largely captured by increasing regional 
unemployment rates affecting the likelihood of a job offer, the effects for 
temporary or unstable jobs seem to be more complicated and require further 
analysis.    
Individuals who are most affected by the financial crisis are males and 
young workers (16-24), the age group 40-51, those living in regions with higher 
unemployment rates, the less qualified, those working in manual occupations, 
individuals without family responsibilities, immigrants, and workers from the 
construction sector (particularly for stable job exits). During the economic crisis, 
the comparative advantages of high skilled workers to find a job seem to 
increase, suggesting that in the downturn high-qualified workers substitute low-
qualified workers. Low skilled workers experience major problems finding jobs 
during the recession, suggesting that in times of crisis they require special 
attention from policymakers through, for example, active labour market 
policies.  
  
73 
the comparative advantages of high skilled workers to find a job seem to 
increase, suggesting that in the downturn high-qualified workers substitute low-
qualified workers. Low skilled workers experience major problems finding jobs 
during the recession, suggesting that in times of crisis they require special 
attention from policymakers through, for example, active labour market 
policies.  
During the crisis, because of the scarcity of primary jobs, unemployed 
with more chances to work in core jobs become also more likely to exit into 
unstable or temporary jobs, showing that primary and secondary jobs are not 
completely separated and that there is more mobility between them if the 
labour market is tighter.  
From a policy point of view, the current study has the obvious limitation 
that demand and supply factors were not disentangled. We find some evidence 
that unemployed workers respond to the lack of permanent or stable job offers 
by accepting temporary or unstable jobs, but a more structural analysis 
(probably also involving data on job search that are not available in our 
administrative records) seems needed to analyse this further.  
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Appendix A.2 
 
Table A1. Sample selection Number of individuals 
Filters 2005 sample 
2009 
sample 
Number of individuals starting any unemployment benefit spell in the year of 
reference 100,250 188,448 
Drop individuals with lack of relevant information 480 2,296 
Drop Individuals with any disability pension in the observation period 974 1,737 
Drop individuals from agriculture industry 9,997 23,016 
After merging consecutive unemployment spells, drop spells starting before 
the year of reference 6,741 14,893 
Drop overlapped spells and incidences 2,876 13,749 
Drop spells because of missing information of former type of contract 2,619 6,874 
Drop individuals with any degree of disability 746 1,397 
Final sample (number of individuals) 75,817 124,486 
Source: Own elaboration from 2005-2007 LWLS and 2009-2011 LWLS. 
 
Table A2. Definitions of explanatory variables  
 
Individual characteristics 
Male 1 if male 
Age Dummies for ages 16-19; 20-24; 25-29;30-34;35-39;40-44;45-51;52-60; older 61 (time-varying) 
Spanish-speaking immigrants 1 if immigrant from a Spanish-speaking country 
Non-Spanish speaking 
immigrants 1 if immigrant from a non-Spanish-speaking country 
Dummy dependent children 
1 if the individual has children younger than 25 years old or of any age  
with a degree of disability of at least 33%,  living in a common house, 
with income lower than €8,000 (in 2013) and not filing an IRPF tax 
return 
High skilled 
In non-manual occupations: engineers, graduates, senior executives, 
technical engineers and technical assistants; In manual occupations: 
first and second officers 
Medium skilled 
In non -manual occupations: administration officers, head foremen and 
non-qualified assistants; In manual occupations: third officers and 
specialists  
Low skilled In non-manual occupations: administrative assistants and subalterns; in manual occupations: peons, etc. 
Non-manual occupation 1 if non-manual occupation 
Macroeconomic variables 
Unemployment rate Quarterly unemployment rate by gender and region (time-varying); source: Economically Active Population Survey (EPA)  
Inhabitants>40,000 1 if the number of inhabitants of the municipality where the individual is living is greater than 40.000 
Sector of activity Dummies for sector of activity in which the individual has been working the longest:  Manufacturing, construction or services 
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Table A2, continued 
 
Previous job and labour market history variables 
Historical use of Unemployment 
Benefits 
Number of days receiving unemployment benefits divided by the sum of days 
working and days receiving unemployment benefits 
Duration of previous job Duration of former job (in days) 
Type of previous contract Dummies for permanent, on-call temporary, temporary, and open-ended 
Size of the firm in previous job Dummies for 0 (self-employed, missing), 1-19, 10-19,20-49,50-249, >250 
Part time coefficient in former 
job Hours worked as a fraction of full time work (1 in a full time job) 
Source: Own elaboration from LWLS and INE. 
 
Table A3: Estimation results of models with correlated competing risks for 
definitions of stable and unstable jobs according to three thresholds: 60, 90 
and 180 days.  2005 sample. 
 
Stable 60  Stable 90  Stable 180  Unstable 60 Unstable 90 Unstable 180 
Unemployment rate -3.648*** -3.781*** -3.335*** 0.0791 -0.238 -1.538*** 
  (0.164) (0.174) (0.202) (0.238) (0.220) (0.195) 
Male 0.196*** 0.176*** 0.194*** 0.350*** 0.329*** 0.268*** 
  (0.0145) (0.0150) (0.0174) (0.0236) (0.0215) (0.0188) 
Aged_16_19 0.0909 0.000839 -0.201* 0.206* 0.295*** 0.333*** 
  (0.0829) (0.0923) (0.120) (0.114) (0.106) (0.0926) 
Aged_20_24 0.281*** 0.249*** 0.188*** 0.320*** 0.340*** 0.359*** 
  (0.0284) (0.0297) (0.0348) (0.0445) (0.0409) (0.0360) 
Aged_25_29 0.387*** 0.359*** 0.336*** 0.339*** 0.343*** 0.375*** 
  (0.0241) (0.0250) (0.0288) (0.0392) (0.0356) (0.0311) 
Aged_30_34 0.380*** 0.358*** 0.345*** 0.328*** 0.331*** 0.352*** 
  (0.0236) (0.0244) (0.0281) (0.0388) (0.0352) (0.0307) 
Aged_35_39 0.401*** 0.372*** 0.375*** 0.352*** 0.378*** 0.379*** 
  (0.0242) (0.0251) (0.0288) (0.0398) (0.0361) (0.0315) 
Aged_40_44 0.412*** 0.387*** 0.389*** 0.430*** 0.436*** 0.424*** 
  (0.0250) (0.0257) (0.0295) (0.0408) (0.0371) (0.0325) 
Aged_45_51 0.384*** 0.369*** 0.363*** 0.384*** 0.372*** 0.375*** 
  (0.0246) (0.0254) (0.0291) (0.0406) (0.0370) (0.0322) 
Older61 -0.627*** -0.605*** -0.635*** -0.722*** -0.667*** -0.624*** 
  (0.0369) (0.0385) (0.0444) (0.0639) (0.0582) (0.0492) 
Spanish speaking -0.101*** -0.105*** -0.192*** 0.0668 0.0593 0.0819* 
immigrants (0.0350) (0.0369) (0.0446) (0.0535) (0.0497) (0.0435) 
Non Spanish speaking -0.225*** -0.224*** -0.249*** -0.196*** -0.162*** -0.169*** 
immigrants (0.0275) (0.0290) (0.0342) (0.0434) (0.0405) (0.0357) 
Dependent children 0.147*** 0.138*** 0.151*** 0.0963*** 0.0941*** 0.0922*** 
  (0.0127) (0.0131) (0.0151) (0.0211) (0.0191) (0.0168) 
Inhabitants>40,000 -0.00268 -0.000919 -0.00529 0.0124 0.00258 0.00785 
  (0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0138) (0.0184) (0.0168) (0.0148) 
High skilled 0.172*** 0.180*** 0.224*** 0.0174 0.0427* 0.0451** 
  (0.0154) (0.0160) (0.0185) (0.0244) (0.0224) (0.0198) 
Medium skilled 0.0229 0.0259* 0.0345** -0.0626*** -0.0393* -0.0258 
 (0.0140) (0.0146) (0.0169) (0.0221) (0.0203) (0.0180) 
Non-manual 0.0528*** 0.0693*** 0.111*** -0.00743 -0.0134 -0.0265 
  (0.0135) (0.0140) (0.0163) (0.0219) (0.0201) (0.0176) 
Construction 0.206*** 0.184*** 0.156*** 0.212*** 0.211*** 0.230*** 
  (0.0172) (0.0180) (0.0212) (0.0274) (0.0250) (0.0221) 
Manufacturing 0.0566*** 0.0273* -0.0536*** 0.0735*** 0.123*** 0.173*** 
  (0.0153) (0.0159) (0.0186) (0.0250) (0.0227) (0.0198) 
Firm size missing 0.0176 -0.0110 -0.0626*** 0.138*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 
  (0.0166) (0.0173) (0.0203) (0.0266) (0.0244) (0.0213) 
Size_10_19 0.0952*** 0.0830*** 0.0751*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.120*** 
  (0.0217) (0.0226) (0.0263) (0.0352) (0.0323) (0.0283) 
Size_20_49 0.185*** 0.164*** 0.154*** 0.195*** 0.223*** 0.224*** 
  (0.0196) (0.0204) (0.0236) (0.0324) (0.0296) (0.0258) 
Size_50_249 0.212*** 0.184*** 0.173*** 0.278*** 0.297*** 0.281*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0186) (0.0214) (0.0293) (0.0268) (0.0234) 
Size_250 0.228*** 0.198*** 0.173*** 0.467*** 0.442*** 0.398*** 
  (0.0192) (0.0199) (0.0230) (0.0306) (0.0279) (0.0245) 
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Table A3, continued 
 
 Stable 60  Stable 90  Stable 180  Unstable 60 Unstable 90 Unstable 180 
       
Open-ended contract 1.747*** 1.775*** 1.870*** 0.534*** 0.663*** 0.888*** 
  (0.0263) (0.0265) (0.0295) (0.0534) (0.0486) (0.0412) 
Temporary contract 0.586*** 0.523*** 0.424*** 0.642*** 0.674*** 0.728*** 
  (0.0191) (0.0193) (0.0217) (0.0362) (0.0330) (0.0285) 
On-call contract 1.022*** 0.927*** 0.791*** 1.393*** 1.386*** 1.391*** 
  (0.0285) (0.0292) (0.0339) (0.0464) (0.0422) (0.0370) 
Duration_1*1000 -0.075*** -0.055*** -0.006 -0.938*** -0.766*** -0.595*** 
  (8.48e-06) (8.42e-06) (8.53e-06) (3.28e-05) (2.79e-05) (2.15e-05) 
Part time coefte_1 0.0633* -0.0224 -0.200*** 0.779*** 0.809*** 0.739*** 
(0.0347) (0.0357) (0.0400) (0.0624) (0.0573) (0.0496) 
Past use of UB -0.586*** -0.638*** -0.845*** -0.102 -0.106* -0.104* 
  (0.0447) (0.0467) (0.0550) (0.0690) (0.0622) (0.0548) 
Number of individuals 75,817 75,817 75,817 75,817 75,817 75,817 
Number of exits 39,634 34,918 25,707 18,801 23,517 32,728 
Total number of  
spells 91,787 91,787 91,787 91,787 91,787 91,787 
Log Likelihood -97,621 -398,732 -73,004 -97,621 -398,732 -73,004 
Implied mass point distribution 1 2 3 E[V] 
60 days 
Probability 36% 2% 62% 
V stable 0.46 2.14 -0.34 0 
V unstable 1.24 2.74 -0.81 0 
Rho= 0.96 
180 days 
Probability 20% 3% 77% 
V stable -0.14 2.34 -0.04 0 
V unstable 1.55 0.84 -0.44 0 
Rho= 0.07 
Notes: see Table 4 
 
Table A4: Estimation results of models with correlated competing risks for 
definitions of stable and unstable jobs according to three thresholds: 60, 90 
and 180 days. 2009 sample. 
Stable 60 Stable 90 Stable 180 Unstable 60  Unstable 90  Unstable 180 
Unemployment rate -1.698*** -1.815*** -2.012*** -1.553*** -1.470*** -1.463*** 
  (0.0865) (0.0921) (0.110) (0.131) (0.120) (0.105) 
Male 0.119*** 0.112*** 0.105*** 0.128*** 0.125*** 0.113*** 
  (0.0107) (0.0113) (0.0130) (0.0169) (0.0155) (0.0136) 
Aged_16_19 -0.102 -0.108 -0.186* 0.208** 0.169* 0.138* 
  (0.0808) (0.0874) (0.112) (0.101) (0.0934) (0.0823) 
Aged_20_24 0.121*** 0.0972*** 0.0344 0.273*** 0.277*** 0.266*** 
  (0.0233) (0.0250) (0.0308) (0.0349) (0.0319) (0.0278) 
Aged_25_29 0.278*** 0.256*** 0.239*** 0.395*** 0.402*** 0.377*** 
  (0.0193) (0.0205) (0.0242) (0.0300) (0.0274) (0.0238) 
Aged_30_34 0.303*** 0.294*** 0.299*** 0.373*** 0.368*** 0.345*** 
  (0.0184) (0.0196) (0.0231) (0.0290) (0.0265) (0.0230) 
Aged_35_39 0.293*** 0.295*** 0.306*** 0.345*** 0.330*** 0.318*** 
  (0.0187) (0.0198) (0.0234) (0.0296) (0.0271) (0.0235) 
Aged_40_44 0.295*** 0.295*** 0.329*** 0.362*** 0.341*** 0.309*** 
  (0.0194) (0.0207) (0.0241) (0.0306) (0.0280) (0.0243) 
Aged_45_51 0.273*** 0.279*** 0.304*** 0.305*** 0.287*** 0.272*** 
  (0.0189) (0.0201) (0.0235) (0.0301) (0.0275) (0.0238) 
Older61 -0.512*** -0.491*** -0.467*** -0.566*** -0.587*** -0.571*** 
  (0.0297) (0.0312) (0.0348) (0.0504) (0.0458) (0.0389) 
Spanish speaking -0.296*** -0.326*** -0.413*** -0.00455 -0.0327 -0.0541** 
immigrants (0.0214) (0.0232) (0.0288) (0.0290) (0.0268) (0.0236) 
Non Spanish -0.428*** -0.426*** -0.439*** -0.418*** -0.413*** -0.403*** 
Speaking imm. (0.0163) (0.0174) (0.0211) (0.0241) (0.0220) (0.0192) 
Dependent children 0.172*** 0.162*** 0.148*** 0.114*** 0.133*** 0.145*** 
  (0.0101) (0.0107) (0.0125) (0.0159) (0.0146) (0.0128) 
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Stable 60  Stable 90  Stable 180 Unstable 60  Unstable 90  Unstable 180 
Inhabitants>40,000 -0.130*** -0.120*** -0.0995*** -0.0858*** -0.113*** -0.127*** 
  (0.00906) (0.00968) (0.0114) (0.0140) (0.0128) (0.0113) 
High skilled 0.267*** 0.278*** 0.334*** 0.165*** 0.175*** 0.163*** 
  (0.0131) (0.0140) (0.0162) (0.0199) (0.0183) (0.0161) 
Medium skilled 0.0844*** 0.0887*** 0.107*** 0.0781*** 0.0809*** 0.0717*** 
  (0.0117) (0.0125) (0.0145) (0.0177) (0.0163) (0.0143) 
Non-manual 0.0877*** 0.102*** 0.161*** 0.0406** 0.0323* 0.00897 
  (0.0115) (0.0123) (0.0144) (0.0181) (0.0166) (0.0145) 
Construction 0.0200 -0.0436*** -0.183*** 0.201*** 0.246*** 0.248*** 
  (0.0131) (0.0141) (0.0174) (0.0199) (0.0182) (0.0160) 
Manufacturing 0.0327** -0.0115 -0.0703*** 0.178*** 0.215*** 0.216*** 
  (0.0134) (0.0144) (0.0168) (0.0213) (0.0194) (0.0170) 
Firm size missing -0.0200 -0.0414*** -0.0965*** 0.168*** 0.160*** 0.149*** 
  (0.0127) (0.0135) (0.0162) (0.0197) (0.0179) (0.0156) 
Size_10_19 0.0625*** 0.0479** 0.0487** 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.0892*** 
  (0.0191) (0.0205) (0.0235) (0.0305) (0.0277) (0.0241) 
Size_20_49 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.0998*** 0.227*** 0.208*** 0.187*** 
  (0.0174) (0.0184) (0.0217) (0.0272) (0.0249) (0.0217) 
Size_50_249 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.191*** 0.346*** 0.315*** 0.291*** 
  (0.0153) (0.0162) (0.0189) (0.0242) (0.0222) (0.0193) 
Size_250 0.306*** 0.304*** 0.294*** 0.538*** 0.511*** 0.465*** 
  (0.0162) (0.0171) (0.0198) (0.0251) (0.0230) (0.0202) 
Open-ended  1.932*** 1.975*** 2.037*** 1.021*** 1.030*** 1.169*** 
 contract (0.0196) (0.0204) (0.0224) (0.0393) (0.0356) (0.0302) 
Temporary contract 0.528*** 0.483*** 0.368*** 0.738*** 0.744*** 0.744*** 
  (0.0134) (0.0141) (0.0161) (0.0238) (0.0215) (0.0186) 
On-call contract 0.958*** 0.866*** 0.718*** 1.519*** 1.508*** 1.437*** 
  (0.0212) (0.0225) (0.0262) (0.0320) (0.0293) (0.0258) 
Duration_1*1000 -0.068*** -0.047*** 0.0005 -0.644*** -0.575*** -0.469*** 
  (6.29e-06) (6.31e-06) (6.37e-06) (2.03e-05) (1.74e-05) (1.37e-05) 
Part time coefte_1 0.00780 -0.0443* -0.274*** 0.709*** 0.677*** 0.699*** 
  (0.0243) (0.0256) (0.0278) (0.0429) (0.0391) (0.0342) 
Past use of UB -1.106*** -1.175*** -1.420*** -0.337*** -0.386*** -0.410*** 
  (0.0396) (0.0423) (0.0511) (0.0573) (0.0529) (0.0462) 
Number of 
individuals 124,486 124,486 124,486 124,486 124,486 124,486 
Number of exits 60,492 52,111 36,674 33,316 41,697 57,134 
Total number of  
spells 158,363 158,363 158,363 158,363 158,363 158,363 
Log Likelihood -671,729 -145,054 -113,160 -671,729 -145,054 -113,160 
Implied mass point distribution 1 2 3 E[V] 
60 days 
Probability 1% 23% 76% 
V stable 3.31 0.68 -0.24 0 
V unstable 0.54 1.69 -0.51 0 
Rho= 0.83 
180 days 
Probability 1% 23% 76% 
V stable 3.46 0.05 -0.07 0 
V unstable 0.24 1.51 -0.45 0 
Rho= 0.16 
Note: See Table 4. 
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 3. New Job Matches and Their Stability Before and During the Crisis. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The Great Recession has led to important adjustments in the labour 
market of most developed countries and has dramatically affected the labour 
market in Spain, which exhibits higher job destruction and lower job creation 
rates than other European countries. Accordingly, the nature of new job 
matches may change, an issue addressed only partly in the existing literature. In 
this paper, we examine shifts in the nature and stability of job matches starting 
before and during the crisis and decompose the changes in the stability of the 
new matches into variation in their composition and residual changes induced 
by changing economic conditions. We particularly focus on the role of firm size 
and the differences in quality between jobs at small and large firms. The goal of 
the Europe 2020 Strategy40 “to create more and better jobs”, emphasizes the 
necessity of assessing the nature and quality of new jobs over time. We 
contribute to this by studying the evolution of the characteristics of new job 
matches over the business cycle. An important indicator of the quality of a 
match is the duration of the job: better matches typically last longer. By 
examining the shifts in job stability during boom and recession, we extend the 
scarce empirical evidence on cyclical fluctuations in match quality, learning 
more about the nature of exit probabilities and their determinants in different 
macro-economic contexts.  
We consider as a new job match any new position of a worker at a new 
employer, or at a previous employer after an interruption by unemployment, 
                                                        
40  http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm 
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non-employment, or employment at a different employer. Workers can be new 
entrants in the labour market, can come from unemployment, or can directly 
come from another job with a different employer. They can replace another 
worker who left the same job, or they can get a newly created job – our data do 
not allow a distinction between these two possibilities.  
During the downturn, the demand for labour falls, the number of 
voluntary job leavers typically falls and the number of unemployed workers 
rises.41 Added worker42 and discouraged worker effects43 will play a role, as well 
as emigration or return migration. Consequently, the characteristics of those 
who start a new job and the characteristics of their jobs vary over the business 
cycle. Devereux (2002) studies changes in educational composition and 
Devereux (2004) studies cyclicality of worker quality. In this paper, we analyse 
the changes in individual and job characteristics of the new matches between 
two years: before the crisis (2005) and during the crisis (2009). Our main 
interest is in the stability of these new matches. The relevance of job stability 
for an individual’s career, an employer’s personnel policy and the functioning of 
the labour market is well established (Boockman and Steffes, 2010), but there is 
little empirical evidence on how job stability and its determinants vary over the 
business cycle. An exception is Bowlus (1995) who examines how for young 
males, the extent of mismatch varies over the business cycle. Previous studies 
typically show the importance of economic conditions for job exits by 
controlling for the state of the economy through including macroeconomic 
indicators or yearly dummies (Blázquez-Cuesta, 2008; García-Perez, 1997). This 
helps to predict the cyclicality of the hazard rates but not the impact of the 
business cycle on the importance of other determinants of job exits. Dütsch and 
                                                        
41 See Longhi and Taylor (2013) for a comparison of the characteristics and behaviour of employed and 
unemployed job seekers over the business cycle.  
42 Added worker effect: Traditionally inactive groups, for instance married women, increase 
participation in the labour force to compensate for the unemployment of their husbands (primary 
workers). 
43 Discouraged worker effect: The unemployed give up search because of the low chances to find a job. 
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Struck (2014) capture the economic conditions estimating models for two 
different years, representative of either cyclical phase.  
It is difficult to interpret the business cycle effects on the durations of 
new jobs since demand and supply forces may work in opposite directions. For 
instance, during the downturn, the employer may recruit better workers 
because of the larger applicant pool. On the other hand, workers may be willing 
to accept matches that they would reject in expansion periods. Job search and 
matching theory (Jovanovic, 1979) imply that lower expectations of the workers 
to improve job conditions reduce job-to-job transitions, increasing the durations 
of new jobs. On the other hand, the decline in expected productivity during the 
downturn rises the number of layoffs and shortens job tenure. As pointed out 
by Bergmann and Mertens (2011), more insight in the opposing forces at work 
can be obtained by considering the exits to different destination states. We 
therefore compare job stability pattern and its determinants –socioeconomic, 
firm and job characteristics- of new jobs starting in 2005 and 2009 using models 
that distinguish several destination states. The observation window for both 
samples is three years, so that we capture a period of expansion (2005-2007) 
and a period of recession (2009-2011). 
We particularly focus on differences between new matches in large and 
small firms before and during the crisis. Government policies that stimulate 
starting a new firm to create employment have been criticized because the 
stability and quality of new jobs at small firms are often inferior, and these 
policies can hamper firm growth (Shane, 2009). It seems particularly relevant to 
analyse to which extent this also applies to Spain in the years of the crisis. In the 
Spanish policy debate, it has already been suggested that larger firms are 
necessary to increase productivity and stable employment (Perez, 2014 and 
Consejo Empresarial para la Competitividad, 2014).  
The data we use come from the Longitudinal Working Lives Sample, 
based upon administrative records from the Spanish Social Security 
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Administration. It contains detailed information on employment and 
unemployment transitions and individual and job characteristics. We construct 
two separate samples with job spells starting in 2005 and in 2009, observing the 
job entrants until either job exit or the end of the observation period. We 
estimate a Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) Models with three destination 
states: other job, unemployment and non-employment. In order to allow for 
dependence among the three hazards, unobserved heterogeneity in these 
hazards is modelled jointly, using a discrete distribution with three points of 
support. The explanatory variables include individual characteristics, variables 
that relate to the individual’s job, and a regional unemployment rate. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a 
brief review of the literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents 
the characteristics and job exit patterns of new jobs. In section 5 we present the 
econometric framework of job durations. Section 6 provides the main results. 
Conclusions are drawn in section 7. 
 
 3.2 Literature review  
In this section we first discuss the literature on the composition of new 
matches over the business cycle and then the cyclical fluctuations in job 
stability. 
 
3.2.1 The nature of new job matches over the business cycle 
Devereux (2002) examines how in the US the educational composition of 
new matches within a given occupation changes over the business cycle.  He 
finds counter-cyclicality in the quality of workers hired, especially in lower 
paying occupations, implying that less skilled workers have more pro-cyclical job 
finding rates. Also for the US, Devereux (2004) explores the cyclical quality 
adjustment of new hires, showing that new matches result in lower quality jobs 
in recessions than in booms and that part of the wage pro-cyclicality in new 
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matches can be attributed to the variation in quality of the matches over the 
business cycle. Similarly, van Ours and Ridder (1995), using Dutch data on 
unemployed workers only, found that jobs obtained in recessions are less 
attractive. For the same country, Teulings (1993) found that involuntary job 
seekers (i.e., workers who expect to be dismissed in the near future) get better 
jobs during an upswing than during a downturn. Among the empirical studies on 
wage cyclicality,44 De la Roca (2014) found that in Spain, the sensitivity of wages 
for the economic cycle declines with tenure and, accordingly, is highest for 
newly-hired workers. Alba-Ramirez (1991) studied changes in the characteristics 
of new jobs in the mid-70s and the mid-80s in Spain and found that job losers 
are among the most disadvantaged groups.  
The evolution of employment has been extensively explored by public 
institutions because of its policy relevance. For instance, Eurofound (2013) used 
a job-based approach45 to describe the net employment evolution for EU 
countries before, during and after the 2008-2010 recession, disaggregating by 
worker characteristics and employment status. They identify groups most 
affected by the crisis in the EU such as young male workers, those with low 
education levels, and those with temporary contracts. The industries with most 
job destruction are manufacturing and construction. They also point at the 
persistence of some longer-term trends, like higher expansion in high-skill 
employment, improvement in female employment both in qualitative and 
quantitative terms, and a strong growth in part-time work and self-
employment.  
Several Spanish studies analyse the effects of the current crisis on 
employment using data from Economically Active Population Survey (EPA). 
Rocha and Aragón (2012) explored the evolution of net employment between 
                                                        
44 See Devereux (2004) for more references. 
45 Under this approach, pioneered in the 1990s in the United States by Stiglitz and others (Council of 
Economic Advisors, 1996), a job is defined as an occupation in a sector and is assigned to a wage 
quintile. This approach is useful to assess whether employment structures are polarizing. 
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2008 and 2012, pointing out the increased concentration of employment in very 
large and very small firms, as well as in high skilled and medium-low 
occupations. They also showed that construction and manufacturing are the 
sectors with most job destruction during the crisis, making young, male, low-
skilled and immigrant workers the most affected. García-Serrano (2012) 
investigated the evolution of employment at sector and occupational level for 
the period 1985-2011 at turning points in the economic cycle, emphasizing the 
evolution and the pro-cyclical nature of the construction sector in Spain 
compared to other European countries. 
 
3.2.2 Cyclicality of the durations of new jobs 
Although job stability has been studied much less extensively than 
unemployment duration, its importance is well established in the literature. 
From a worker’s perspective, job duration influences future prospects, like wage 
levels and welfare state entitlements (Keith and Mc Williams, 1995; Heinz, 
2006) and the development of human capital. From an employer’s perspective, 
separation rates determine employer policies on, e.g., human capital 
investment, promotions, and wages (Hirsch and Schnabel, 2012).  
There is little empirical work on the changes in the stability of new 
matches over the business cycle. For young males in the US, Bowlus (1995) 
examined how mismatching measured by job tenure (without distinguishing 
destination states), varies over the business cycle. She found that mismatching 
occurs more during recessions but is primarily captured in starting wages. Many 
studies have focused on changes over time in mean job tenure in countries with 
different levels of employment protection (see Boockman and Steffes, 2010, for 
references). However, these studies focus on secular changes rather than 
cyclicality.  
Studies that focus on the individual determinants of job stability usually 
include controls for the economic conditions. Bergmann and Mertens (2011) 
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and Hirsch and Schnabel (2012) use a calendar time trend for the business cycle. 
Boockman and Steffes (2010) also incorporate institutional and historical 
variables. Most of these studies distinguish several destination states 
(Frederiksen, 2008; Boockmann and Steffes, 2010; Hirsch and Schnabel 2012; 
Bratberg et al. 2010; Theodossiou and Zangelidis, 2009), reasons for job 
termination (Booth et al., 1999) or both (Bergmann and Mertens, 2011).  
Dütsch and Struck (2014) extend the previous research examining how 
firm characteristics and regional economic conditions influence the mobility 
process in the German labour market. They estimate models for 1999 and 2002, 
representative of the two cyclical phases. They find that firm’s investments in 
training and internal promotion opportunities (typically taking place in larger 
firms) foster employment stability, while the opposite happens with the 
extensive use of fixed-term contracts.  
Studies that specifically focus on job stability and the business cycle in 
Spain are scarce. As in studies for other countries, economic conditions are 
often included as an explanatory factor through regional unemployment rates, 
GDP growth rates, or yearly dummies. García-Pérez (1997) and García-Perez and 
Muñoz-Bullón (2005) used social security records to study patterns and 
determinants of transitions into and out of employment (involuntary turnover). 
The latter study emphasizes the role of Temporary Help Agencies in workers’ 
transitions. Arranz and García-Serrano (2004) explored the influence of previous 
labour market experience on exit rates by reason for termination (end of a 
contract and layoff). Blázquez (2008) distinguished job separations by 
destination states (other job and non-employment) for the period 1995-2001 
with special attention for low paid workers. Rebollo (2012) focused on the 
relationship between the unemployment insurance and different labour market 
transitions. 
According to the theory of labour market segmentation, large 
establishments tend to create circumstances that foster employment stability. 
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Empirical studies based on individual level data typically find that job exit rates 
are indeed significantly lower in larger firms (Bergmann and Mertens, 2011; 
Boockmann and Hagen, 2008; Rebitzer, 1986; Blázquez-Cuesta, 2008; Rebollo, 
2012; Dütsch and Struck,46 2014). On the other hand, most studies based on 
linked employer-employee data (Boockmann and Steffes, 2010; Hirsch and 
Scnabel, 2012; Martin, 2003) find that it is not firm size as such that matters, but 
factors correlated with firm size such as the presence of works councils or 
unions, availability of further training, and the amount of firm specific 
technology. There is also some evidence that some characteristics of large firms 
help to enhance employment stability, such as more training opportunities, 
more job flexibility and possibilities of promotion within the firm, and a better 
ability to adjust the production process to economic shocks (Struck, 2006). The 
latter also suggests that job stability would suffer less during the crisis in large 
firms than in small firms.  
Shane (2009) argues that the jobs created in small firms are often 
unstable and not productive. As a consequence, he proposes to eliminate the 
barriers for firms to grow in size (such as lower taxation or subsidies for small 
firms) and instead stimulate high growth companies (through, e.g., R&D tax 
credits). Perez (2014) and Consejo Empresarial para la Competitividad (2014) 
emphasize that the number of new firms created in Spain is not that small 
compared to other countries, but the new firms are typically small, have low 
survival chances, and do not create permanent employment. Creating stable 
jobs requires eliminating barriers to firm growth,such as subsidies for small 
firms only or inefficacy in judicial system (García Posada and Mora, 2013), 
combined with policies that stimulate firm growth affecting the productivity 
through, e.g., investment, R&D, and professional training as Huerta and Salas 
(2014) suggest, alerting about the inefficacy of focusing only on increasing firm 
size as a goal in itself if for increasing per capita income. 
                                                        
46 Dütsch and Struck (2014) used linked employer-employee data from Germany. 
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3.3 Data 
 
The data we use come from the Longitudinal Working Lives Sample47 
(LWLS), based upon administrative records from the Spanish Social Security 
Administration (SSA). The LWLS is collected annually since 2004 and contains 
information on a 4 percent random sample of the population (approximately 
one million people) who ever had any sort of relationship with the SSA48 in the 
sample period, as contributors or as benefit recipients. It is useful for our study 
because of its longitudinal design and the rich information on employment and 
unemployment transitions, and individual and job characteristics that it 
contains. Due to its longitudinal design, individuals in the 2004 LWLS remain in 
the sample as long as they have a relationship with SSA, making it possible to 
analyse the individuals’ labour market changes over time. LWLS provides 
information on individual characteristics such as gender, age, and nationality, 
and firm and job attributes such as firm size, sector of activity, annual wages 
and type of contract.49  
To compare the expansion and recession periods, we construct two 
samples that include all job spells (excluding self-employment) that started in 
2005 and in 2009, observing them until either the job spell or the observation 
period end. The latter is 31 December 2011 for the 2009 data and is set to 31 
December 2007 for the 2005 data (to increase comparability). This is achieved 
by merging the data sets LWLS 2005-2006-2007 and LWLS 2009-2010-2011. 
We apply several filters to our samples, described in detail in the 
appendix (Table A2). For instance, our samples are restricted to workers aged 
16 to 53 in the year of reference, avoiding exits through an early retirement 
option. We remove individuals with incomplete information and recode 
                                                        
47 We use the LWLS version with fiscal data. 
48 Civil servants are not included in the LWLS. 
49 We use the tax module to obtain information on wages. See Arranz and García-Serrano (2011). 
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overlapping spells.50 Moreover, we only include job spells that last at least 31 
days (after recoding) since the very short spells can normally not be considered 
as serious jobs and would require a separate model. We do not consider 
workers from the agricultural sector because of the particular rules in this sector 
(“Agrarian Special Regime”) and dropped observations from Ceuta and Melilla. 
As explained in Section 1, the immediate destination states (within 31 
days after the end of the job spell) we distinguish are: finding another job 
(including self-employment), transition to unemployment with benefits, and exit 
to non-employment. They are explained in detail in Table 1.  
To construct job spells, consecutive job spells with the same employer 
and a difference shorter than 32 days are considered as one job spell, with the 
characteristics of the first contract. This limit of 31 days and the requirement 
that the duration of the new spell is at least 31 days are meant to avoid 
considering the strategic use of unemployment benefits as job-to-
unemployment transition. The job duration is defined as the difference (in days) 
between the termination date and the starting date of the job. If at the end of 
the observation period the employee is still working with the same employer, 
data are considered right censored. Exits from employment for other reasons 
are also considered right censored. 
 
Table 1: Definition of destination states.  
Destination states Definition 
Other job Immediate job spell of at least 31 days within 31 days after the end of the job 
under study. It includes transitions to a new employer and self-employment. 
Unemployment 
with benefits 
Immediate unemployment benefit spell of at least 31 days of contributory and/or 
social assistance benefits within 31 days after the end of the job under study. 
Non-employment 
state 
Defined as the residual group. Includes unemployment without benefits, 
emigration, black economy and inactivity (for instance to care for family or to 
become a student).  
This state is identified if there is no subsequent job spell (of at least 31 days) and 
no spell with unemployment benefits (of at least 31 days) within 31 days after the 
end of the job under study.   
                                                        
50  The consecutive criteria applied to preserve spells corresponding to the main activity are: we keep 
the spells with 1) the highest part-time coefficient; 2) with the longest spell, and 3) with the highest 
contributory base. The remainder of overlapping spells is removed.  
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Our samples consist of 176,419 individuals starting 222,125 new job 
spells in 2005, and 141,153 employees with 170,249 new jobs spells in 2009.  
The difference between the two samples reflects the substantial drop in the 
number of new jobs between 2005 and 2009.  
 
3.4 Characteristics of new job matches before and during the crisis.  
In this section we describe the variation of the sample composition of 
new job matches over the business cycle and the influence of the economic 
situation on job stability patterns, disaggregating by destination states. 
 
3.4.1 Characteristics of new jobs starting before and during the crisis 
New job matches are the result of the interaction of job searchers and 
firms.  The business cycle may lead to changes in the pool of job searchers and 
in the job assignment process, shifting the sample composition of new job 
starters. To explore the cyclical sample composition variation we compare 
descriptive statistics of individual and job characteristics of new job starters in 
the two years (Table 2). The importance of the crisis is reflected in the 
substantial growth of the average regional unemployment rate.  
Worker characteristics considered are age, gender, education level, 
nationality and dependent children. The average age at the time of starting a 
new job spell is about 2 years older in the 2009 sample than in 2005. During the 
recession period, the proportion of younger individuals (16-29 years old) in new 
matches decreases, while the proportion of workers older than 35 increases. In 
a context of excess supply of labour, employers hire more experienced workers, 
in line with the finding of Devereux (2004).  
 The drop of the fraction of males (from 54% in 2005 to 51% in 2009) may 
be due to the relative overrepresentation of males in declining sectors 
(manufacturing and construction), while women are often employed in growing 
sectors like health and education. It could also be due to an added worker 
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effect. Only 32% (35%) of the sample individuals have dependent children 
(younger than 16 years old) in the expansion (recession) period. Most workers 
starting a new job have Spanish nationality, but the proportion of natives in new 
matches declined from 89% in 2005 to 85% in 2009. The proportion of non-
Spanish speaking immigrants rose from 6% to 10%, possibly due to the surge of 
immigrants in the pool of job searchers due to job loss.  
The distribution of education level of the new matches remains stable. 
Most individuals (40%) have lower secondary level of education while only 16% 
have post-secondary level. The proportion of new job starters in non-manual 
occupations increases slightly from 41% in 2005 to 42% in 2009. Degree of 
urbanization is captured by a dummy for living in a larger municipality. Around 
45% of workers live in a municipality with more than 40,000 inhabitants in 2005 
and 48% in 2009.  
The job characteristics we consider relate to sector of activity, type of 
contract, firm size, and daily salary. Sectors of activity are grouped into 
construction, services and manufacturing industry. Most workers who started a 
new job in 2005 did it in the services sector (71%). The proportions in the 
manufacturing and construction sectors fell from 11% to 8% and from 18% to 
15% with the burst of the property bubble, respectively. This fits with the pro-
cyclical nature of the construction sector and the decrease in industrial 
employment during recessions found in García-Serrano (2012). In 2005, 9% of 
new job matches are in sectors with a high level of technology; this fell 
dramatically to only 3% during the recession.    
The majority of the new contracts are temporary, about 74% in both 
periods. Open-ended contracts are especially set up for seasonal activities, as 
they allow for interruptions of the employment relation due to seasonality. This 
type of contract is found in about 3% (5%) of the new jobs in 2005 (2009). The 
proportion of part time contracts is lower than the European average (Labour 
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Force Survey, 2009), but new part time contracts became more common (22% 
in 2005 versus 28% in 2009). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the 2005 and 2009 samples  
2005 2009 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Unemployment rate (quarterly) 0.09 0.04 0.20 0.05 
Male unemployment rate  (quarterly) 0.07 0.021 0.19 0.05 
Female unemployment rate of  
(quarterly) 0.11 0.043 0.20 0.06 
Inhabitants>40,000 (*) 0.45 0.498 0.48 0.50 
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Male (*) 0.54 0.50 0.51 0.50 
Age at the year of starting the job 
spell 32 9.09 34 9.22 
Spanish native (*) 0.89 0.31 0.85 0.36 
Spanish speaking immigrant (*) 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 
Non Spanish speaking immigrant (*) 0.06 0.23 0.10 0.30 
Children<4 (*) 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.33 
Children>3 & <16 (*) 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42 
Primary_education (*) 0.18 0.39 0.19 0.39 
Lower_secondary  (*) 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49 
Upper secondary  (*) 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43 
Post-secondary (*) 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37 
JOB CHARACTERISTICS 
Non-Manual occupation  (*) 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49 
Construction  (*) 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.36 
Manufacturing (*) 0.11 0.32 0.08 0.27 
Services (*) 0.71 0.45 0.77 0.42 
High technology (*) 0.09 0.28 0.03 0.17 
Firm size missing (*) 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.18 
Size_1_9 (*) 0.29 0.45 0.34 0.47 
Size_10_19 (*) 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 
Size_20_49 (*) 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 
Size_50-249 (*) 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.40 
Size_250 (*) 0.19 0.40 0.18 0.38 
Current contract is temporary (*) 0.64 0.48 0.62 0.48 
Current contract is on-call temporary 
(*) 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26 
Current contract is open-ended (*)  0.03 0.17 0.05 0.23 
Current contract is permanent (*) 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.43 
Current contract is part-time (*) 0.22 0.41 0.28 0.45 
Temporary Help Agency (*) 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.18 
Public Sector (*) 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.31 
Real daily wage (euros in 2009) (**) 50 24.34 54 27.37 
Source: Own calculations using LWLS and the Spanish Labour Force Survey (quarterly regional 
unemployment rate) 
Note: Descriptive characteristics corresponding to the first observation of each individual in each 
sample.(*)Dummy variables, (**) Real daily wages for full time Jobs. According to t-tests, all differences 
in means between both samples are statistically significant except for Lower secondary and Post-
secondary school).  Variable definitions are given in Table A1 (Appendix). 
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The proportion of new jobs signed through Temporary Help Agencies 
(THA) acting as an intermediary, declined from 4% in 2005 to 3% in 2009. This 
fall may seem surprising given that the main service provided by the THAs is 
just-in-time labour that helps firms to adjust to demand fluctuations (Amuedo-
Dorantes et al., 2008) and is more necessary in uncertain periods. Possibly the 
fall is a consequence of the fact that THA contracts are more common for 
younger and low-qualified workers, larger firms, and more inhabited regions, 
groups that exhibit a higher reduction in hiring in 2009.  
The proportion of new hires in the public sector (not including civil 
servants) has increased from 8% in 2005 to 10% in 2009. This growth may be 
explained by the employment creation in public sector industries such as 
education and health. It may also be influenced by the increased tendency of 
the public sector to hire through labour contracts instead of in the form of civil 
service employment, in a context of public spending cuts.  
The average real daily wage in a new job increased from €50 in 2005 to 
€54 in 2009 sample.51 The percentiles in Table 3 show that the rise in wages is 
non-uniform: higher paid jobs exhibit greater wage growth than mid and low 
paid new jobs. A possible explanation of the greater wages growth in higher 
paid jobs is, in line with Devereux (2002), that the abilities of workers hired 
might be higher in recessions as during a recession, the tasks within occupation 
require better skills. 
To sum up, the changes in sample composition reveal interesting facts that are 
in line with previous studies: first, the marked sectorial character of this crisis and the 
dramatic reduction in high technology intensive jobs. Second, the growth of the share 
of new hires in micro-enterprises during the crisis. Third, the countercyclical nature of 
the number of part time jobs. Fourth, the surge in the demand for labour in public 
services as well as the growing trend in hiring through labour contracts. Finally, higher 
growth in real wages in high-paid jobs than in low and medium paid jobs. 
                                                        
51 Both amounts in euros in 2009, deflated by the average annual CPI of base 2011, and referred to full-
time jobs. 
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Table 3. Percentiles and variation in the real daily wage in new job matches in 
2005 and 2009.  
Variation 
Percentiles 2005 2009 Absolute Relative 
1% 18.15 19.49 1.34 7% 
5% 25.61 27.47 1.86 7% 
10% 29.55 31.52 1.97 7% 
25% 36.20 38.47 2.27 6% 
50% 43.48 46.93 3.44 8% 
75% 55.39 60.53 5.14 9% 
90% 77.98 86.05 8.06 10% 
95% 98.44 109.39 10.95 11% 
99% 152.19 169.35 17.16 11% 
Note: Own elaboration from the real daily wage at the start of a new job. Part-time jobs excluded. 
 
 
3.4.2 Job exits before and during the crisis 
The fraction of job separations over the total observation window is high 
and rather similar in both periods: 77% of the new matches in 2005 and 82% in 
2009 ended within three years. This reveals the importance of the job turnover 
in the Spanish labour market (Dolado et al. 2002), especially for new employees 
according to the LIFO (Last in, First Out) scheme.52 The similarity of exit rates in 
the two years is also apparent from the Kaplan Meier survival function 
estimates in Figure 1. It appears to be driven by two opposite processes: the 
pro-cyclical nature of transitions to other jobs (29% in 2005 and 18% in 2009) 
and to non-employment (33% in 2005 and 30% in 2009), and the counter-
cyclical nature of job-to-unemployment rates (16% in 2005 and 34% in 2009). 
Job-to-job exits dominate in the expansion period, while job-to-unemployment 
transitions dominate in the crisis. The aggregated job-to-any-exit hazard 
combines very distinct outflows correlating differently with the business cycle, 
hindering the interpretation and confirming the necessity to estimate job 
separation hazards by destination state.  
Figure 2 shows separate Kaplan Meier survival functions for exits to 
another job, unemployment, and non-employment (treating other types of exits 
                                                        
52 The LIFO scheme is due to the lower dismissal costs associated with shorter job tenures. Cueto and 
Rodriguez (2013) show that the use of the LIFO scheme is becoming slightly weaker since 2010, but it is 
not clear whether this is because of the 2010 labour market reform or the economic crisis.  
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as right-censoring). For example, the probability that an employed changed to 
another job within a year fell from 34% in 2005 to 23% in 2009, but the 
probability to become unemployed within a year increased from 23% to 43%. 
Survival functions for exits to unemployment and other job show a greater 
decline after 180 and 360 days of employment, perhaps due to the higher 
incidence of temporary employment. The probability of a transition from a job 
to non-employment within one year fell from 41% to 38%. It is not clear what 
should be expected here due to the residual character of this exit, which 
combines voluntary exits from the labour market with involuntary exits of fired 
workers who are not entitled to unemployment benefits. 
 
Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier Survival estimates; exits from job spells to any 
destination state; 2005 and 2009 samples. Durations in days. 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration from LWLS. 
 
The hazard rates corresponding to these survival functions are sketched 
in Figures 3 and 4.53 The empirical hazard rate at time t is the proportion of 
individuals employed for at least t days that leave the job on day t+1. Figure 3 
shows that workers exhibit similar job separation patterns in both periods, with 
declining hazards until about 400 days of tenure. Some local peaks in the 
hazards are found, at 90, 180, 270 and 360 days. These peaks are also found in 
                                                        
53 The estimates use Kernel smoothing. 
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previous studies and correspond to the usual durations of temporary contracts. 
The hazard in Figure 3 is the sum of the hazards of the three exits in Figure 4: 
other job, unemployment and non-employment. The pattern of the overall 
hazard seems to follow that of the dominant destination in each sample.  
 
Figure 2: Kaplan Meier Survival estimates; Exits from employment to other 
job, unemployment and non-employment. 2005 and 2009 samples. Durations 
in days.  
 
 Source: Own elaboration from LWLS. 
 
The hazard rates corresponding to these survival functions are sketched 
in Figures 3 and 4.54 The empirical hazard rate at time t is the proportion of 
individuals employed for at least t days that leave the job on day t+1. Figure 3 
shows that workers exhibit similar job separation patterns in both periods, with 
declining hazards until about 400 days of tenure. Some local peaks in the 
hazards are found, at 90, 180, 270 and 360 days. These peaks are also found in 
previous studies and correspond to the usual durations of temporary contracts. 
The hazard in Figure 3 is the sum of the hazards of the three exits in Figure 4: 
other job, unemployment and non-employment. The pattern of the overall 
hazard seems to follow that of the dominant destination in each sample.  
The negative association between the hazard rate and the duration, with 
the exception of the peaks, is found for all exits. They may reflect both genuine 
                                                        
54 The estimates use Kernel smoothing. 
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negative state dependence and spurious negative state dependence due to 
heterogeneity and the changing nature of the pool of employed over time. 
These explanations will be disentangled in the econometric model.   
 
Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier kernel smoothed hazard functions; exits from 
employment to any destination state;  2005 and 2009 samples. Durations in 
days.  
 
Source: Own elaboration from LWLS. 
 
 
Figure 4: Kaplan Meier kernel smoothed hazard functions; exits from 
employment to other job, unemployment and non-employment. 2005 and 
2009 samples. Durations in days.  
  
Source: Own elaboration from LWLS. 
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3.5 Econometric framework for job stability analysis  
To analyse the pattern and determinants of job stability we use a single 
risk model (job separation) and a competing risk model (distinguishing between 
exits to other job, unemployment and non-employment).   
 
3.5.1 Single risk model 
Since job durations are measured in days, we consider the duration of 
each job spell as a continuous random variable. The hazard rate at duration t is 
the probability of job termination at spell length t conditional on the duration 
lasting up to t:  
h(t)=f(t)/S(t)            (1) 
Here f(t) represents the density function of the job durations and S(t) is 
the survival function given by S(t)=1-F(t), where F(t) is the cumulative density 
function. The interpretation is that the conditional probability of leaving 
employment in the short time interval (t, t+Δ) is approximately h(t)Δ.  
We specify the hazard using the multiple-spell data extension of the 
Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) model, using gap time representation: time is 
reset to zero after each event (see, e.g., van den Berg, 2001). The conditional 
hazard function evaluated at spell duration t for the s-th spell of individual i is 
given by the product of the baseline hazard, ℎ(), an observed heterogeneity 
factor, ()′	, including time-varying covariates (and excluding the intercept, 
as a normalization needed to identify the model) and an unobserved 
heterogeneity (“frailty”) component 
: 
 ℎ(|(), 
) = 
 ∙ ℎ() ∙ exp (()	)   (2) 
We assume that the baseline hazard (ℎ()) is piecewise constant (using 
mainly quarterly cut-points):  
ℎ() = ℎ  ∈ (, ),  = 1, … ,     (3) 
This specification has the advantage of not imposing a particular 
functional form, thus allowing for a flexible shape of duration dependence.  
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The main parameters of interest are in the vector 	 indicating how the 
hazard varies with observed individual and job characteristics. A positive 
coefficient implies that, other things (covariates and unobserved heterogeneity) 
being equal, an increase in the covariate leads to an increase in the probability 
that the job ends. A way to interpret the size of the coefficients is through the 
percentage change in the hazard produced by a one unit change in the 
covariate, obtained as ( − 1) ∙ 100.  
The proportional hazard assumption implies that the shape of the 
duration dependence (“baseline hazard”) is the same for all individuals; the 
covariates change the hazard rates with the same proportion at each t, so the 
level of the hazard may change across individuals.  
We assume that spells of the same individual share the same frailty. In 
other words, unobserved heterogeneity is at the level of person i: 
 = 
. 
Conditional on observed heterogeneity () and unobserved heterogeneity 
 
different durations of the same individual are independent. 
We assume that the distribution of the frailty term 
 is Gamma
55 with 
mean normalized to 1 and with finite variance . The parameter  indicates the 
amount of unobserved heterogeneity but also drives the correlation between 
recurrent events of the same individuals. The choice of this frailty distribution is 
justified by the fact that it gives a higher maximum likelihood than other 
common frailty distributions.56 Ignoring unobserved heterogeneity may lead to 
biases in the estimates of β and would make the estimated duration 
dependence more negative (Nickell, 1979). The flexible baseline hazard and the 
inclusion of frailty in the model make it possible to analyse genuine duration 
dependence before and during the crisis. The model can be estimated by 
maximum likelihood, using standard Stata commands. 
                                                        
55 The density of Gamma (1/,) is: J(K) = K
1
L ∙−
K
L
Γ(1 L )
1
L
 
56 Estimations assuming shared frailty heterogeneity fit better than estimations under unshared frailty for different 
distributions of the unobserved heterogeneity.  
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3.5.2 Multi-state (exit to other job, unemployment with benefits, or non-
employment): Competing risks model      
To analyse the employment duration pattern and the determinants of 
transitions to another job, unemployment, and non-employment, we extend 
the single risk model using a competing risks framework (see, e.g., Kalbfleisch 
and Prentice, 2002, Chapter 8). A job spell can end with a transition to another 
job (j=1), an unemployment with benefits (j=2), or non-employment (j=3). This 
gives the total hazard 
   ℎ() = ℎ() + ℎ() + ℎN()           (6) 
Here ℎ() is the hazard to exit from the employment spell to any 
destination state at job duration t, and h1(t), h2(t) and h3(t) are the hazards for 
exits to the three competing exits. Conditional on observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity, the competing risks are assumed to be independent. We specify 
the following Multivariate Mixed Proportional Hazard (MMPH) model with gap-
time representation with hazards ℎ (|(), 
)  for the three types of 
transitions j=1-3, of individual i conditional on observed and unobserved 
characteristics: 
ℎ (|(), 
) = ℎ
() ∙ exp (()	) ∙ exp(
)     (7) 
The baseline hazard for the transitions j=1-3,  ℎ
(), is specified as 
piecewise constant, as for the single risk model. The parameters of main 
interest are the vectors 	,  = 1,2,3, which determine how the three hazards 
vary with individual and job characteristics. A positive coefficient in 	of a 
covariate implies that, conditional on other covariates and unobserved 
heterogeneity, an increase of the covariates increases the probability of exit j.  
The unobserved heterogeneity terms are 
. Following Heckman and 
Singer (1984), we use discrete frailty and allow ,  and N to be correlated. 
This discrete distribution is computationally easier than continuous 
distributions. Moreover, it is common in the literature on labour market 
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transitions; see, for instance, Bover, Arellano and Bentolila (2002), Rebollo 
(2012), or Bijwaard and Wahba (2014). 
Under a discrete frailty distribution, the population consists of several 
subpopulations with different risks. For instance, one group of more motivated 
individuals and with a larger social network could have higher probabilities of 
finding another job but a lower probability to become unemployed or non-
employed. The group to which an individual belongs, however, is not observed. 
The population fractions of the groups are unknown parameters pk57. The 
number of groups is finite and denoted by K, with ; K is also the number 
of mass points of the distribution of (, , N).    
We assume that unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time (within 
and across spells of the same individual). For identification, we also assume it is 
independent of observed characteristics, the standard assumption in this kind of 
duration models (van den Berg, 2001). Moreover, since we do not impose a 
normalization on the baseline hazard or on ()	 , we need to impose 
E(Vj)=0:  for j=1,2,3 as a normalization.  
All parameters are estimated jointly by Maximum Likelihood. The 
likelihood function is, under the independence assumption, the product of the 
Likelihood function of all the individuals (i), 7 = ∏ 7 . The likelihood 
contribution 7 of individual i for three competing risks (j=1,2,3) can be written 
as the expected value of the conditional likelihood given (, , N):7 =
∑ 9:< ⋅ 7() , where 7()  is the conditional likelihood contribution 
given (, , N)  is equal to the k
th mass point  = (, , N).  This 
conditional likelihood contribution is a standard likelihood contribution in a 
model without unobserved heterogeneity; it includes the conditional density 
                                                        
57 To ensure the probability is between zero and one we assume  =
!"# ($%)
(&∑ !"# ($*))
-34
*64
 
 
pk
k=1
K
 =1
pkV
j
k=1
K
 = 0
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function for the observed exits of the completed spells and the conditional 
survival function for right-censored spells at each competing risks (j):  
7() = ∏ ∏ ℎ
?
< (|(@), 
)AB,C,DN<  E
FG(@), 
H  (8) 
Here s=1,…,S are the spells of individual i, and I,,  is a dummy  that is 1 if spell 
s ends in a transition of type  j and 0 otherwise. Our estimation code is based 
upon the Stata code of Bijwaard (2014).  
 
3.6 Estimation results  
3.6.1 Job stability 
Job search and matching theory imply that the valuation of labour market 
states by workers and firms depends on individual and job characteristics, as 
well as the state of the labour market (Frederiksen and Westergaard-Nielsen, 
2007). Moreover, according to more recent models, tenure is explicitly the 
outcome of the interaction of the dynamics across jobs and workers (Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1990, Burgess et al., 1999 and 2001). Empirical studies, for 
instance Hirsch and Schnabel (2012) and Frederiksen (2008) also point out the 
importance of considering these variables in workers’ transition behaviour 
studies. We therefore include as explanatory variables in our job duration 
model individual and job characteristics as well as macroeconomic variables 
(see Section 3). 
We estimated several specifications of the single and competing risk 
models. Table 4 presents the results for our benchmark models. Estimates for 
alternative specifications are presented in the appendix and briefly discussed 
below. The single risk benchmark model has a flexible piecewise constant 
baseline hazard and a shared Gamma distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, 
since this specification gave a better likelihood than several alternatives (such as 
unshared distributions or a shared inverse Gaussian distribution). For the 
competing risks model, the best likelihood is obtained using a discrete 
unobserved heterogeneity distribution with three mass points.  
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3.6.1.1 Coefficients on the covariates   
 Since the coefficients in the single risk model are difficult to interpret, we 
mainly focus on the coefficients of the competing risks model. One of the most 
important determinants of job stability is the quarterly regional unemployment 
rate. Consistent with the descriptive analysis, we find opposite signs: local 
unemployment is positively correlated with transitions into unemployment, in 
line with the findings of García-Pérez (1997) and Arranz and García-Serrano 
(2004) for layoffs, but negatively with exits to other jobs. The latter is in contrast 
with Blazquez-Cuesta (2008, Table A5) who found a positive effect of the yearly 
unemployment rate coefficient on changing jobs. The effect of the 
unemployment rate is stronger in exits to unemployment than in switches to 
other job during the crisis, which is in line with the higher importance of 
employment destruction compared to the reduction of job creation during the 
crisis (Silva and Vázquez-Grenno, 2013).   
Coefficients are smaller for the 2009 sample than for 2005, but given the 
higher unemployment rate, the average elasticity of transitions to 
unemployment for the regional unemployment rate has increased from 0.23 in 
2005 sample to 0.28 in 2009 sample. On the other hand, the elasticity of the 
job-to-job hazard has changed from -0.23 to -0.14, maybe because regional 
mobility has increased during the crisis.  
Higher regional unemployment rate reduces exits to non-employment 
especially in the expansion period. 
Gender differences in job stability become smaller during the crisis. The 
main change is that men in the 2005 sample were much less likely to become 
unemployed than otherwise similar women, but this advantage shrunk 
substantially in 2009 (from 24% to 11%). Men are more mobile across jobs, 
especially in the expansion period (8.2% more than women). During the 
economic boom, women were more likely (4.6%) to exit to non-employment, 
but this difference disappeared in 2009, perhaps because of an added worker 
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effect (fewer women give up their job because their husbands are unemployed 
or at risk to become unemployed). Previous evidence is mixed: in Blazquez-
Cuesta (2008) the male coefficient is not significant in transitions to other job 
and to non-employment. In Arranz and García-Serrano (2004) and García-
Serrano and Malo (1996) men are less likely to become unemployed than their 
female counterparts, but according to García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2005) as 
well as García-Pérez (1997), the gender impact is reversed for longer spell 
durations. 
 For both samples, the hazard for other job (except 16-19 aged workers) 
and non-employment is negatively correlated with age. This is in line with 
Blazquez-Cuesta (2008) who finds that transitions to another job or non-
employment are more likely among young workers. In general, according with 
job search and matching theory, older workers have had more time to find a 
better match that will typically last longer. The job-to-job pattern is consistent 
with job-shopping (Stigler, 1962). Younger workers are more likely than older 
ones to try a variety of jobs to learn about the labour market and get a better 
match. As far as non-employment exits are concerned, younger workers may 
not be entitled to unemployment benefits, and those without family 
responsibilities can more easily emigrate or go back to education than older 
groups. In contrast, the probability to become unemployed (with benefits) 
increases with age until about age 30. To sum up, in the downturn, workers of 
ages 35-55 years become more mobile, while the group of 16-29 years old 
seems to be hit hardest by the crisis in terms of a substantial increase in the 
probability of unemployment or non-employment.  
Immigrants exhibit more job mobility and fewer transitions to 
unemployment than natives during the expansion period. The latter may be due 
to their lower unemployment coverage given their less stable careers. However, 
in the downturn, the probability of an unemployment exit for Spanish speaking 
immigrants is similar to that of natives. The job-to-job mobility for both groups 
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of immigrants is reduced, also becoming similar to that of natives. Immigrants 
show more transitions to non-employment than natives in both periods, 
probably due to return migration (Dustmann et al., 2010). In conclusion, 
specifically Spanish speaking immigrants, have suffered the highest increase in 
job instability in the contraction period. 
There is no clear pattern in the effects of having dependent children on 
the hazards, with changing signs and significance levels. In both periods, 
individuals living in larger cities show lower job mobility and a lower exit 
probability to non-employment, but they are more likely (2.7%) to enter 
unemployment than others. 
A higher level of education is important to reduce the probability to 
become unemployed in both periods. The difference between primary and 
lower secondary education is significant during the crisis only. This is in line with 
the theory predicting that during the crisis, firms fire the more replaceable low 
educated employees. On the other hand, the higher educated have a higher 
probability to exit to non-employment in both periods. During the crisis, job 
mobility is rising with education level. This may reveal a preference on the firm 
side for recruiting higher educated workers. To conclude, it seems that the least 
educated workers are the most adversely affected by the economic crisis, both 
in terms of job-to-job mobility and in the chances of unemployment. 
Workers in non-manual occupations have more stable jobs than manual 
workers, with lower hazards in both periods for all destinations, particularly to 
unemployment. Arranz and García-Serrano (2004) found that non-manual 
workers have a lower probability of job termination than manual workers due 
to temporary contracts. 
In order to interpret coefficients of current job characteristics it is 
important to note that they may capture causal effects but also (time-
persistent) heterogeneity. The influence of the industry on job duration varies 
over the business cycle and destination states. The results show that different 
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industries are affected differently by the crisis. For example, the burst of the 
housing bubble severely hit the construction sector so that workers in 
construction suffered a substantial increase in the probability to become 
unemployed, going from the lowest to the highest unemployment exit 
probability, and a fall in job-to-job rotation. Jobs in sectors more intensive 
technology where human capital accumulation is more relevant, seem to be 
more stable than those in other sectors, showing lower incidence in 
unemployment and non-employment, but higher job mobility in both periods.   
The estimated coefficients on firm size all confirm that job stability 
increases with firm size. This is in line with the findings of Blázquez-Cuesta 
(2008) for the period 1995-2001. During the crisis, the probability of job ending 
to any exit has decreased compared to the reference category (firm size 1-9). 
Especially workers in the largest firms exhibit a decline in all the hazard rates 
compared to those in the smallest firms, particularly in transitions to other jobs 
and non-employment. Firms for which firm size is missing are often unstable 
firms that have disappeared, explaining why workers in these firms exhibit 
higher exit chances. This effect is stronger during the downturn. 
Larger firms tend to provide better working conditions, implying higher 
separation costs for employers and higher opportunity cost of quitting. Higher 
investment in the hiring process ensures a better matching between employee 
and employer. In contrast, small firms usually offer short-term jobs due to a 
lower capability of internal labour market adjustments.  
  
1
0
8
 
Ta
bl
e 
4:
 E
st
im
at
io
n 
re
su
lts
 o
f 
si
ng
le
 r
is
k 
(a
ny
 e
xi
t)
 a
nd
 c
or
re
la
te
d 
co
m
pe
tin
g 
ris
ks
 (
ex
it 
to
 o
th
er
 jo
b,
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
an
d 
no
n-
em
pl
oy
m
en
t)
 m
od
el
s f
or
 2
00
5 
an
d 
20
09
 sa
m
pl
es
.  
20
05
 sa
m
pl
e 
20
09
 sa
m
pl
e 
An
y 
ex
it 
Jo
b 
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
N
on
-e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
An
y 
ex
it 
Jo
b 
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
N
on
-e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e 
-0
.3
41
**
* 
-2
.4
54
**
* 
2.
48
2*
**
 
-0
.3
67
**
* 
0.
36
1*
**
 
-0
.8
19
**
* 
1.
52
8*
**
 
-0
.2
40
**
 
  
(0
.0
80
8)
 
(0
.1
50
) 
(0
.1
72
) 
(0
.1
26
) 
(0
.0
53
4)
 
(0
.1
26
) 
(0
.0
88
1)
 
(0
.0
97
2)
 
M
al
e 
 
-0
.0
36
0*
**
 
0.
07
73
**
* 
-0
.2
75
**
* 
-0
.0
46
2*
**
 
-0
.0
14
2*
* 
0.
05
41
**
* 
-0
.1
16
**
* 
0.
01
16
 
  
(0
.0
06
97
) 
(0
.0
12
2)
 
(0
.0
16
1)
 
(0
.0
11
1)
 
(0
.0
06
32
) 
(0
.0
14
4)
 
(0
.0
10
8)
 
(0
.0
11
0)
 
Ag
ed
_1
6_
19
 
0.
30
7*
**
 
-0
.3
26
**
* 
-1
.1
05
**
* 
0.
84
0*
**
 
0.
32
0*
**
 
-0
.4
79
**
* 
-0
.8
83
**
* 
0.
93
3*
**
 
  
(0
.0
12
5)
 
(0
.0
26
5)
 
(0
.0
52
6)
 
(0
.0
17
0)
 
(0
.0
17
2)
 
(0
.0
55
8)
 
(0
.0
48
7)
 
(0
.0
23
2)
 
Ag
ed
_2
0_
24
 
0.
14
0*
**
 
-0
.0
44
2*
**
 
-0
.2
58
**
* 
0.
41
7*
**
 
0.
13
1*
**
 
-0
.1
11
**
* 
-0
.1
67
**
* 
0.
46
3*
**
 
  
(0
.0
07
66
) 
(0
.0
13
1)
 
(0
.0
19
7)
 
(0
.0
12
1)
 
(0
.0
09
18
) 
(0
.0
21
5)
 
(0
.0
17
0)
 
(0
.0
15
0)
 
Ag
ed
_3
0_
34
 
-0
.0
56
4*
**
 
-0
.0
69
8*
**
 
0.
09
96
**
* 
-0
.1
40
**
* 
-0
.0
55
3*
**
 
-0
.0
69
7*
**
 
0.
05
31
**
* 
-0
.1
84
**
* 
  
(0
.0
07
99
) 
(0
.0
12
9)
 
(0
.0
17
7)
 
(0
.0
13
8)
 
(0
.0
08
87
) 
(0
.0
19
1)
 
(0
.0
14
6)
 
(0
.0
16
4)
 
Ag
ed
_3
5_
39
 
-0
.0
94
2*
**
 
-0
.1
63
**
* 
0.
10
3*
**
 
-0
.1
54
**
* 
-0
.0
67
0*
**
 
-0
.1
31
**
* 
0.
07
14
**
* 
-0
.2
03
**
* 
  
(0
.0
09
17
) 
(0
.0
15
2)
 
(0
.0
19
6)
 
(0
.0
15
8)
 
(0
.0
09
63
) 
(0
.0
21
2)
 
(0
.0
15
6)
 
(0
.0
18
2)
 
Ag
ed
_4
0_
44
 
-0
.1
14
**
* 
-0
.2
34
**
* 
0.
09
30
**
* 
-0
.1
53
**
* 
-0
.0
62
9*
**
 
-0
.1
70
**
* 
0.
09
88
**
* 
-0
.2
19
**
* 
  
(0
.0
10
1)
 
(0
.0
17
1)
 
(0
.0
21
1)
 
(0
.0
17
4)
 
(0
.0
10
4)
 
(0
.0
23
6)
 
(0
.0
16
6)
 
(0
.0
19
9)
 
Ag
ed
_4
5_
49
 
-0
.1
89
**
* 
-0
.3
42
**
* 
0.
07
69
**
* 
-0
.2
51
**
* 
-0
.0
69
1*
**
 
-0
.2
16
**
* 
0.
11
1*
**
 
-0
.2
55
**
* 
  
(0
.0
11
2)
 
(0
.0
19
3)
 
(0
.0
22
5)
 
(0
.0
19
4)
 
(0
.0
11
2)
 
(0
.0
26
1)
 
(0
.0
17
4)
 
(0
.0
21
7)
 
Ag
ed
_5
0_
55
 
-0
.2
03
**
* 
-0
.4
71
**
* 
0.
13
6*
**
 
-0
.2
41
**
* 
-0
.0
81
5*
**
 
-0
.3
24
**
* 
0.
11
6*
**
 
-0
.2
60
**
* 
  
(0
.0
13
8)
 
(0
.0
25
0)
 
(0
.0
26
6)
 
(0
.0
24
2)
 
(0
.0
13
1)
 
(0
.0
31
9)
 
(0
.0
20
0)
 
(0
.0
25
8)
 
Sp
an
is
h 
sp
ea
ke
rs
 
0.
13
0*
**
 
0.
16
4*
**
 
-0
.3
42
**
* 
0.
30
4*
**
 
0.
10
9*
**
 
-0
.0
10
4 
0.
01
65
 
0.
31
4*
**
 
  
(0
.0
11
9)
 
(0
.0
19
4)
 
(0
.0
31
2)
 
(0
.0
19
0)
 
(0
.0
12
1)
 
(0
.0
28
8)
 
(0
.0
20
4)
 
(0
.0
21
2)
 
N
on
 S
pa
ni
sh
 sp
ea
ke
rs
 
0.
13
9*
**
 
0.
06
89
**
* 
-0
.1
19
**
* 
0.
32
6*
**
 
0.
06
37
**
* 
0.
02
58
 
-0
.1
24
**
* 
0.
31
6*
**
 
(0
.0
11
2)
 
(0
.0
18
8)
 
(0
.0
26
9)
 
(0
.0
18
2)
 
(0
.0
09
27
) 
(0
.0
21
6)
 
(0
.0
15
8)
 
(0
.0
16
2)
 
ch
ild
re
n_
4 
0.
00
57
1 
-0
.0
28
7*
* 
0.
08
68
**
* 
-0
.0
08
13
 
-0
.0
00
19
8 
-0
.0
34
6*
 
0.
07
95
**
* 
-0
.0
75
9*
**
 
(0
.0
08
21
) 
(0
.0
13
7)
 
(0
.0
17
5)
 
(0
.0
13
9)
 
(0
.0
08
54
) 
(0
.0
19
3)
 
(0
.0
13
4)
 
(0
.0
16
1)
 
ch
ild
re
n_
15
 
-0
.0
16
1*
* 
-0
.0
12
1 
0.
03
67
**
 
-0
.0
64
6*
**
 
0.
00
04
40
 
0.
02
73
* 
0.
05
94
**
* 
-0
.1
15
**
* 
(0
.0
07
09
) 
(0
.0
12
0)
 
(0
.0
14
3)
 
(0
.0
12
3)
 
(0
.0
07
21
) 
(0
.0
16
6)
 
(0
.0
11
0)
 
(0
.0
14
2)
 
Pr
im
ar
y_
ed
uc
at
io
n 
0.
03
13
**
* 
-0
.0
21
7*
 
0.
02
39
 
0.
09
79
**
* 
0.
03
49
**
* 
-0
.0
46
3*
* 
0.
09
22
**
* 
0.
01
86
 
(0
.0
07
05
) 
(0
.0
12
3)
 
(0
.0
15
2)
 
(0
.0
11
7)
 
(0
.0
07
53
) 
(0
.0
18
8)
 
(0
.0
11
8)
 
(0
.0
14
0)
 
U
pp
er
-S
ec
on
da
ry
 
0.
01
48
**
 
-0
.0
25
2*
* 
-0
.1
50
**
* 
0.
10
6*
**
 
0.
00
39
7 
0.
01
80
 
-0
.1
51
**
* 
0.
13
1*
**
 
(0
.0
06
78
) 
(0
.0
11
6)
 
(0
.0
15
4)
 
(0
.0
11
1)
 
(0
.0
07
33
) 
(0
.0
16
9)
 
(0
.0
12
4)
 
(0
.0
13
0)
 
Po
st
-s
ec
on
da
ry
 
0.
03
54
**
* 
0.
02
00
 
-0
.5
05
**
* 
0.
21
4*
**
 
-0
.0
67
5*
**
 
0.
05
81
**
* 
-0
.4
90
**
* 
0.
15
5*
**
 
(0
.0
08
64
) 
(0
.0
14
9)
 
(0
.0
22
0)
 
(0
.0
13
5)
 
(0
.0
09
51
) 
(0
.0
20
7)
 
(0
.0
17
6)
 
(0
.0
16
1)
 
 
  
1
0
9
 
Ta
bl
e 
4,
 c
on
tin
ue
d 
 
 
20
05
 
20
09
 
An
y 
ex
it 
Jo
b 
U
ne
m
p.
 
N
on
-e
m
p.
 
An
y 
ex
it 
Jo
b 
U
ne
m
p.
 
N
on
-e
m
p.
 
In
ha
bi
ta
nt
s>
40
,0
00
 
-0
.0
39
0*
**
 
-0
.0
36
9*
**
 
0.
02
41
**
 
-0
.0
70
3*
**
 
-0
.0
19
0*
**
 
-0
.0
57
1*
**
 
0.
01
73
* 
-0
.0
43
5*
**
 
(0
.0
05
18
) 
(0
.0
08
75
) 
(0
.0
11
2)
 
(0
.0
08
43
) 
(0
.0
05
62
) 
(0
.0
12
8)
 
(0
.0
08
92
) 
(0
.0
09
82
) 
N
on
 m
an
ua
l 
-0
.1
64
**
* 
-0
.0
62
3*
**
 
-0
.2
56
**
* 
-0
.2
00
**
* 
-0
.1
59
**
* 
-0
.0
30
9*
 
-0
.3
00
**
* 
-0
.1
06
**
* 
(0
.0
06
57
) 
(0
.0
11
3)
 
(0
.0
14
5)
 
(0
.0
10
3)
 
(0
.0
07
00
) 
(0
.0
15
9)
 
(0
.0
11
6)
 
(0
.0
11
7)
 
Co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n 
-0
.2
07
**
* 
-0
.0
55
2*
**
 
-0
.3
38
**
* 
-0
.3
16
**
* 
0.
01
18
 
-0
.1
38
**
* 
0.
20
2*
**
 
-0
.2
41
**
* 
(0
.0
07
78
) 
(0
.0
12
5)
 
(0
.0
17
7)
 
(0
.0
13
3)
 
(0
.0
08
75
) 
(0
.0
20
2)
 
(0
.0
13
2)
 
(0
.0
17
0)
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
-0
.2
19
**
* 
-0
.3
24
**
* 
-0
.0
06
85
 
-0
.2
74
**
* 
-0
.1
14
**
* 
-0
.2
50
**
* 
0.
00
69
9 
-0
.2
40
**
* 
(0
.0
09
39
) 
(0
.0
16
1)
 
(0
.0
18
3)
 
(0
.0
15
7)
 
(0
.0
11
3)
 
(0
.0
26
1)
 
(0
.0
16
6)
 
(0
.0
21
7)
 
Hi
gh
_t
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
-0
.0
24
2*
* 
0.
07
90
**
* 
-0
.1
22
**
* 
-0
.0
70
0*
**
 
-0
.0
52
9*
**
 
0.
06
08
* 
-0
.0
65
3*
* 
-0
.1
35
**
* 
(0
.0
10
1)
 
(0
.0
16
5)
 
(0
.0
22
8)
 
(0
.0
16
6)
 
(0
.0
18
1)
 
(0
.0
35
7)
 
(0
.0
29
6)
 
(0
.0
33
6)
 
si
ze
_1
0_
19
 
-0
.0
78
0*
**
 
-0
.0
53
8*
**
 
-0
.1
56
**
* 
-0
.0
82
6*
**
 
-0
.1
30
**
* 
-0
.1
05
**
* 
-0
.1
77
**
* 
-0
.1
19
**
* 
(0
.0
08
73
) 
(0
.0
14
5)
 
(0
.0
18
9)
 
(0
.0
14
3)
 
(0
.0
09
36
) 
(0
.0
21
0)
 
(0
.0
14
6)
 
(0
.0
16
8)
 
si
ze
_2
0_
49
 
-0
.1
31
**
* 
-0
.1
16
**
* 
-0
.2
49
**
* 
-0
.1
24
**
* 
-0
.1
66
**
* 
-0
.1
75
**
* 
-0
.2
24
**
* 
-0
.1
43
**
* 
(0
.0
08
09
) 
(0
.0
13
5)
 
(0
.0
17
5)
 
(0
.0
13
3)
 
(0
.0
08
78
) 
(0
.0
19
8)
 
(0
.0
13
8)
 
(0
.0
15
6)
 
si
ze
_5
0_
24
9 
-0
.1
77
**
* 
-0
.2
50
**
* 
-0
.2
56
**
* 
-0
.1
27
**
* 
-0
.2
34
**
* 
-0
.3
30
**
* 
-0
.2
96
**
* 
-0
.1
77
**
* 
(0
.0
07
70
) 
(0
.0
13
2)
 
(0
.0
16
4)
 
(0
.0
12
4)
 
(0
.0
08
25
) 
(0
.0
18
9)
 
(0
.0
13
0)
 
(0
.0
14
3)
 
si
ze
_2
50
 
-0
.2
44
**
* 
-0
.3
86
**
* 
-0
.3
57
**
* 
-0
.1
23
**
* 
-0
.3
37
**
* 
-0
.5
39
**
* 
-0
.3
89
**
* 
-0
.2
33
**
* 
(0
.0
08
58
) 
(0
.0
15
0)
 
(0
.0
18
8)
 
(0
.0
13
6)
 
(0
.0
09
45
) 
(0
.0
21
7)
 
(0
.0
15
2)
 
(0
.0
16
0)
 
O
pe
n-
en
de
d 
0.
01
21
 
-0
.8
86
**
* 
0.
72
3*
**
 
-0
.3
21
**
* 
-0
.0
16
2 
-0
.8
78
**
* 
0.
31
4*
**
 
-0
.3
13
**
* 
(0
.0
14
3)
 
(0
.0
38
7)
 
(0
.0
21
4)
 
(0
.0
25
3)
 
(0
.0
12
3)
 
(0
.0
41
7)
 
(0
.0
16
6)
 
(0
.0
22
7)
 
Pe
rm
an
en
t 
-1
.7
17
**
* 
-1
.4
34
**
* 
-2
.0
89
**
* 
-1
.9
80
**
* 
-1
.5
54
**
* 
-1
.1
63
**
* 
-1
.7
75
**
* 
-1
.8
16
**
* 
(0
.0
08
87
) 
(0
.0
13
0)
 
(0
.0
22
2)
 
(0
.0
15
2)
 
(0
.0
09
59
) 
(0
.0
17
7)
 
(0
.0
15
1)
 
(0
.0
17
0)
 
O
n-
ca
ll 
Te
m
po
ra
ry
 
-0
.0
85
1*
**
 
-0
.1
26
**
* 
-0
.3
01
**
* 
0.
07
30
**
* 
-0
.0
01
71
 
0.
01
98
 
-0
.1
54
**
* 
0.
21
4*
**
 
(0
.0
12
2)
 
(0
.0
22
4)
 
(0
.0
25
2)
 
(0
.0
19
2)
 
(0
.0
11
6)
 
(0
.0
26
7)
 
(0
.0
19
5)
 
(0
.0
19
7)
 
Du
m
m
y 
m
is
si
ng
 fi
rm
 si
ze
  
0.
66
1*
**
 
0.
94
1*
**
 
0.
43
6*
**
 
0.
43
8*
**
 
0.
69
3*
**
 
0.
95
1*
**
 
0.
60
1*
**
 
0.
56
2*
**
 
(0
.0
10
9)
 
(0
.0
17
3)
 
(0
.0
26
9)
 
(0
.0
18
2)
 
(0
.0
14
2)
 
(0
.0
30
9)
 
(0
.0
23
7)
 
(0
.0
23
6)
 
Te
m
po
ra
ry
 A
ge
nc
y 
0.
62
5*
**
 
1.
08
2*
**
 
0.
16
8*
**
 
0.
35
9*
**
 
0.
52
9*
**
 
1.
11
0*
**
 
0.
23
3*
**
 
0.
36
8*
**
 
(0
.0
11
2)
 
(0
.0
18
2)
 
(0
.0
30
6)
 
(0
.0
18
5)
 
(0
.0
14
0)
 
(0
.0
28
3)
 
(0
.0
25
9)
 
(0
.0
23
9)
 
Pu
bl
ic
 S
ec
to
r 
-0
.1
20
**
* 
-0
.5
32
**
* 
0.
19
8*
**
 
-0
.0
18
5 
-0
.0
08
12
 
-0
.2
82
**
* 
0.
15
8*
**
 
-0
.0
18
1 
(0
.0
11
3)
 
(0
.0
22
8)
 
(0
.0
21
7)
 
(0
.0
17
5)
 
(0
.0
10
5)
 
(0
.0
26
0)
 
(0
.0
16
5)
 
(0
.0
17
8)
 
ln
_d
ai
ly
_s
al
ar
y 
-0
.0
16
7*
* 
0.
17
5*
**
 
0.
14
4*
**
 
-0
.2
31
**
* 
0.
01
29
* 
0.
23
7*
**
 
0.
05
70
**
* 
-0
.1
45
**
* 
(0
.0
07
20
) 
(0
.0
12
4)
 
(0
.0
15
5)
 
(0
.0
11
4)
 
(0
.0
07
34
) 
(0
.0
16
6)
 
(0
.0
11
9)
 
(0
.0
12
2)
 
 
  
1
1
0
 
Ta
bl
e 
4,
 c
on
tin
ue
d 
20
05
 
20
09
 
An
y 
ex
it 
Jo
b 
U
ne
m
p.
 
N
on
-e
m
p.
 
An
y 
ex
it 
Jo
b 
U
ne
m
p.
 
N
on
-e
m
p.
 
Pa
rt
 ti
m
e 
co
ef
. 
-0
.1
88
**
* 
0.
14
2*
**
 
0.
73
3*
**
 
-0
.5
96
**
* 
-0
.1
89
**
* 
-0
.1
35
**
* 
0.
56
3*
**
 
-0
.7
20
**
* 
(0
.0
15
9)
 
(0
.0
29
8)
 
(0
.0
38
2)
 
(0
.0
24
1)
 
(0
.0
16
0)
 
(0
.0
37
9)
 
(0
.0
27
9)
 
(0
.0
26
1)
 
Ln
 T
he
ta
 
-2
.9
95
**
* 
-4
.2
37
**
* 
( 0
.0
81
27
93
) 
(0
.3
05
) 
V1
 
-0
.5
90
**
* 
-0
.1
34
**
 
0.
70
6*
**
 
-0
.4
61
**
* 
0.
05
58
**
* 
0.
76
5 
 
(0
.0
93
1)
 
(0
.0
58
1)
 
(0
.0
46
4)
 
(0
.0
73
3)
 
(0
.0
20
4)
 
  
V2
 
0.
39
4*
**
 
0.
15
8*
**
 
-0
.1
25
**
* 
-1
.0
26
**
* 
-2
.2
56
**
* 
 -1
3.
22
 
(0
.0
26
9)
 
(0
.0
23
6)
 
(0
.0
37
2)
 
(0
.1
56
) 
(0
.3
28
) 
  
a1
 
1.
77
9*
**
 
0.
32
6*
 
(0
.1
81
) 
(0
.1
94
) 
a2
 
2.
47
7*
**
 
-2
.5
92
**
* 
(0
.1
61
) 
(0
.1
96
) 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
90
3,
14
7 
90
3,
14
7 
90
3,
14
7 
90
3,
14
7 
71
5,
70
5 
71
5,
70
5 
71
5,
70
5 
71
5,
70
5 
Lo
g 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
-2
82
,3
42
 
-1
,3
03
,0
00
 
-2
25
,7
04
 
-1
,0
49
,0
00
 
N
um
be
r o
f i
ds
 
17
6,
41
9 
17
6,
41
9 
17
6,
41
9 
17
6,
41
9 
14
1,
15
3 
14
1,
15
3 
14
1,
15
3 
14
1,
15
3 
N
um
be
r o
f e
xi
ts
 
17
1,
80
6 
63
,3
14
 
35
,4
76
 
73
,0
16
 
13
8,
46
7 
29
,6
27
 
57
,8
25
 
51
,0
15
 
Te
rm
s o
f m
as
s p
oi
nt
s 
  
1 
2 
3 
  
1 
2 
3 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 
0.
31
 
0.
63
 
0.
05
 
0.
56
 
0.
03
 
0.
41
 
V 
jo
b 
-0
.5
9 
0.
39
 
-1
.1
9 
-0
.4
6 
-1
.0
3 
0.
72
 
V 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
-0
.1
3 
0.
16
 
-1
.0
9 
0.
06
 
-2
.2
6 
0.
09
 
V 
no
n-
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
0.
71
 
-0
.1
2 
-2
.6
9 
0.
77
 
-1
3.
22
 
-2
.5
9 
Rh
o 
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
N
on
-e
m
p.
 
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
N
on
-e
m
p.
 
Jo
b 
0.
86
 
0.
02
 
0.
34
 
-0
.3
1 
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
  
  
0.
53
 
  
  
  
0.
72
 
  
 No
te
s:
 S
in
gl
e 
ris
k 
es
tim
at
io
n:
 p
ie
ce
w
ise
 b
as
el
in
e 
an
d 
sh
ar
ed
 fr
ai
lty
 a
ss
um
in
g 
Ga
m
m
a 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
fo
r u
no
bs
er
ve
d 
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ity
. B
ot
h 
in
 2
00
5 
an
d 
20
09
 L
R 
te
st
 s
ho
w
 th
at
 
fr
ai
lty
 is
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 (p
-v
al
ue
=0
.0
00
). 
Co
rr
el
at
ed
 C
om
pe
tin
g 
ris
ks
 e
st
im
at
io
n:
 p
ie
ce
w
ise
 b
as
el
in
e 
an
d 
di
sc
re
te
 d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 u
no
bs
er
ve
d 
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ity
 w
ith
 th
re
e 
m
as
s p
oi
nt
s. 
 
Re
fe
re
nc
es
 c
at
eg
or
ie
s:
 fe
m
al
e,
 A
ge
d_
25
_2
9,
 , 
lo
w
er
 s
ec
on
da
ry
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
le
ve
l, 
Na
tiv
e 
Sp
an
ish
, m
an
ua
l o
cc
up
at
io
n,
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
se
ct
or
,n
on
-h
ig
h 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 s
ec
to
r, 
siz
e_
1_
9,
 
te
m
po
ra
ry
 co
nt
ra
ct
, ,
 P
riv
at
e 
se
ct
or
. A
ge
, d
ai
ly
 w
ag
e,
 a
nd
 q
ua
rt
er
ly
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e 
ar
e 
tim
e-
va
ry
in
g 
va
ria
bl
es
. S
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 le
ve
ls:
 *
**
 p
<0
.0
1,
 *
* 
p<
0.
05
, *
 p
<0
.1
. 
St
an
da
rd
 E
rr
or
s f
or
 so
m
e 
un
ob
se
rv
ed
 h
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
 p
ar
am
et
er
s c
ou
ld
 n
ot
 b
e 
co
m
pu
te
d 
fo
r 2
00
9 
sin
ce
 p
ar
am
et
er
s t
en
d 
to
 -∞
. 
 
111 
 
As expected, the type of contract influences job stability. Employees with 
open-ended contracts exhibit the highest unemployment hazard in both 
samples, followed by temporary, on-call and permanent contracts. During the 
crisis, particularly the hazards of on-call temporary contracts to all destination 
states have increased substantially. The higher job-to-job hazard rates of 
workers with fixed-term contracts may be related to their possibility of 
anticipating the end of the contract to search early and avoid unemployment. 
The lower exit hazards of permanent contracts, also found in Blazquez-Cuesta 
(2008), might be explained by the fact that permanent contracts tend to be 
signed by workers in primary jobs that are hard to replace. Workers from 
temporary help agencies (THA workers) exhibit less stable careers, especially 
during the crisis, with higher job rotation, unemployment risk and non-
employment hazard rates than those hired directly. The higher unemployment 
incidence is confirmed by García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2005), who argue 
that THA contracts are used for temporarily adjusting capacity to the economic 
situation.   
Public sector workers are less likely to change jobs but more likely to 
become unemployed than those in the private sector. Both groups show the 
same exit probability to non-employment. Previous evidence on this is mixed: 
García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2005) find a positive impact of public sector on 
the hazard from employment to unemployment, not including job 
characteristics such as type of contract, firm size or industry. Blázquez-Cuesta 
(2008) finds that working in the public sector reduces the hazard of changing job 
or moving towards non-employment.   
Following Blazquez-Cuesta (2008)58 we also consider the wage level as a 
job characteristic (exogenously given). The influence of the wage level59 on the 
                                                        
58 Blazquez-Cuesta(2008) demonstrates that low pay can be assumed to be exogenous to job mobility. 
59Since in the LWLS information about hours worked is not available we are not able to compute hourly wages. The 
possible distortion, already mentioned by Arranz and García-Serrano (2012), due to the use of daily wage instead of 
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separation rates differs across economic periods. Workers with higher wages 
exhibit higher job mobility (especially in the downturn), more chances to 
become unemployed (mainly during the expansion period), and lower 
separation rates to non-employment. Unlike our results, Arranz and García-
Serrano (2004) found a disincentive effect of wages on the hazard rate for 
involuntary job termination (layoff and end of temporary contract) for the 
period 1987-1997; they did not include characteristics of the current job such a 
type of contract, industry, firm size and part time coefficient.  
The positive relationship between earnings and the hazard of 
unemployment in the expansion period might be explained by the strategic use 
of unemployment benefits by firms and workers with consecutive employment 
spells and unemployment benefit spells (Alba et al., 2012). In the downturn this 
seems to be less relevant.  
Job starters with a higher part time coefficient have higher job mobility 
and unemployment risk, specially in 2005, although lower probability to exit 
into non-employment. During the downturn, job instability has increased for 
part time workers who have lower opportunity costs to leave the labour market.  
 
3.6.1.2 Unobserved heterogeneity  
In the single risk specifications, the variance of unobserved heterogeneity 
is higher in the 2005 than in the 2009 sample (5% versus 1.4%). In the 
competing risks estimations, it is also significantly present in both periods, 
demonstrating the importance of unobserved characteristics such as 
motivation, effort, social pressure, etc. to remain in the same job. 
According to the estimated discrete distribution, the correlation between 
the unobserved heterogeneity terms changes over the business cycle. The most 
interesting one is the correlation between job-to-job and unemployment 
                                                                                                                                                                  
hourly wage in workers with different number of hours worked  is mitigated by the small proportion of part-time 
jobs in Spanish labour market and the inclusion of part-time coefficient as an explanatory variable. 
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hazards, which is 0.86 in 2005 and 0.34 in 2009 and significant. This implies that 
someone who is likely to become unemployed also has higher chances of exiting 
to another job, particularly  during the expansion period. This could point at the 
strategic use of unemployment benefits during the expansion period. 
Most individuals (63% in 2005 and 41% in 2009) belong to a group in 
which exit hazard rates to unemployment and to other job are both higher than 
the average, but while hazard rates to non-employment are relatively low. A 
second group (31% in 2005 and 56% in 2009) has lower chances to exit to 
another job (45% and 37% lower than average) but high chances to exit to non-
employment. The smallest proportion of individuals belong to the most stable 
group (5% in 2005 and 3% in 2009) in which all exit hazard rates are lower than 
the  average. 
 
3.6.1.3 Baseline Hazard Estimates 
Figure 5 shows the survival and hazard functions of the competing risks 
model for a benchmarck person. Unlike Figures 1 to 4, observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity are controlled for through the covariates and frailty 
terms, so that slopes can be interpreted as true state dependence. The top 
panel shows, for instance, that in the benchmarck group in 2005, 43% would 
move to another job within 1 year, 21% would become unemployed and 41% 
non-employed, so that the probability of ending the current job would be 73% 
(1-0.56*0.78*0.59)*100). In 2009, the probability to switch to another job has 
fallen by 11% points, while the probability to become unemployed has 
increased by 18% points and the likelihood to become non-employed has 
slightly fallen. Adding up these three, the bechmarck group’s probability to 
ending the job remains virtually constant, in line with the flat separation pattern 
over the business cycle found by Bachman (2005). Correspondingly, while the 
overall median job duration (not shown) was approximately seven months in 
both periods, the median job durations (assuming other competing risks do not 
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exist) for exits to other jobs increased from 14 to 19 months and for non-
employment from 16 to 19 months, but decreased from 25 to 15 months for 
unemployment transitions.  
The botton panel shows the corresponding hazard rates. Exits to other 
jobs are more likely than exits to unemployment during the expansion period, 
while the opposite is found in the downturn (except for 7-9 months). This 
confirms that hazard rates into unemployment are countercyclical while hazard 
rates for job-to-job exits or into non-employment are procyclical, resulting in an 
almost constant overall hazard over the business cycle.  
García-Perez and Muñoz-Bullón (2005) found that the hazard into 
unemployment is counter-cyclical only for short employment spells (under 5 
months) and García-Pérez (1997), for the period 1978-1993, found weakly pro-
cyclical pattern for short jobs and a-cyclical patterns for jobs longer than six 
months. The international evidence, however, reveals strong counter-cyclicality. 
 
Figure 5. Survival functions (top panel) and hazard rates (bottom panel) 
benchmark person for job, unemployment and non-employment transitions; 
2005 and 2009 samples; competing risks model  
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Figure 5, continued 
 
  
 
Note: Benchmarck individual: male, low-skilled, non-manual occupation, native, 25-29 Aged, No children, 
services sector, Non-High-Technology, temporary contract, firm size 1-9, No through temporary Agency, 
private sector. For continuous variables mean value is taken. 
 
For exits to other job and unemployment, we find slight positive duration 
dependence during the first 1.5 years of employment, stronger in exits to 
unemployment in 2009 and in transitions to other job in 2005, that 
subsequently turns negative. These patterns might be explained by job 
matching theory. In a first stage hazard rates increase since employers and 
employees are learning from the matching quality;  thereafter job exits decline 
and good matches survive. Since job-to-job exits dominate in 2005 and job-to-
unemployment exits in 2009,  the job separation process is more an employee 
decision in 2005 (given that in the expansion period workers have more chances 
to leave poor matches), while in 2009 job separations are more driven by 
employer decisions and workers are willing to remain in a poor match due to 
the lack of job oportunities. The initially increasing pattern of the job-to-
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unemployment hazard may also be explained by the lower number of workers 
entitled to unemployment benefits60 after a few days of contribution. 
 
3.6.1.4 Sensitivity analysis  
 Table A3 in the Appendix shows the results of a competing risks model 
for exits to stable and unstable jobs in which the two shared frailty terms follow 
independent Gamma distributions. Comparing to the correlated competing risks 
model in Table 4 shows that the coefficients retain the same sign and similar 
size. Significance levels are also similar; only four coefficients change the 
significant level. 
 
3.6.2 The role of compositional variation and business cycle in job duration 
Table 7 shows the results of decompositions61 of the difference between 
the survival probabilities after 360 days in the periods before and during the 
crisis, in the spirit of, for example, Verho (2014). The first rows give the average 
survival probabilities for the two samples according to the model estimates62 
and the difference between these two. For example, according to the 
competing risk model the average probability of not switching to another job 
(assuming no other exit possibilities) was 71.76 percent, which increased to 
80.44 percent in the 2009 sample, a difference of 8.69 percentage points. In the 
same line, the average of not exiting to non-employment increased from 61.76 
percent in 2005 to 72.6 percent in 2009. In contrast, the probability of not 
becoming unemployed decreased substantially from 83.8 percent in 2005 
sample to 66.38 percent in 2009 sample.  
                                                        
60 The minimum contributory period required to be entitled to the unemployment insurance benefit is 
12 months in the last 6 years. For the means tested assistance benefits, it is 3 (with family 
responsibilities) or 6 months in the last 6 years for individuals without family responsibilities. 
61 The decomposition analysis is only studied for the competing risks model since it is not relevant for 
any exit given that job duration hardly change and is the result of a combination of very different risks 
(other job vs unemployment). 
62 Here for simplicity the time-varying variables are considered constant over time. We use the age and 
the daily wage at the moment of starting the new job. And the average regional unemployment rate in 
the period considered by gender.  
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The remaining rows show the decomposition of these differences. First, 
we take the 2005 estimates and the 2005 regional unemployment rates, but 
compute the average probabilities for the new job starters in the 2009 sample. 
Comparing with the 2005 probabilities in row 3 gives the composition effect: 
the difference explained by the fact that individual and job characteristics in the 
2009 and 2005 samples are different. 
 
Table 7 Decomposition analysis for exits from the current job to other job, 
unemployment and non-employment.  
 
Other job Unemployment Non-employment 
Total Effect 8.69% 100% -17.51% 100% 10.91% 100% 
EP,,P
P 80.44% 66.38% 72.67% 
EQ,,Q
Q  71.76% 83.89% 61.76% 
Composition effects 0.56% 6% -1.31% 7% 5.22% 48% 
Business cycle effects 8.12% 94% -16.20% 93% 5.69% 52% 
Note: For composition effects we fix 2005 model and for the business cycle effect we fix 2009 sample. For 
notation, E,,RS as the average survival probability at month 12, under the model m (2005, 2009), for the 
sample s (2005, 2009), using the average regional unemployment rate of the period p (2005, 2009). 
Source: Own elaboration from LWLS.  
 
Despite the significant changes in the sample characteristics examined in 
section 3, the composition effect explains partially the substantial changes in 
transitions to other jobs and to unemployment, only about 6 percent of the 
differences.  In contrast, sample composition differences explain almost half of 
the total differences in non-employment. 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
In this paper we have analysed the nature of new job matches in Spain 
starting before (2005) and during the recent recession (2009). Job transitions 
were explored for an observed window of three years distinguishing several 
destination states, with single and competing risk models.   
The data reveal substantial variation over the business cycle in the 
characteristics of both workers and jobs in new matches, due to both supply 
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and demand factors. For example, during the recession, the workers in new 
matches are more experienced and are more often non-Spanish speaker 
immigrants. The crisis leads to a fall of construction and manufacturing jobs, 
also implying a reduction of new matches for male workers (who are 
overrepresented in these sectors).  
We find that the distribution of durations in new jobs remains steady 
over the business cycle. Interestingly, this hides two opposing forces that cancel 
out: the pro-cyclicality of job turnover and job-to-non-employment (and 
unemployment without benefits) transitions, and the counter-cyclical nature of 
exits into unemployment (with benefits). Exits to other jobs and to non-
employment (more supply driven),  are more likely than exits to unemployment 
(more demand driven) in a period of economic growth. The opposite is true in 
the downturn.  
Job hazards to unemployment and other jobs confirm the pattern implied 
by matching theory: they show a first stage of positive duration dependence 
(first 1.5 years) that subsequently turns negative. 
The current study has the limitation that neither the quality of a match 
nor the job options at the separation time are directly observed. Both depend 
on the business cycle and influence job duration. For instance, we cannot 
determine whether the reduction in the hazard of exits to other jobs in the 
recession period is due to better matching or to a scarcity of job offers that 
make individuals hang on to their jobs even if the match is rather poor.  
A decomposition analysis shows that changing characteristics of the pool 
of new job starters explain virtually nothing of the substantial changes of exits 
to other jobs or unemployment. Most of the variation is due to business cycle 
effects, applying to individuals with given characteristics and job attributes. On 
the other hand, changes in average survival probabilities of non-employment 
are explained by sample composition and business cycle effects to 
approximately the same extent. 
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Job exits to unemployment are the most worrying issue for policy 
purposes, because of their implications for the unemployment rate, welfare, 
human capital accumulation, and social and health problems.63 This makes 
identifying factors driving hazards into unemployment essential, particularly 
during the crisis. The individuals hit hardest by the crisis are males and young 
workers (16-29), those with primary education level, those working in manual 
occupations, Spanish speaking immigrants, and workers in the construction 
sector.  
During the economic crisis, the disproportionally higher growth in the 
number of transitions to unemployment for less qualified workers might be 
explained by their higher replaceability and lower training and hiring costs 
compared to higher qualified individuals. In order to enhance job stability of 
low-qualified and more vulnerable workers, that seem to be trapped in inferior 
and unstable jobs, it seems that active labour market policies adjusted to the 
economic situation need to be provided, such as facilities for on the job 
training64 accompanied with specific social protection measures.  
Workers that exhibit a surge of job mobility in the recession period are 
females and native workers, the age group 35-55, workers with upper 
secondary and post-secondary education level, those in non-manual 
occupations. Finally, those showing an increase in the likelihood to become non-
employed are males and young workers (16-29), Spanish speaking immigrants, 
those working in non-manual occupations, individuals without family 
responsibilities and workers in the construction sector. 
                                                        
63 According to Silva and Vázquez-Grenno (2013), from a macroeconomic perspective, the contributions 
of the employment-unemployment rate is much more important than that of the job finding rate in 
explaining fluctuations in Spain’s unemployment rate. Transitions from unemployment to employment, 
that also explain the unemployment rate, were already analyzed in Nagore and van Soest (2014). 
64 Currently among active labour market policies, dual training and employment programs are already 
provided to unemployed combining employment and training in a training center (Royal Decree 
1529/2012, of 9 November). On the other hand, qualified dual vocational training programs are 
boosted. 
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The proportion of workers starting a new job in large firms in 2009 is 
slightly lower than in 2005. New job starters have more stable jobs in larger 
firms especially during the downturn. This result sheds light upon the current 
policy debate of the necessity of stimulating the growth of Spanish firm size to 
increase the productivity and employment stability, in line with the Europe 2020 
strategy of sustainable growth. Policy should not only focus on creating new 
(and small) firms but also on stimulating these firms to grow and stabilize.   
In line with this, current policy proposals want to boost firms to enter into 
new emergent sectors. Our results show that during the crisis fewer new hires 
were realized in high technology firm, while these new jobs appear more stable 
than those starting in the non-intensive technology sector during both 
economic periods. In a sector intensive in knowledge, human capital 
accumulation is crucial and should lead to enhanced job stability.  
  
121 
 
Appendix A3 
Table A1: Definitions of explanatory variables. 
Individual characteristics 
Male 1 if male. 
Age at the moment of 
exiting the current job   16-19; 20-24; 25-29; 30-34; 35-39; 40-44; 45-49; 50-55. It is a time varying covariate. 
Spanish native 1 if  Spanish citizenship. 
Spanish-speaking 
immigrants  1 if immigrant comes from a Spanish-speaking country. 
Non-Spanish speaking 
immigrants   1 if immigrant comes from a non-Spanish-speaking country. 
Dummy children_4  1 if the individual has children younger than 4 years old. It is a time-varying covariate.  
Dummy children_15 1 if the individual has children between 4 and 15 years old. It is a time-varying covariate.   
  
Primary education 1 if none and elementary education level. 
Lower secondary 1 if lower secondary education level (middle school) 
Upper secondary   1 if upper secondary education level (high school) 
Post-secondary  1 if tertiary education level  
Macroeconomic variables 
Unemployment rate Quarterly unemployment rate by gender and region of residence (time-varying); source: Economically Active Population Survey (EPA).  Time varying covariate. 
Inhabitants>40,000 1 if the number of inhabitants of the municipality where the individual is living is greater than 40.000. Time-varying covariate. 
Current job spell variables 
Non-manual occupation 1 if non-manual occupation 
Sector of activity Manufacturing, construction and services. 
High Technology 1 if sector of activity in high technology according with the classification of industries by technologic level. 
Type of contract Permanent, on-call temporary, temporary, open-ended.  
Part-time coefficient Hours worked as a fraction of full time work (1 in a full time job) 
Temporary Agency 1 if the employment is signed through a temporary help agency. 
Size of the firm  Dummies for 0 (missing), 1-19, 10-19,20-49,50-249, >250 
Daily wage 
Real annual wage (gross salary) divided by the number of days worked in the year by 
employer. For reliability we have applied a filter in 1st and 99th percentile to this 
variable. It is a time-varying variable 
Public Sector 1 if the employer is Public Sector. 
Source: Own elaboration 
Note: Education level is constructed as a constant variable from the more recent LWLS given that from 
2009 LWLS information for education level is more reliable.  
 
Table A2: Sample selection    
 Number of individuals 
Filters 2005 sample 2009 sample 
Individuals starting any job spell in the year of reference between 16 and 53 years old 328,641 282,670 
Drop individuals with lack of relevant information 233 0 
Drop individuals from agriculture industry  44,638 43,747 
After merging consecutive job spells, drop spells starting before the year of reference 19,134 16,631 
Drop spells shorter than 32 days and not real labour relationships 26,024 29,906 
Drop learning or  apprenticeship contracts 4,478 6,382 
Drop overlapped spells and incidences 5,319 6,518 
Drop spells because of missing information of current type of contract(*) and salaries lower 
than the 1st percentile or higher than 99th percentile. 52,396 38,333 
Final sample (number of individuals) 176,419 141,153 
Source: Own elaboration from 2005-2007 LWLS and 2009-2011 LWLS. 
Note: Data from fiscal module exclude information of Regime of household, individuals paying personal 
taxes in Basque Country and Navarra. 
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 4. Gender Differences in Unemployment Dynamics and Initial Wages 
over the Business Cycle 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Differences in unemployment rates between males and females in the 
Spanish labour market have been persistent for a long time but strongly declined 
during the recent economic crisis. According to the Labour Force Survey65, in the 
first quarter of 2002 the female unemployment rate was twice that of males 
(8%), in contrast, during the crisis this divergence virtually disappeared: the 
unemployment rate in the first quarter of 2013 was around 27% for both men 
and women. In this paper, we analyse whether this decline stems from the 
convergence of unemployment and/or re-employment probabilities for men and 
women during the crisis and explore if this is accompanied by a reduction in the 
gender gap in the initial wages of the unemployed who have found a job. We 
decompose all these differences into variation in the sample composition and 
residual changes induced by different returns to the characteristics. Few studies 
have analysed the relationship between gender and labour market outcomes 
other than wages or earnings. The gender dimension in the Europe 2020 
strategy66, recognising the detrimental effect of gender inequality on economic 
growth, emphasizes the necessity of assessing gender differences in labour 
market outcomes over time. We contribute to this by: i) identifying the labour 
market flows accounting for the gender gap in unemployment rates, ii) exploring 
the changes of gender gaps in labour market outcomes over the business cycle 
and iii) finding the factors driving to more inequality.  
We particularly focus on differences in the unemployment and 
employment dynamics and on initial wages over the business cycle. Examining 
the aggregate unemployment rate by gender may mask important gender 
                                                        
65 See Figure A1 in the appendix. 
66 The principle of Europe 2020: reinforce mutually a Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
and the Strategy for Equality between women and men. See http://www.eesc.europa.eu.  
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inequalities (Queen and Sen, 2010), so it is relevant to decompose it in flows into 
and out of unemployment. Azmat et al.  (2006) find that high-gap countries67 
tend to have larger gender gaps in both flows from employment to 
unemployment and vice versa. Variation of the gender divergence of the 
unemployment rate over the business cycle shows the relevance to explore this 
issue  in boom and bust periods.  
Economic theories provide several explanations for differences in labour 
market outcomes by gender68 and over the business cycle. Job search theory 
gives ambiguous predictions of differences in unemployment duration by gender. 
The traditional role of women as second earners (mainly responsible for domestic 
commitments) may lead to lower job search intensity and fewer job options for 
females, but cannot explain lower reservation wages. Queneau and Sen (2008) 
also argue that differences in reservation wages are ambiguous: “On the one 
hand, if women incur greater search costs than men, their reservation wages 
should, all else equal, be lower than those of men (Lippman and McCall,1976). On 
the other hand, women may have higher reservation wages than men   due to a 
greater propensity to engage in housework and childcare.” Discrimination via 
employer prejudice or statistical discrimination69  may also be behind gender 
differences in labour market outcomes. If employers expect women to leave the 
job sooner than men, they will be less willing to invest in their training (Donohue, 
1988) or may allocate them into occupations with lower capital intensity (Barron 
et al., 1993), resulting in lower wages and more vulnerability to unemployment 
incidence, especially during downturns. On the other hand, gender segregation 
across occupations and activities predicts labour market outcomes of the group 
                                                        
67 High gap countries are countries in which the female unemployment rate is much higher than the male. 
This is the case in Mediterranean countries (Spain, Greece, Italy and France).  
68 For a review of this literature, see Altonji and Blank (1999). 
69 Economic models identify two main sources of discrimination. The first one is associated to the 
prejudice that employers might have against women. And statistical discrimination refers to the 
underestimation of women’s skills, productivity, and labour market attachment in the presence of 
imperfect information. 
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allocated to more procyclical occupations to be more dependent on the business 
cycle.  
Empirical evidence on gender divergences in labour market outcomes 
other than wages and their cyclical patterns is scarce and not conclusive. We 
contribute to this literature by addressing the following research questions: how 
different are the probabilities to find a job for unemployed men and women with 
similar individual characteristics? Once they leave unemployment, how different 
are their (initial) wages and the probability to fall back into unemployment? And 
finally, how do all of those inequalities vary over the business cycle? To answer 
these questions we compare the sample characteristics, patterns and 
determinants of transitions from unemployment to any job and subsequently 
from the job to non-employment between males and females during the period 
2002-2013. Moreover, we compare the initial wages after an unemployment spell 
and their determinants for the 2004-2013 period.  
An important contribution of this analysis is the use of an administrative 
dataset (Longitudinal Working Lives Sample70) from the Spanish Social Security 
Administration. It contains detailed information on employment and 
unemployment transitions and individual and job characteristics of a large 
sample. We construct a sample that includes all the unemployment benefit spells 
and the consecutive job spells that started between 2002 and 2013, and we 
observe individuals until the end date of the spell or December 2013. We avoid 
left-censoring, but do have a limited number of long right censored spells. To 
examine the probabilities of leaving and re-entering unemployment, we estimate 
bivariate mixed proportional hazard rate models. The analysis of initial wages 
after re-employment is carried out using standard linear regressions, separately 
for men and women and controlling for individual and job characteristics and 
economic conditions.  
                                                        
70 Rebollo (2012) points out that the use of an administrative dataset in this type of analysis avoids the 
seam bias associated with misreported transitions. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a 
brief review of the literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the 
characteristics and exit patterns of unemployment and consecutive job spells. In 
section 5 we present the econometric framework of unemployment and job 
durations. Section 6 discusses the main results. Conclusions are drawn in section 
7.   
 
4.2 Literature review  
In spite of gender equality policies71 in Spain during the last decades, 
inequalities still exist, revealing differences in employment opportunities. The 
importance of this issue is well established in the literature and amongst 
policymakers. The Europe 2020 strategy recognises the detrimental effect of 
gender inequality on economic growth and considers gender equality a priority 
policy issue. Cebrián and Moreno (2007) indicate that equality will  lead to 
productivity enhancements and Queen and Sen (2010) point out the status of 
women relative to men as a measure of progress. 
However, the literature on the gender gap has focused mainly on pay and 
participation divergences and studies on the gender gap in unemployment are 
scarce. International evidence on the different impact of the business cycle on 
unemployment by gender concludes that gender segregation and the 
concentration of males in specific industries and occupations are crucial 
explanatory factors. For the US, Nielsen (1984) argues that the sector distribution 
and the specific sectors affected by the recession lead to higher unemployment 
rates for men during recessions. Rives and Sosin (2002), developing occupation-
weighted unemployment rates, found that the gender distribution across 
occupations favours lower unemployment rates for women.  
Decomposing the unemployment rate into flows into and out of 
unemployment, Azmat et al. (2006) in a cross-country study using data from the 
                                                        
71 See Guner et al. (2014) for a review. 
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European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for 1994-1999, found that high-
gap countries tend to have larger gender gaps in both the flows from 
employment to unemployment and vice versa. Sahin et al. (2009) affirm that in 
the US, the higher unemployment rate of males during the 2007 recession stems 
from their higher unemployment inflow, which is a consequence of the 
deterioration of male dominated industries and of the increase the number of 
men that enter the labour force but fail to find a job.  
 Studies on unemployment and employment exits using separate equations 
for men and women have shown that determinants of labour market outcomes 
vary with gender (Wilkins and Wooden, 2013). Royalty (1998) finds that gender 
differences in job turnover for young workers in the US arise from the behaviour 
of less educated  women.  Frederiksen (2008) shows that the factors behind the 
lower stability of jobs for women in Denmark might reflect labour market 
segregation by gender and differences in  individual characteristics that are 
associated with relatively high job separation rates. Azmat et al. (2006) point out 
differences in human capital accumulation, institutions, and social attitudes as 
determinants of the gender gap in unemployment rates. However, few of these 
studies take into account the influence of the business cycle. Theodossiou (2002) 
investigates gender differences in labour turnover in the UK and finds that the 
changing conditions in the labour market have more affected males than females. 
Studies for Argentina (Ortega, 2008) and Poland (Malgorzata, 2013) 
applying non-linear Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions find that the gender 
inequalities in unemployment rates are due to differences in the returns to 
characteristics rather than differences in the characteristics, suggesting the 
possibility of labour market discrimination against women.  
Studies that focus on gender differences in labour market outcomes other 
than wages are also scarce in Spain. Eusamio (2004) using data from ECHP for the 
period 1994-1998, found that women have more difficulties to leave 
unemployment and higher probabilities to leave their job. She considered both 
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individuals starting an unemployment spell or an employment spell. From a non-
linear Oaxaca decomposition, she found that men and women have the same 
characteristics but these are rewarded differently. Ahn and Ugidos-Olazabal 
(1995), using the Encuesta de Calidad de Vida en el Trabajo (ECVT)72 of 1985, 
explored the determinants of unemployment durations separately for men and 
women, distinguishing exits to employment and out of the labour force. Alonso-
Villar and del Río (2008) found that agglomeration especially favours women in 
terms of unemployment rates. Hospido (2009)  using ECHP (1994-2001) for young 
workers showed that turnover rates are similar by gender but the factors that 
affect them differ. Moreover she points out the existence of a gender wage 
penalty for interruptions and mobility. Peña-Boquete (2014) found that the 
concentration of women in less-cyclical sectors reduces job loss and the 
unemployment gap during the current recession. Guner et al. (2014) analysed the 
trends in gender equality in employment and wages during the 1977-2013 
period. Using the Encuesta de Población activa (EPA) data, they pointed out a 
decline in the gender gap in employment arising from compositional changes 
(married women entering the labour force) and potential effects of other factors 
such as public policies and institutional changes. Still, differences in occupational 
segregation and wages remained quite stable. The latter is driven mainly by 
differences in returns to individual characteristics. Finally, Murillo and Simón 
(2014) examined the evolution of the gender gap in Spain between 2002 and 
2010 using the Wage Structure Survey. They found that the decreasing trend of 
the wage gender gap seen in the expansion period reversed during the first stage 
of the crisis.  This is mainly explained by the relative improvement of the return 
to males’ characteristics due to the employment destruction during the crisis. 
  
                                                        
72 The Survey on Quality of Life at Work.   
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4.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
The data we use come from the Longitudinal Working Lives Sample73 (LWLS) 
based upon administrative records from the Spanish Social Security 
Administration (SSA). The LWLS is collected annually since 2004 and contains 
historical information on a four percent random sample of the population who 
ever had any relationship with the SSA in the sample period, paying contributions 
or receiving benefits. It has approximately one million people. Individuals in the 
2004 LWLS remain in the sample as long as they have a relationship with SSA, 
allowing us to analyse individuals’ labour market transitions over time. LWLS 
contains information on individual characteristics such as gender, age, and 
nationality, firm and job attributes such as firm size, sector of activity, annual 
wages74 and type of contract, as well as information related to contributory and 
non-contributory benefits. It therefore allows us to analyse how the labour 
market transitions correlate with individual and job characteristics. 
To analyse unemployment exits and subsequent job stability over the 
business cycle, we construct one sample including unemployment spells with 
benefits starting between 2002 and 2013 and a corresponding sample including 
the consecutive job spells. Therefore, individuals with job spells only enter if we 
observe a transition from unemployment to a job.  
We apply several filters. For instance, our sample is restricted to individuals 
younger than 56 years old, avoiding exits through early retirement and workers in 
the Social Security Regime75. We remove individuals with incomplete information 
or any degree of disability and observations from Ceuta and Melilla. We drop 
overlapping spells. We only include spells that last at least 31 days (after 
recoding) since the very short spells normally are an administrative artefact and 
cannot be considered as serious labour market states. 
                                                        
73 We use the LWLS version with fiscal data. 
74 We use the tax module to obtain information on wages. See Arranz and García Serrano (2011) 
75 Workers that have contributed any time during the period 1997-2013 to other regimes, such as Self-
employment Special Regime or Agrarian Special Regime, etc., are excluded from our sample since they 
follow specific rules in the use of unemployment benefits. 
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For unemployment exits, we distinguish two immediate destination states 
(within 31 days after the end of the unemployment spell): finding a job and 
exiting to non-employment (without benefits). For the analysis of the stability of 
the consecutive job, the immediate exits (within 31 days after the end of the job 
spell) we separate are finding another job and non-employment (with or without 
benefits). They are explained in detail in Table 1. Our definition of unemployment 
is restricted to spells with receipt of benefits76. Given that LWLS does not include 
information on spells of individuals without relationship with SSA, we cannot 
identify activity or inactivity when benefits are exhausted and the individual has 
not found a job. The length of the unemployment benefit spell is measured as the 
difference (in days) between the date of entry into unemployment and the date 
of ending the unemployment benefit spell, either because unemployment 
benefits expire or because the worker finds a job. If at the end of the observation 
period the worker still receives unemployment benefits, the spell is right-
censored. Exits for other reasons are also considered right-censored. 
 
Table 1: Definition of labour market transitions and their destination states 
Original state  Destination state Definition 
Unemployment
with benefits 
 Any job Immediate job spell of at least 31 days within 31 days after the end of 
the unemployment benefit spell under study.  
  
Non-employment 
state (without 
benefits) 
Includes unemployment without benefits, emigration, black economy 
and inactivity (e.g. to care for family or to become a student).  
This state is identified if there is no subsequent job spell (of at least 31 
days) within 31 days after the end of the unemployment benefit spell 
under study. 
Job (after an 
unemployment 
spell) 
 
Other job 
Immediate job spell of at least 31 days within 31 days after the end of 
the job spell under study. It includes transitions to a new employer. 
  
Non-employment 
(with or without 
benefits) 
Includes unemployment with and without benefits, emigration, black 
economy and inactivity (for instance to care for family or to become a 
student). This state is identified if there is no subsequent job spell (of 
at least 31 days) within 31 days after the end of the job spell under 
study. This includes transitions (within 31 days after the end of the job 
spell) to unemployment with benefits. 
 
To construct job spells, consecutive job spells with the same employer and 
a difference shorter than 32 days are considered as one job spell, with the 
                                                        
76 For details about the Spanish Unemployment Insurance System see, e.g., Nagore and van Soest (2014) 
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characteristics of the first contract. The limit of 31 days and the requirement that 
the duration of the new spell is at least 31 days avoid considering the strategic 
use of unemployment benefits as a job-to-unemployment transition. Job duration 
is defined as the difference (in days) between the termination date and the 
starting date of the job. If at the end of the observation period the employee is 
still working for the same employer, data are considered right censored. Job exits 
for other reasons are also considered right censored. 
The sample of unemployed workers consists of 164,177 women and 
167,655 men starting an unemployment spell with benefits during the 
observation period. Among these, 90,649 women and 99,681 men comprise the 
sample of unemployed workers that found a new job. Multiple-spells per 
individual are considered. The sample used for analysing initial wages includes 
the first observation of individuals that found a full-time job after a spell of 
unemployment benefits.  
 
4.4 Characteristics of unemployed and re-employed workers over the business 
cycle  
In this section we explore the variation between the male and female 
sample composition of unemployed workers and new job starters (among the 
unemployed workers who found a job) in two economic periods. We also show 
the influence of the recent crisis on the patterns of re-employment probabilities 
and consecutive job-to-non-employment hazard rates for males and females. 
 
4.4.1 Characteristics of unemployment by gender over the business cycle 
Personal characteristics such as gender, age, level of education, 
nationality, children and economic conditions may affect the chances of leaving 
unemployment. In turn, men and women may differ in these characteristics and 
that may lead to differences in unemployment exit rates. To explore the gender 
sample composition over the business cycle, Table 2 shows descriptive statistics 
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of unemployed men and women in the periods before (2000-2007) and during 
the recession (2008-2013). The importance  of the crisis is reflected in the 
substantial growth of the average regional unemployment rate and the increase 
in the numbers of unemployed individuals (which is clearly stronger for males). 
The average age of the unemployed individuals is similar for both genders, 
around 33 years old in the expansion period and two years older during the 
recession. Most unemployed workers during the expansion have Spanish 
nationality, 95% of women and 90% of men. During the recession these 
proportions fall, especially for men (to 84%) due to the increase of unemployed 
immigrants, mainly non-Spanish speaking. Only 15% (11%) of unemployed 
women (men) have dependent children younger than four years old and around 
24% (20%) of women (men) have children between 4 and 16 years old. These 
proportions remain stable over time. Around 45% of workers live in a 
municipality with more than 40,000 inhabitants in two periods. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for unemployment spells starting in a period of 
expansion versus recession, for males and females 
Expansion period Recession period 
  Females Males Females Males 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 
  MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Regional Unemployment rate 10.28 3.59 10.65 3.89 17.67 7.43 17.66 7.03 
Inhabitants>40,000 46.2% 49.9% 44.8% 0.50 45% 50% 45.1% 0.50 
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Age 33.40 8.83 33.22 9.35 35.33 9.24 35.35 9.52 
Spanish native 95.3% 0.21 90.3% 0.30 91.3% 0.28 84.9% 0.36 
Spanish speaking immigrant 2.0% 0.14 3.8% 0.19 2.9% 0.17 5.2% 0.22 
Non-Spanish_speaking 2.7% 0.16 5.9% 0.24 5.8% 0.23 9.9% 0.30 
Children<4 15.8% 0.36 11.2% 0.32 15.9% 0.37 12.6% 0.33 
Children>3 &<16 24.7% 0.43 20.1% 0.40 26.1% 0.44 22.0% 0.41 
Primary education 15.6% 0.36 25.0% 0.43 16.0% 0.37 24.5% 0.43 
Lower secondary 40.1% 0.49 43.8% 0.50 38.5% 0.49 44.1% 0.50 
Upper secondary 28.8% 0.45 22.6% 0.42 27.8% 0.45 22.2% 0.42 
Post-secondary 15.4% 0.36 8.6% 0.28 17.7% 0.38 9.1% 0.29 
Number of individuals 89,751  82,864  126,356  133,234  
Source: Own elaboration using LWLS and the Spanish Labour Force Survey (quarterly regional 
unemployment rate). Note: Descriptive characteristics corresponding to the first observation of each 
individual in each period. Expansion period: 2002-2007 & recession period: 2008-2013.  (*) Dummy 
variables.  
Applying mean test all differences between males and females are significant except age for E-to-U and 
inhabitants in the recession period for both events. Variable definitions are given in Table A1 (Appendix). 
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The distribution of education level varies by gender and slightly by 
economic period. Most unemployed individuals have lower-secondary level of 
education, in the expansion period 40% (43.8%) of women (men). Nevertheless, a 
higher share of women is high qualified. For instance, 15.4% (17.7%) of women 
while only 8% (9.1%) of men have post-secondary level in the expansion 
(recession) period.  This is consistent with an OECD report (OECD, 2004) 
confirming that in Spain, the proportion of female tertiary graduates has 
surpassed that of men already in the early 1990s.  
 
4.4.2 Characteristics of the first job after unemployment by gender over the 
business cycle 
Personal, job characteristics and economic conditions may affect the 
likelihood of losing the job, and they may differ by gender. Table 3 provides some 
descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables of job duration of the 
unemployed workers who found a job for both samples in the two economic 
periods.    
 Personal characteristics were already analysed in section 4.1; the 
differences compared to the unemployment samples are due to differences in 
job finding rates, which will be analysed in section 6.1. For example, the 
proportion of men and women with primary education is smaller in the sample of 
those who are employed than in the unemployment sample, mainly in the 
recession period. This is because the lower educated more often fail to find a new 
job.  
The job characteristics we consider relate to type of occupation, sector of 
activity, type of contract, firm size and (real) daily wage. The proportion of 
women working in non-manual occupations (54.8%) is more than twice that of 
men (24.4%) in the expansion period. These proportions increase slightly in the 
recession period, since manual occupations are hit hardest by the crisis. The 
largest proportion of individuals in both samples belongs to services sector, 
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particularly for females (87.7% in the expansion period, compared to 51.5% for 
males). These proportions increase in the recession, especially for men. In 
contrast, the proportions of workers in manufacturing and mainly construction 
sectors are larger for men and decrease with the burst of the property bubble. 
33.3% (29.8%) of men against 2.4% (2.2%) of women are in construction during 
the expansion (recession) period. In the expansion period a higher proportion of 
men 4.7% (versus 3.3% of women) are employed in sectors with a high level of 
technology; this fell to 4.3% (2.6%) in the recession for men (women). [Among 
Europe 2020 recommendations, European Economic and Social Committee 
recommends focusing on digital education for women, who are under-
represented in IT production jobs (new emerging sectors). 
Information on the size of the firm (number of employees) where the 
worker is hired is not always available, and we include a dummy for a missing 
value.77 Most workers are employed in microenterprises (size_1_9), for instance 
38.6% (28%) of men (women) in the pre-recession. Women are more often 
employed in large firms than men.  
Most contracts are temporary in both periods, but there are gender 
differences in the specific type of contract. Women more often than men have 
on-call temporary contracts that are more common in public sector. The 
proportion of part time contracts is around 20% higher for women than for men 
in both periods. Accordingly, Dolado et al. (2001, 2004) found that occupational 
segregation by gender is positively correlated with the share of part time jobs in 
the economy. The use of part time jobs increases during the recession period for 
both samples. The proportion of new contracts signed through Temporary Help 
Agencies (THA) acting as intermediary is quite similar for both sexes and 
                                                        
77 The main reason is that the information on firm size in the LWLS of a given year is based upon 
administrative records collected in March of the next year. For many workers, the firm at which they had 
their last job no longer exists at that time. However, in order to reduce these missing values, we have 
assigned the more recent firm size available from previous LWLS, however, it is not possible for firms that 
dissapear before 2004 . 
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decreases in downturn, from 6% to 4%. The proportion of women in public sector 
(16%) is more than twice that of men (7%) in both economic periods.   
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for consecutive job spells for males and females. 
Expansion and Recession period 
Expansion period Recession period 
  Females Males Females Males 
Variable Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 
  MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Regional Unemployment rate 9.95 3.45 10.53 3.79 16.84 7.60 17.36 7.34 
Inhabitants>40,000 46.5% 0.50 46.2% 0.50 45.8% 0.50 47% 0.50 
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Age 33.51 8.38 33.83 8.95 35.08 8.53 35.73 8.86 
Spanish native 95.9% 0.20 91.4% 0.28 93.1% 0.25 86.5% 0.34 
Spanish speaking immigrant 1.7% 0.13 3.5% 0.18 2.4% 0.15 5.0% 0.22 
Non-Spanish speaking immigrant 2.4% 0.15 5.1% 0.22 4.5% 0.21 8.5% 0.28 
Children<4 13.0% 0.34 12.4% 0.33 14.2% 0.35 13.9% 0.35 
Children>3 &<16 25.1% 0.43 22.5% 0.42 26.3% 0.44 24.6% 0.43 
Primary education 13.6% 0.34 24.6% 0.43 12.5% 0.33 22.7% 0.42 
Lower secondary 39.6% 0.49 45.5% 0.50 38.0% 0.49 46.0% 0.50 
Upper secondary 29.8% 0.46 21.8% 0.41 29.1% 0.45 21.9% 0.41 
Post secondary 17.0% 0.38 8.1% 0.27 20.4% 0.40 9.4% 0.29 
JOB CHARACTERISTICS 
Non_manual 54.8% 0.50 24.4% 0.43 58.8% 0.49 27.6% 0.45 
Construction 2.4% 0.15 33.3% 0.47 2.2% 0.15 29.8% 0.46 
Manufacturing 9.6% 0.30 14.7% 0.35 7.0% 0.25 13.5% 0.34 
Services 87.7% 0.33 51.5% 0.50 90.8% 0.29 56.7% 0.50 
High_technology 3.3% 0.18 4.7% 0.21 2.6% 0.16 4.3% 0.20 
Size_0 7.2% 0.26 10.8% 0.31 2.0% 0.14 3.1% 0.17 
Size_1_9 28.0% 0.45 38.6% 0.49 29.2% 0.45 40.2% 0.49 
Size_10_19 8.8% 0.28 11.2% 0.32 9.3% 0.29 12.6% 0.33 
Size_20_49 12.4% 0.33 12.8% 0.33 12.8% 0.33 14.5% 0.35 
Size_50_249 20.0% 0.40 14.8% 0.35 21.2% 0.41 16.6% 0.37 
Size_250 23.7% 0.43 11.9% 0.32 25.5% 0.44 13.0% 0.34 
Current contract is open_ended 8.3% 0.28 2.8% 0.16 8.3% 0.28 2.9% 0.17 
Current contract is on-call temporary 13.7% 0.34 4.5% 0.21 14.6% 0.35 5.1% 0.22 
Current contract is temporary 60.3% 0.49 74.3% 0.44 55.2% 0.50 69.0% 0.46 
Current contract is permanent 17.7% 0.38 18.4% 0.39 21.9% 0.41 23.0% 0.42 
Current contract is part_time 27.1% 0.44 6.2% 0.24 34.2% 0.47 11.3% 0.32 
Temporary Help Agency 6.0% 0.24 5.7% 0.23 4.2% 0.20 4.3% 0.20 
Public Sector 16.3% 0.37 6.6% 0.25 16.7% 0.37 7.0% 0.26 
Real daily wage  (in euros of 2011) 46.01 17.88 50.42 17.44 49.42 20.34 52.93 19.01 
PREVIOUS UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SPELL 
Previous unemployment duration 167.03 149.60 150.05 127.45 201.01 189.10 202.11 182.21 
Number of individuals 48,583  51,950  69,923  76,462  
Note: See Table 2. (**) Real daily wage for full time jobs. Applying mean test all differences between males 
and females are significant except age for E-to-U and inhabitants in the recession period for both events. 
 
Table 4 presents the evolution of the average initial wages of new full-time 
jobs (consecutive to unemployment) for men and women during the period 
2004-2013. Average initial wages vary by gender and change over time. They are 
higher for men than for women, but these differences decrease, especially since 
2009. Initial wages increased more moderately for men during the expansion 
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period and decreased during the recession (specially for men) with the exception 
of the increase in 2009 that is more pronounced for women. This might respond 
to a positive selection of women into employment, so that more qualified women 
find a job. In contrast, men are more concentrated than women in low-paying 
occupations78 and during the recession they more often have to be re-employed 
into jobs paying lower wages in other sectors.  
 
Table 4. Average real initial daily wages (full time jobs) for males and females. 
2004-2013 
Males Females Difference 
mean Std. Dev mean Std. Dev Male-female 
2004 50.01 16.7 45.05 16.64 4.96 
2005 50.74 17.31 46.13 17.49 4.61 
2006 50.98 17.28 46.87 17.37 4.11 
2007 51.72 17.53 47.42 17.21 4.3 
2008 51.36 17.79 46.95 18.09 4.41 
2009 52.99 16.77 50.09 18.55 2.9 
2010 52.43 16.99 49.71 18.43 2.72 
2011 52.36 17.26 49.67 18.59 2.69 
2012 51.05 17.44 49.05 19.01 2 
2013 50.86 17.51 49.68 19.7 1.18 
Source: see table 2.  
Note: Real daily wages in euros of 2011. 
 
To sum up, we have found clear gender differences 79  in sample 
composition. The most important ones relate to level of education and job 
characteristics. Women have higher level of education than men and are more 
concentrated in non-manual occupations, services and the public sector. They 
work more often in large firms and more often work part-time. Finally, women 
have lower initial wages than men. 
The changes during the recession reveal some interesting facts: first, the 
marked sectorial character of the crisis, affecting men more seriously than 
women. Second, the surge in the demand for more experienced and qualified 
workers, more pronounced for women. Third, and probably as a consequence of 
                                                        
78 Brindusa et al. (2013) document the recent process of job polarization in Spain, characterized by an 
increase of occupations at the low end of the wage distribution where males have a higher concentration. 
79 Most of them are in line with Cebrián and Moreno (2007). 
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the previous facts, the reduction of the gender gap in wages. Finally, an 
important growth of part-time jobs to adjust to fluctuations in demand.  
 
4.4.3. Unemployment to any job and job to joblessness exits over the business 
cycle 
Figures 1 and 2 show Kaplan Meier survival functions for unemployment 
exits to any job and re-entries to non-employment (treating other types of exits 
as right-censoring) for males and females in both economic periods. For example, 
the probability that an unemployed male found a job within a year fell from 75% 
in the expansion period to 50% in the recession period; these probabilities are 
59% and 50% for the female group. On the other hand, the probability of a 
transition from job to non-employment increased from 50% in the boom period 
to 68% in the recession for men, and from 65% to 71% for women. Thus, in the 
expansion period gender differences in unemployment exits and re-entries are 
substantial, but they are reduced significantly during the crisis.  
 
Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier Survival estimates; exits from unemployment to any job.  
Expansion (2002-2007) and recession (2008-2013) period. Males & Females.  
Duration in days 
 
Source: Own elaboration from LWLS. 
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Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier Survival estimates; exits from job to non-employment. 
Expansion (2002-2007) and recession (2008-2013) period.  Males & Females. 
Duration in days 
 
Source: Own elaboration from LWLS. 
 
The hazard rates corresponding to these survival functions are sketched in 
Figures 3 and 480. The empirical hazard rate at time t is the proportion of 
individuals unemployed (employed) for at least t days that find (loss) the job on 
day t+1.  The figures confirm that the highest impact of the crisis on 
unemployment exits and job losses are found for males, particularly in the first 
year of the spells. In Figure 3 there is a negative association between each hazard 
rate and the duration of the spell, and it is stronger for males in the expansion 
period. An exception is the peak in the hazard after two years of unemployment, 
which corresponds to the maximum duration of contributory unemployment 
benefits. Figure 4 shows that males and females exhibit similar job loss patterns 
in both periods, with declining hazards until about 400 days of tenure. Some local 
peaks are found at 90, 180, 270 and 360 days. These peaks are also found in 
previous studies and correspond to the usual durations of temporary contracts. 
More specifically, the pronounced females’ peak around 270 days may 
correspond to seasonal activities that are more common in females. The negative 
association between hazard and duration in Figures 3 and 4 may reflect genuine 
negative state dependence or spurious state dependence due to heterogeneity 
                                                        
80 The estimates use Kernel smoothing. 
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and the changing nature of the pool of unemployed over time. These 
explanations will be disentangled in the econometric model. 
 
Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier Kernel smoothed hazard functions; Exits from 
unemployment to any job. Expansion (2002-2007) and recession (2008-2013) 
period. Males & Females. Duration in days 
 
Source: Own elaboration from LWLS. 
 
Figure 4. Kaplan-Meier Kernel smoothed hazard functions; Exits from Job to 
non-employment. Expansion (2002-2007) and recession (2008-2013) period. 
Males & Females. Duration in days  
 
Source: Own elaboration from LWLS. 
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than for males (after 6 months in the job). In the downturn, job finding rates 
decrease more for men than for women and job losses rise more for men than 
for women. As a consequence, both groups exhibit a similar likelihood of finding a 
job (during the first year of unemployment) and the consecutive job stability is 
usually higher for females than for males.  
 
4.5 Econometric framework for unemployment duration and job stability 
analysis  
To analyse the pattern and determinants of leaving unemployment and re-
entering non-employment we estimate a correlated competing risks model with 
two types of exits for each event. For the first event, the destination states that 
we differentiate are any job and non-employment and for the second one: other 
job and non-employment.  The models are estimated separately for men and 
women in order to reflect the gender differences in labour market dynamics 
 
4.5.1 Multi-state: Competing risks model    
To analyse the duration patterns and the determinants of transitions, we use 
a competing risks framework (see, e.g., Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002, Chapter 
8). An unemployment spell can end with a transition to any job (j=1) or to non-
employment (j=2). Analogously, a job spell can end with a transition to another 
job (j=1) or non-employment (j=2). This gives the total hazard 
   ℎ() = ℎ() + ℎ()           (1) 
Here ℎ() is the hazard to exit from the unemployment (job) spell to any 
destination state at duration t, and h1(t) and h2(t)  are the hazards for exits to the 
two competing exits. Conditional on observed and unobserved heterogeneity, 
the competing risks are assumed to be independent. We specify the following 
Multivariate Mixed Proportional Hazard (MMPH) model with gap-time 
representation with hazards ℎ (|(), 
) for the two types of transitions j=1-
2, of individual i conditional on observed and unobserved characteristics: 
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ℎ (|(), 
) = ℎ
() ∙ exp (()	) ∙ exp(
)     (2) 
The baseline hazard for the transitions j=1-2 ,  ℎ
() , is specified as 
piecewise constant. The parameters of main interest are the vectors 	,  =
1,2, which determine how the two hazards vary with individual and job 
characteristics. A positive coefficient in 	of a covariate implies that, conditional 
on other covariates and unobserved heterogeneity, an increase of the covariates 
increases the probability of exit j.  
The unobserved heterogeneity terms are 
.  Following Heckman and 
Singer (1984), we use discrete frailty and allow  and   to be correlated. This 
discrete distribution is computationally easier than continuous distributions. 
Moreover, it is common in the literature on labour market transitions; see, for 
instance, Bover et al.  (2002), Rebollo (2012), or Bijwaard and Wahba (2014). 
Under a discrete frailty distribution, the population consists of several 
subpopulations with different risks. For instance, for job hazard, one group of 
more motivated individuals and with a larger social network could have higher 
probabilities of finding another job but a lower probability to become non-
employed. The group to which an individual belongs, however, is not observed. 
The population fractions of the groups are unknown parameters pk81. The number 
of groups is finite and denoted by K, with ; K is also the number of mass 
points of the distribution of (, ).    
We assume that unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time (within 
and across spells of the same individual). For identification, we also assume it is 
independent of observed characteristics, the standard assumption in this kind of 
duration models (van den Berg, 2001). Moreover, since we do not impose a 
                                                        
81 To ensure the probability is between zero and one we assume  =
!"# ($%)
(&∑ !"# ($*))
-34
*64
. 
 
pk
k=1
K
 =1
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normalization on the baseline hazard on ()	 , we need to impose E(V
j)=0: 
 for j=1,2 as a normalization.  
All parameters are estimated jointly by Maximum Likelihood. The 
likelihood function is, under the independence assumption, the product of the 
Likelihood function of all the individuals (i), 7 = ∏ 7 . The likelihood contribution 
7 of individual i for two competing risks (j=1,2) can be written as the expected 
value of the conditional likelihood given (, ) : 7 = ∑ 9:< ⋅ 7() , 
where7() is the conditional likelihood contribution given(, ) is equal to 
the kth mass point  = (, ). This conditional likelihood contribution is a 
standard likelihood contribution in a model without unobserved heterogeneity; it 
includes the conditional density function for the observed exits of the completed 
spells and the conditional survival function for right-censored spells at each 
competing risks (j):  
7() = ∏ ∏ ℎ
?
< (|(@), 
)AB,C,D<  E
FG(@), 
H  (3) 
Here s=1,…,S are the spells of individual i, and I,,  is a dummy  that is 1 if spell s 
ends in a transition of type  j and 0 otherwise. Our estimation code is based upon 
the Stata code of Bijwaard (2014).  
 
4.6 Estimation results  
This section includes the estimation results of the hazards out of 
unemployment (to a job or to non-employment without benefits) and of the exits 
from the first job after unemployment  (to another job or to non-employment), 
as well as the OLS estimates of the equations for initial wages in the new job 
following the unemployment benefit spells. The period covered is 2002 (or 2004, 
when wages are considered) to 2013. The estimations are conducted separately 
for males and females  
 
 
pkV
j
k=1
K
 = 0
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4.6.1 Transitions from unemployment to work  
Table 5 presents the estimation results of the correlated competing risks 
model distinguishing two exits: any job and non-employment. The best likelihood 
is obtained using a discrete unobserved heterogeneity distribution with three 
mass points. In our specification, as is well established in the literature, the 
probability of leaving unemployment depends on individual characteristics such 
as age, nationality, children and level of education, as well as labour market 
conditions, such as the regional unemployment rates.  
 
4.6.1.1 Coefficients on the covariates  
We are mainly interested in transitions to work; the other exit is controlled 
for but not of our primary interest since it merges unemployment without 
benefits with exit to non-participation; we cannot disentangle the two. We focus 
on the differences in the determinants of transitions from unemployment to 
work between males and females. As expected, individuals living in regions with 
higher unemployment rates have a lower probability of finding a job. The 
estimated coefficient is larger for women than for men, suggesting that women 
are more sensitive to regional labour market conditions. Younger groups and 
particularly the group older than 45 years exhibit more difficulties in finding a 
new job. Particularly for men, the group between 24 and 44 years old has much 
better chances to find a new job than other age groups.  
Female immigrants (Spanish speaking and non-Spanish speaking) and non-
Spanish-speaking male immigrants are less likely to find a job than natives. 
Women in the group of Spanish speaking immigrants seem particularly 
disadvantaged. As expected, having dependent children has opposite effects on 
job finding rates for males (positive, but only for children older than four years) 
and females (negative, especially for children younger than four years). The 
positive effect of living in larger cities on the hazard is stronger for males than for 
females.  
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Table 5. Estimation results of correlated competing risks (exit to any job and 
non-employment) models for male and female samples 
Female sample Male sample 
Any Job Non-employment Any Job Non-employment 
Unemployment rate -0.0166*** 0.00410*** -0.00629*** 0.00121** 
(0.000622) (0.000503) (0.000541) (0.000523) 
Age 0.0441*** -0.0587*** 0.0730*** -0.0644*** 
(0.00289) (0.00247) (0.00243) (0.00239) 
Age2 -0.000700*** 0.000523*** -0.00110*** 0.000487*** 
(3.90e-05) (3.31e-05) (3.27e-05) (3.21e-05) 
Spanish_speaking -0.110*** 0.331*** -0.00475 0.372*** 
(0.0210) (0.0154) (0.0132) (0.0124) 
Non_Spanish_speaking -0.141*** 0.194*** -0.132*** 0.264*** 
(0.0156) (0.0116) (0.0102) (0.00933) 
Children<4 -0.562*** -0.143*** -0.00104 -0.187*** 
(0.00814) (0.00640) (0.00738) (0.00820) 
Children>3 &<16 -0.0942*** -0.0857*** 0.0598*** -0.132*** 
(0.00666) (0.00578) (0.00617) (0.00671) 
Primary -0.111*** 0.0544*** -0.0657*** 0.0405*** 
(0.00921) (0.00719) (0.00662) (0.00662) 
Upper_secondary 0.0237*** -0.00187 -0.0696*** 0.0596*** 
(0.00744) (0.00622) (0.00693) (0.00708) 
Post_secondary 0.207*** 0.0830*** -0.00943 0.0814*** 
(0.00889) (0.00782) (0.0102) (0.0106) 
Inhabitants >40,000 0.0585*** 0.0591*** 0.111*** 0.0206*** 
(0.00588) (0.00497) (0.00522) (0.00536) 
V1 -1.170*** 0.300*** -0.576*** 0.327*** 
(0.0615) (0.00858) (0.0224) (0.00852) 
V2 0.318*** -0.00456 0.438*** -0.242*** 
(0.0168) (0.00797) (0.00873) (0.00763) 
a1 1.034*** 4.337*** 
(0.104) (0.0999) 
a2 1.866*** 4.710*** 
(0.0527) (0.108) 
Observations 1,271,359   1,242,403   
Log Likelihood -2,503,000 -2,483,000.00 
Number of ids 164,177 164,177 167,655 167,655 
Number of exits 179,990 176,172 188,776 165,090 
Terms of mass points Female sample Male sample 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
Probability 27% 63%  10% 40.5% 58.89% 0.5% 
V any job -1.170 0.318 1.234 -0.576 0.438 -4.556 
V non-employment 0.300 -0.00456 0.813 0.327 -0.242 1.976 
Rho -85%     -99.12%     
Notes: Correlated Competing risks estimation: piecewise baseline and discrete distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity with three mass points. References categories: Native Spanish, lower secondary education 
level. Age and quarterly unemployment rate are time-varying variables. Yearly dummies are included in 
the estimation.  Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
A higher level of education implies better chances to find a job for females 
but not for males. For instance, a woman with post-secondary education level is 
23% more likely to find a job than a woman with lower secondary education 
level, while for men these probabilities are not significantly different.  Women 
with lower level of education are in a disadvantaged position compared to similar 
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men, perhaps due to the different type of jobs they access. Accordingly, Dolado 
et al. (2001,2004) find that occupational segregation in Spain is much higher for 
the less educated women. 
 
4.6.1.2 Unobserved heterogeneity 
According to the estimated discrete distribution, the correlation between 
the unobserved heterogeneity terms is negative and sizeable. This implies that 
someone who is likely to find a job has lower chances to exit out of the labour 
force. This correlation is higher for males, possibly due to the prominent role of 
women in taking care of the family which reduces the link between productivity 
and exit probabilities.  For instance, women in the third group are more likely to 
find a job but also to become non-employed; they apparently have unobservable 
characteristics that make them more prone to find a job, but also more prone to 
withdraw from the labour market because of  family responsibilities. Most 
individuals (63% of women and 59% of men) belong to a group in which exit 
hazard rates to any job are higher than the average, and hazard rates to non-
employment are average for women but lower for men. A second group (27% of 
women and 40.5% of men) has below average chances of an exit to a job but 
higher chances to non-employment. The very small third group of men (0.53%) 
has virtually no chance of finding a job but a high chance to withdraw from the 
labour market.  
 
 4.6.1.3 Baseline Hazard Estimates 
Figure 6 shows the hazard functions of the competing risks model for a 
benchmark man and woman for the unemployment to job transitions in a year of 
expansion. Unlike in figures 1 to 4, observed and unobserved heterogeneity are 
controlled for through the covariates and frailty terms, so that slopes can be 
interpreted as true state dependence. The pattern is quite similar for men and 
women, but the benchmark man is more likely to find a job than a similar 
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woman, mostly during the first three months of unemployment. From then both 
hazards functions and their differences decrease with unemployment tenure. 
Thus, the baseline hazard for both groups shows negative duration dependence, 
in line with a negative stigma effect (employers are reluctant to hire individuals 
who have been unemployed for a longer time) or discouraged worker effect. The 
duration dependence is larger for males. 
 
Figure 6.  Hazard rates benchmark person for unemployment to any job 
transition. Males and females; competing risks model. Duration in months 
 
Note: Benchmark individual: Native, no children, lower secondary level of education, living in a 
municipality with less than 40,000 inhabitants, year 2002. Unemployment rate=10.28 and age=33. 
 
Figure 7 shows the impact of the economic conditions on the probability of 
finding a job after 12 months of unemployment for an unemployed male and 
female, controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. As expected, 
better economic conditions rise the probability to find a job and worse economic 
conditions reduce it. The pattern of these functions is captured by the yearly 
dummies and the regional unemployment rate coefficient. The effect of the 
regional unemployment rate is higher for females while the procyclical pattern of 
the yearly dummies is stronger for males, probably due to the higher 
procyclicality of men’s occupations. As a consequence, in the expansion period 
the probability of finding a job is higher for men than for women (for instance, in 
2005 75% for males and 67% for females), while in the recession period those 
two effects tend to offset each other (i.e, in 2010 59% for males and 60% for 
females), implying a reduction of the gender gap in unemployment duration 
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during the  downturn. The most pronounced drops in job finding probabilities are 
found in 2008, 2009 and 2012.  
 
Figure 7. Probability of finding a job after 12 months of unemployment. Males 
and females. 2002-2013 
 
Note: Benchmark individual: the same as in the Figure 6 except for year dummy and the unemployment 
rate, which is the total unemployment rate for the second quarter of each year. 
  
4.6.1.4 The role of compositional variation and business cycle in unemployment 
duration 
Table 6 displays the results of decompositions of the difference between 
the survival probabilities in unemployment82 after 360 days for the male and 
female samples in the pre-recession (2002-2007) and recession (2008-2013) 
periods. The first rows give the average survival probabilities for the two samples 
in each economic period according to the models estimated, and the difference 
between them, which is a measure of the gender gap. For instance, the average 
probability of not finding a job was 34 percent for males and 45 percent for 
females in the expansion period, a gender difference of minus 11.1 percentage 
points. However, during the recession the survival probabilities increase to 48.8 
percent for males and 50.7 percent for females, implying a substantial decrease 
in the differential between males and females to -1.85% percent. 
The remaining rows show the decomposition of these observed 
inequalities between men and women into composition effect and behavioural 
                                                        
82 According to our goals, we focus on analysing unemployment exits to any job. 
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effect. First, we take the female estimates, but compute the average probabilities 
for the male sample. Comparing with the female probabilities in row 3 gives the 
composition effect: the difference explained by the fact that individual 
characteristics in the male and female samples are different. Following the 
methodology proposed by Yun(2004), we also obtain the contribution of each 
variable to the composition effect83. The remaining part of the male-female 
changes is the behavioural effect (last row). 
 
Table 6 Decomposition analysis for exits from unemployment to any job 
Expansion Recession 
Total Differences -11.10% 100% -1.85% 100% 
Males 33.9% 48.8% 
Females 45.0% 50.7% 
Composition effects 1.168% -10.5% 1.9% -102% 
Regional Unemp rate 0.400 -4.21% -0.008 0.8% 
Age 0.387 -4.07% 0.183 -18.8% 
Immigrants 0.412 -4.34% 0.404 -41.4% 
Children -1.919 20.18% -1.107 113.5% 
Education level 1.670 -17.57% 1.380 -141.4% 
Inhabitants 0.052 -0.54% -0.0004 0.04% 
Yearly dummy exp. -0.003 0.03% 0.000 0.0% 
Yearly dummy rec. 0.000 0.00% 0.148 -15.2% 
Behavioural effect -12.3% 110.5% -3.7% 202% 
Note: Evaluated at female coefficients.  
 
Focusing firstly on the expansion period, the results suggest that the 
longer average unemployment duration for females against males is not due to 
differences in characteristics between men and women but to differences in the 
labour market returns (estimated parameters) to their characteristics. There may 
be many reasons for this, such as differences in motivation, (statistical) 
discrimination, job search intensity, etc.; unfortunately our data do not allow to 
distinguish them. On the other hand, the opposite sign of the composition effects 
(1.2%), compared to the sign of the total difference, reveals a dampening effect 
                                                        
83 The weight of each variable is computed as a linear combination of mean characteristics and estimated 
parameters as follow:  T∆VB =
B
W(XY
ZXY
W)
W(XZXW)
   and ∑  T∆VB = 1 

< ; where k is the number of the explanatory 
variables in the model and S and [  the mean level of characteristics for men and women respectively. 
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of women’s characteristics. If women and men had the same characteristics, the 
gender gap would be greater. Specifically, differences in the distribution of 
education level contribute to increasing female’s job finding rates compared to 
males’. The higher level of education, therefore, can be viewed as protecting 
women from unemployment.  
The reduction of the gender gap in the downturn, is due to the substantial 
drop of the behavioural effect  (from -12.3% to -3.7%), largely explained by 
changes in time trend (already analyzed in Figure 7) and a small increase in the 
dampening effect of sample composition. 
 
4.6.2. Gender gap in initial Wages over the business cycle 
Table 7 presents the estimation results of log initial wages of full time jobs 
following an unemployment spell using ordinary least squares (OLS) for males 
and females. Different specifications are shown. Model I includes personal 
characteristics and labour market conditions. By sequentially adding job 
characteristics (in Model II) and previous unemployment duration (in Model III), 
we eliminate differences in estimated initial wages between samples that may be 
due to differences in these observable characteristics (described in Section 3). We 
mainly focus on Model III and point out some differences between models. 
 
4.6.2.1 Coefficients on the covariates 
Male wages are more negatively affected by the labour market conditions 
than female wages. Initial wages increase with age until around age 47. They 
increase more with age for women than for men, particularly at younger ages. 
Nationality influences wages differently by gender. Male immigrants earn less 
than their native counterparts. For the female sample, non-Spanish speaking 
immigrants earn more than Spanish speaking immigrants and native women. 
However, immigrants, especially women, tend to take the lower paid jobs. Having 
children certainly influences the gender wage gap, reducing wages for women 
but increasing them for men. The positive effect of education level is stronger for 
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women than for men. Thus, lower educated women are in a clear disadvantaged 
position, which is aggravated by their concentration in lower-paid jobs. In 
contrast, higher educated women and (to a lesser extent) men, are concentrated 
in higher-paid jobs. Living in a more densely populated area leads to lower initial 
wages. Jobs in non-manual occupations are better paid than in manual 
occupations. Construction is the industry that pays the highest wages, followed 
by manufacturing and services. Differences in wages (with respect to services) are 
bigger for men, especially in manufacturing. Jobs with more intensive technology 
pay better wages than other jobs, especially for women. Female wages in the 
public sector are higher than in the private sector. The opposite is true for men.  
 
Table 7 OLS Estimation of initial ln wages for males and females  
Females Males 
Model I Model II Model III Model I Model II Model III 
Unemployment rate -0.00242*** -0.00264*** -0.00274*** -0.00472*** -0.00386*** -0.00391*** 
(0.000243) (0.000222) (0.000221) (0.000172) (0.000163) (0.000163) 
Age 0.0229*** 0.0199*** 0.0220*** 0.0193*** 0.0178*** 0.0190*** 
(0.00113) (0.00101) (0.00101) (0.000779) (0.000729) (0.000727) 
Age2 -0.000243*** -0.000229*** -0.000253*** -0.000214*** -0.000194*** -0.000206*** 
(1.51e-05) (1.36e-05) (1.36e-05) (1.04e-05) (9.76e-06) (9.72e-06) 
Spanish_speaking -0.0736*** 0.00693 0.000401 -0.0906*** -0.0712*** -0.0762*** 
(0.00752) (0.00679) (0.00677) (0.00406) (0.00382) (0.00381) 
Non_Spanish_speak -0.0249*** 0.0495*** 0.0459*** -0.0390*** -0.0252*** -0.0291*** 
(0.00544) (0.00492) (0.00491) (0.00313) (0.00295) (0.00294) 
Children<4 -0.0256*** -0.0333*** -0.0250*** 0.0110*** 0.00790*** 0.00880*** 
(0.00329) (0.00296) (0.00296) (0.00232) (0.00217) (0.00216) 
Children>3 & <15 -0.0195*** -0.0206*** -0.0176*** 0.00687*** 0.00616*** 0.00659*** 
(0.00256) (0.00231) (0.00230) (0.00188) (0.00177) (0.00176) 
Primary -0.0419*** -0.0196*** -0.0193*** -0.0193*** -0.0223*** -0.0220*** 
(0.00324) (0.00293) (0.00292) (0.00194) (0.00183) (0.00182) 
Upper_secondary 0.111*** 0.0576*** 0.0573*** 0.0615*** 0.0453*** 0.0451*** 
(0.00262) (0.00247) (0.00246) (0.00214) (0.00208) (0.00207) 
Post_secondary 0.338*** 0.220*** 0.216*** 0.240*** 0.181*** 0.179*** 
(0.00312) (0.00308) (0.00307) (0.00334) (0.00343) (0.00342) 
Inhabitants -0.0296*** -0.0114*** -0.0115*** -0.0162*** -0.0102*** -0.0109*** 
(0.00212) (0.00195) (0.00194) (0.00158) (0.00150) (0.00150) 
Non_manual 0.0930*** 0.0930*** 0.0918*** 0.0920*** 
(0.00233) (0.00232) (0.00221) (0.00220) 
Construction 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.183*** 0.179*** 
(0.00674) (0.00671) (0.00193) (0.00193) 
Manufacturing 0.00966*** 0.00683** 0.122*** 0.120*** 
(0.00332) (0.00331) (0.00242) (0.00241) 
High_technology 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.0847*** 0.0854*** 
(0.00590) (0.00588) (0.00414) (0.00412) 
Public 0.112*** 0.113*** -0.0271*** -0.0236*** 
(0.00323) (0.00322) (0.00346) (0.00344) 
Size_0 0.0159** 0.0177*** -0.00400 -0.00213 
(0.00661) (0.00659) (0.00380) (0.00379) 
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Table 7, continued 
Females Males 
Model I Model II Model III Model I Model II Model III 
Size_10_19 0.0301*** 0.0286*** 0.0271*** 0.0260*** 
(0.00364) (0.00363) (0.00235) (0.00234) 
Size_20_49 0.0687*** 0.0667*** 0.0633*** 0.0617*** 
(0.00318) (0.00317) (0.00227) (0.00226) 
Size_50_249 0.116*** 0.112*** 0.136*** 0.134*** 
(0.00284) (0.00283) (0.00228) (0.00227) 
Size_250 0.189*** 0.183*** 0.213*** 0.210*** 
(0.00307) (0.00306) (0.00284) (0.00283) 
Open_ended 0.0935*** 0.0790*** 0.116*** 0.102*** 
(0.00294) (0.00298) (0.00334) (0.00335) 
On_call_temporary 0.128*** 0.122*** 0.113*** 0.108*** 
(0.00314) (0.00313) (0.00375) (0.00374) 
Permanent 0.00417 0.00783*** 0.00863*** 0.0115*** 
(0.00294) (0.00293) (0.00221) (0.00221) 
THA 0.0487*** 0.0504*** 0.0514*** 0.0532*** 
(0.00433) (0.00431) (0.00386) (0.00384) 
Previous unemp. duration -0.000226*** -0.000241*** 
(1.56e-05) (1.16e-05) 
Previous unemp. duration_2 6.82e-08*** 1.07e-07*** 
(2.01e-08) (1.52e-08) 
Constant 3.243*** 3.156*** 3.151*** 3.511*** 3.355*** 3.363*** 
(0.0201) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0141) (0.0133) (0.0132) 
              
Observations 90,454 90,115 90,115 136,456 136,139 136,139 
R-squared 0.171 0.33 0.334 0.076 0.19 0.197 
Log Likelihood -23,837 -13,996 -13,633 -23,982 -14,710 -14,119 
Note: Model I: personal characteristics; Model II: adding job characteristics to Model I; and Model III: 
adding previous unemployment duration to Model II. References categories: Native Spanish, lower 
secondary education level, services sector, size_1_9, temporary. Quarterly unemployment rate and age  
are time-varying variables. Yearly dummies are included in the estimation.  Significance levels: *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Figure 8 shows the evolution of log wages for a benchmark man and 
woman over the period 2004-2013. We find similar patterns for both sexes, a 
moderate growth in the wages during the expansion period followed by a decline 
in 2008 and an immediate increase in 2009. All these changes are slightly 
stronger for women. From 2009 a declining trend is observed, particularly for 
men. As a consequence, there is a smooth reduction in the gender differential 
during the crisis. Male wages are somewhat more negatively influenced by the 
conditions of the labour market and time trend is more unfavourable for men, 
perhaps because men had to move more often than women to other industries in 
order to leave unemployment, given the sectorial character of the crisis. 
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Figure  8. Evolution of initial wages 2004-2013 for a benchmark individual. Male 
and Female. Model III 
 
Note: Benchmark individual: native, No children, lower secondary, and living in a municipality with less 
than 40,000 inhabitants, working in private sector, in a small company (1-10), in services sector, non-
manual occupation, non-high technology, with temporary contract, non THA. Unemployment rate of the 
second quarter of each year; Average age=33. Previous unemployment duration=167 days. 
 
 
4.6.2.2 The role of compositional variation by gender in initial wages 
Table 8 shows the results of the decomposition of mean differences in log 
wages between males and females in two economic periods based on Model III. 
Using the methodology described in Table 6, the first rows give the average log 
wages for males and females in each economic period according to the estimated 
models84, and the difference between them. For example, in the expansion 
period, the average log wage was 3.88 for males and 3.78 for females, so the 
gender gap  was 10.33 percent in favour of males. In the downturn, the increase 
in the average real wages was higher for women than for men, leading to a 
smaller gender gap (7.12 percent). The gender wage gap after controlling for 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity is significantly higher than the observed 
wage gap (Table 4) suggesting that the sample characteristics of the women help 
to reduce the gross wage gap. This is in line with Guner et al. (2014), although, 
while our sample consists of full time workers just after leaving the 
unemployment spell, they consider the  complete workforce.  
                                                        
84 The decomposition analysis is done for Model III for males and females that includes personal, job characteristics 
and previous unemployment duration as explanatory variables.  
3,00
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3,20
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Table 8. Decomposition analysis of gender gap in initial wages. 
Expansion Recession 
Total Differences 10.33% 100% 7.12% 100% 
males 3.88 3.90 
females 3.78 3.83 
Composition effects -7.2% -70% -9.4% -132% 
Regional Unemp rate 0.024 -1.7% 0.017 -2.3% 
Age 0.004 -0.3% -0.013 1.7% 
Immigrants -0.014 1.0% -0.017 2.2% 
Children 0.003 -0.2% 0.009 -1.2% 
Education level 0.360 -25.2% 0.355 -46.8% 
Inhabitants -0.004 0.3% 0.001 -0.1% 
Yearly dummy exp. 0.005 -0.3% 0.000 0.0% 
Yearly dummy rec. 0.000 0.0% -0.024 3.2% 
Public 0.177 -12.4% 0.161 -21.2% 
Firm size 0.425 -29.8% 0.361 -47.5% 
Industry -0.633 44.4% -0.490 64.5% 
Non_manual 0.375 -26.4% 0.324 -42.7% 
High_technology -0.022 1.5% -0.013 1.7% 
Type of contract 0.315 -22.1% 0.297 -39.1% 
THA 0.010 -0.7% 0.006 -0.8% 
Previous unemp_dur -0.025 1.7% 0.027 -3.5% 
Behavioural effect 17.6% 170% 16.5% 232% 
 Note: Evaluated at female coefficients 
The remaining rows show the two components that contribute to 
explaining the gender gap: the composition effect (explained part), which is also 
detailed by groups of characteristics, and the behavioural effect (residual part). 
For the two periods, the gender gap is completely explained by the differences in 
the returns to the characteristics. This may capture potential effects of gender 
differences in unobservable variables such as differences in the type of jobs85, 
motivation, productivity, discrimination, etc. Again, women’s characteristics 
dampen the behavioural effect. For instance, gender differences in the 
distribution by level of education, firm size and non-manual occupation 
contribute reducing the income inequality, and dominate the effect of industry in 
the opposite direction86.  
During the recession period the gender gap in initial wages narrows due to 
a moderate reduction of the residual part87, mainly associated with changes in 
                                                        
85 Evidence from Croson and Gneezy (2009) and Bonin et al. (2007) reveals that women are more risk-averse than 
men so they apply to more stable jobs with lower average wages.  
86 Women are more concentrated than men in the services sector which is the lower-paying industry. 
87 Guner et al. (2014),  also find that the unexplained part of the observed gender wage gap has decreased from 2004 
to 2010 for the complete workforce. 
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time trend (already described in Figure 8), and women’s gain in composition 
characteristics, largely explained by the reduction in the opposite effect of 
industry.  
 
4.6.3. Differentials in Job duration (to non-employment) over the business cycle 
Table 9 presents the estimation results of the hazards for job transitions to 
other job and to non-employment88, for male and female samples using three 
different models. Model I includes personal characteristics and labour market 
conditions; by sequentially adding job characteristics (in Model II) and initial 
wages (in Model III), we eliminate differences in estimated job durations between 
groups that may be due to differences in these observable characteristics. The 
best likelihood is obtained using a discrete unobserved heterogeneity distribution 
with three mass points for females and two mass points for males89. Our 
benchmark model is Model III, and we point out substantial differences with the 
other specifications. 
 
4.6.3.1 Coefficients on the covariates   
Local unemployment is positively correlated with transitions to non-
employment, particularly for men. Young and older workers have less stable jobs 
than middle-aged workers and differences by gender in favour of men’s job 
tenure increase gradually with age. Immigrants have less stable jobs than natives 
(and the effect is intensified by the characteristics of the jobs of immigrants), 
especially Spanish speaking immigrants. The effect for non-Spanish speaking 
immigrants is smaller for women than for men. Unlike men, women with 
dependent children have more chances to fall into non-employment (i.e., 9% for 
children younger than four). A higher level of education increases job stability for 
both samples. Furthermore, this effect is intensified by the characteristics of the 
                                                        
88  In this context, exits to non-employment include transitions to unemployment (with and without benefits) and out 
of the labour force. 
89  Estimation for males using discrete distribution of unobserved heterogeneity with three mass points does not 
converge.  
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jobs associated to each level of education. For primary level of education, the 
effects of job characteristics reducing stability are similar for both sexes, but for 
upper and post-secondary level of education, the effect of job characteristics 
adding stability is stronger for men. Possibly this is because men are more likely 
to receive job specific training which protects them against layoffs. Living in larger 
cities increases the job hazard rates for women but decreases them for men.   
In order to interpret coefficients of current job characteristics it is 
important to note that they may capture causal effects but also (time-persistent) 
heterogeneity. Workers in non-manual occupations have more stable jobs than 
manual workers. The influence of the industry on job duration varies by gender. 
Female employees in construction exhibit the lowest job hazard (-15%), followed 
by services and manufacturing industries. In contrast, male workers in 
manufacturing show the lowest exit rates, followed by services and construction. 
Moreover, jobs in sectors with more intensive technology seem to be more stable 
than other jobs. While women working in the public sector are (4.5%) less likely 
to become non-employed than those in the private sector, the opposite is true 
for men (18.8%). Job stability and gender differences in favour of males’ job 
stability increase with firm size. The influence of the type of contract on job 
stability is as expected, with differences by gender in the magnitudes of the 
coefficients. Workers from temporary help agencies have less stable jobs. Higher 
part time coefficients are associated with more stable jobs. Workers with higher 
wages exhibit more chances to become non-employed, particularly women. 
Previous unemployment duration correlates differently by gender. It is hardly 
associated with subsequent job stability for men. Maybe two opposite effects 
cancel out: longer time  
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with unemployment benefits allows workers to wait until a good job match 
arrives91 but the scarring effect reduces their job options and makes them 
accept worse jobs (with shorter tenure). On the other hand, previous 
unemployment duration is positively associated with the women’s hazard rate 
until two years of unemployment. This may reflect the lower job opportunities 
and shorter unemployment benefit periods of women that lead them to accept 
less stable jobs. 
 
4.6.3.2 Unobserved heterogeneity 
The unobserved heterogeneity parameters in Table 10 show that the 
groups with lower job to non-employment turnover tend to have higher Job-to-
job transitions and vice versa for both genders. Most workers (90% of women 
and 63% of men) belong to a group in which hazard rates to other job are above 
average and hazard rates to non-employment are below average (for males) or 
virtually equal to the average (for females). Another group of women (8%) has 
the highest probabilities to transit to other job and the lowest to become non-
employed.  
 
Table 10. Terms of mass points92 correlated from the correlated competing 
risk model using Model III 
Terms of mass points 
Female sample Male sample 
1 2 3 1 2 
Probability 2% 8% 90% 63% 37% 
V Other job -17.01 1.21 0.20 0.28 -0.47 
V Non-employment 0.87 -0.45 0.02 -0.09 0.15 
Rho -0.75     -1   
 
 
 
                                                        
91 From Job matching theory, jobs are experienced goods and good job matches are those that survive longer. 
92 Unobserved heterogeneity terms using Model I and II: for females, using the Model I: Prob(type I)= 10.7%; 
Prob(type II)=69%; Prob(type III)=20%; V3 (other job)=-1.529 V3(non-emp)=0.306 Rho=-47%; using the Model II: 
Prob(type I)= 88.7%; Prob(type II)=9%; Prob(type III)=2%; V3 (other job)=-14.7; V3(non-emp)=0.861; Rho=-78%;  
For males: Using model I: p1=31%; p2=69%; V2(other job)= 0.33; V2(Non-emp)=-0.11;  Rho=-1; Using Model II: 
p1=56%; p2=44%; V2(other job)=-0.335; V2(Non-emp)=0.12;  Rho=-1 
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4.6.3.3 Baseline Hazard Estimates 
Analogous to Figure 6, Figure 9 shows the hazard function of the 
competing risks model for exits to non-employment for a male and a female 
worker in a year representative of the expansion period. Patterns for males and 
females are quite similar with the exception of a higher exit rate from job to 
non-employment in months 7-13 for women, probably associated to the 
seasonal nature of female activities. Afterwards there is a shape decline in exit 
rates93. So, initially there is a positive duration dependence, markedly stronger 
for females, that subsequently turns negative. This confirms the pattern 
predicted by the job matching theory, after a stage of learning (employees and 
employers) from the matching quality, good matches survive. 
 
Figure 9 Hazard rates benchmark person for Job to non-employment 
transition. Females and Males; competing risks Model III. Duration in month
Note: Benchmark person: Unemployment rate= 10.28; age=33; native, no children, lower secondary level 
of education; year 2004; private sector; size_1_9; services sector; Non-manual occupation; non-High 
Technology; temporary contract; no THA; part time coefficient=0.9; previous unemployment duration= 
167 days; real daily wage= 46.01.  
 
Analogous to Figure 7, Figure 10 shows the influence of the business 
cycle on the probability of job exits to non-employment after 12 months in the 
job for a benchmark male and female, controlling for observed (personal, and 
job characteristics) and unobserved heterogeneity. This probability remains 
                                                        
93 In line with this, Rebollo (2012) finds a spike in the probability of leaving employment corresponding to the 
moment in which the employee qualifies for unemployment benefits. 
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quite stable for 2005-2007 period for both sexes and increases from 2007 to 
2012, with a large growth in 2008, particularly for males. As a consequence, the 
gender gap in exits to non-employment decreases in the downturn. 
Nevertheless, it is worth to note the stronger decline in the job exit probability 
for males in 2013, which may point at an increase in the gender gap in the near 
future.  
The shape of these functions captures the changes in the regional 
unemployment rate and the time trends. The positive effect of unemployment 
rate and the increasing time trend in job exits are higher for males, mostly 
during the recession period. However, the comparison of Models I and II reveals 
that job characteristics change over time, showing a growing job stability 
pattern, similar for both sexes during the expansion period but only for men 
during the recession. In addition, differences between Models II and III suggest 
that women work in jobs where the dynamic positive effect of wages on job 
exits is more pronounced, especially during the crisis. The economic slump 
therefore influences more negatively men’s job stability, which is consistent 
with males tending to be employed in more procyclical occupations. But the 
characteristics of their jobs act in the opposite direction, which would lead to 
more job stability for men.   
 
Figure 10. Probability of exiting to non-employment after 12 months in the 
job. Females & Males. 2004-2013.  Model III 
Note: See note of figure 9 for benchmark characteristics. Here the unemployment rate corresponds to 
the unemployment rate of the second quarter of each year. 
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4.6.3.4 The role of compositional variation and business cycle in job duration 
(exits to non-employment) 
Table 10 shows the results of decompositions94 of the gender gap in job 
duration, using the methodology presented in Table 6. Gender inequality is 
measured as the difference between the survival probabilities after 360 days for 
the male and female sample, in two different economic periods. For instance, 
the first rows show that the average probability of not exiting to non-
employment was 49.8 percent for males and 41.9 percent for females in the 
expansion period, a difference of 7.9 percentage points. During the recession 
this probability decreases to 36.9 percent for males and 37.6 percent for 
females, so that the gender gap disappears. 
 
Table 10 Decomposition analysis for exits from job to non-employment 
Expansion Recession 
Total Differences 7.90% 100% -0.70% 100% 
males 49.8% 36.9% 
females 41.9% 37.6% 
Composition effects -4.7% -59.6% -4.8% 686% 
Regional Unemp rate 0.036 -2.14% 0.032 22.1% 
Age 0.015 -0.87% 0.007 5.0% 
Immigrants 0.044 -2.64% 0.065 44.7% 
Children -0.012 0.70% -0.007 -4.5% 
Education level 0.220 -13.10% 0.249 170.6% 
Inhabitants -0.001 0.06% 0.004 2.5% 
Yearly dummy exp. -0.004 0.23% -0.004 -2.8% 
Yearly dummy rec. 0.000 0.00% -0.004 -3.0% 
Public 0.032 -1.89% 0.032 22.0% 
Firm size 0.356 -21.23% 0.274 187.9% 
Industry -0.334 19.91% -0.295 -202.3% 
non_manual 0.427 -25.47% 0.445 304.9% 
high_technology -0.007 0.44% -0.009 -5.9% 
Type of contract -0.042 2.52% -0.080 -54.9% 
THA -0.003 0.18% 0.001 0.6% 
Part time coef. -0.120 7.16% -0.136 -93.0% 
Unemp_dur_1 -0.012 0.73% 0.023 15.8% 
Real_daily_wage 0.406 -24.23% 0.403 276.2% 
Behavioural effect 12.6% 160% 4.1% -586% 
Note: evaluated at female coefficients. 
 
                                                        
94 According to our goals, the decomposition analysis is studied for the job to non-employment 
transition. 
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The remaining rows show the decomposition of these observed 
inequalities between men and women into a composition effect and a 
behavioural effect. The results suggest that the gender gap in the expansion 
period is not explained by differences in characteristics but by differences 
coefficients. Differences in coefficients may be due to different reasons, such as 
differences in job match quality, productivity, motivation, or discrimination 
behavior, but as said before we cannot distinguish them. The  women’s 
characteristics as a whole contribute to decreasing (-4.7%) the gender gap. 
Specifically, gender differences in the distribution of education level, firm size, 
and proportion of non-manual occupations, as well as the lower wages of 
females contribute to the increasing females’ job stability.  
In the recession period, the gender gap has disappeared and this is driven 
by a  substantial reduction in the behavioural effect, largely associated with the 
changes in time trend and economic conditions (already analyzed in Figure 7) 
that is canceled out by the composition effect that remains stable in comparison 
with the expansion period.  
 
4.7 Conclusions  
In this paper we have examined gender differences in unemployment 
duration, consecutive job stability and initial wages over the business cycle 
(2002-2013) in the Spanish labour market. Unemployment transitions were 
explored estimating correlated competing risks models. We focus on transitions 
from unemployment to any job and consecutive job exits to non-employment. 
Estimations were done separately for men and women. 
The data reveal substantial gender differences in the characteristics of 
unemployed workers and consecutive jobs, and their changes by economic 
period, due to both supply and demand factors. For instance, women are more 
qualified and more concentrated in non-manual occupations, services and part-
time jobs. The crisis leads to a fall of construction and manufacturing jobs (male 
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concentrated sectors), a reduction of the hires among low qualified workers, 
mainly women, and a narrowing of the gender gap in initial wages. 
Comparing unemployment exits for men and women, we find that the 
chances to find a job decrease with the duration of unemployment for both 
sexes, but they are higher for males, mainly during the first three months. 
Negative duration dependence of the hazard is stronger for males, probably due 
to their stronger discouraged worker effects. 
In the expansion period, average unemployment duration is significantly 
higher for women than for men. A decomposition analysis reveals that these 
gender inequalities are not explained by observed characteristics; unobserved 
differences in employees (productivity, job search effort) or employers 
(discrimination, statistical discrimination) are behind this, which we 
unfortunately cannot distinguish. Female education level increases females’ job 
finding rates and therefore contributes to reducing the gender disparity. 
During the recession period, job finding rates decrease more for men 
than for women, resulting in a substantial decrease in the gender inequalities in 
unemployment duration. This is mainly due to the larger procyclicality (time 
trend) of job finding rates for men, probably associated to men’s occupations.  
Women harmed against similar men in job finding chances are those with 
children, low level of education, the age group 24-44 and Spanish speaking 
immigrants. 
Focusing on the new jobs taken by the unemployed workers, we find that 
during the expansion period, both the initial wages and job stability are higher 
for men. These gender gaps again are driven by differences in the returns to 
individual characteristics (unexplained part). Some women’s personal (level of 
education) and job (firm size, non-manual occupation) characteristics contribute 
narrowing both gender inequalities.  
In the downturn, male wages increase less than female wages, narrowing 
slightly the gender gap in initial wages. Male wages are more negatively 
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influenced by the labour market conditions and by the negative time trend, 
perhaps because men had to move more often than women to other industries 
to leave the unemployment, suffering a penalty of wages. In turn, changes in 
the industry composition lead to higher wages for women.  
Furthermore, job tenure declines more for men and as a result the 
gender gap in job stability disappeared. The former reduction responds to the 
larger impact of the crisis on men’s job tenure, which is consistent with males 
tending to be employed in occupations more affected by cyclical fluctuations. 
However, the characteristics of their jobs would increase job stability, and effect 
that is not found for females during the recession. 
Hazards to non-employment show similar patterns for men and women 
with the exception of a higher job exit rate for females (7-13 months), probably 
associated with the seasonal nature of their activities. The pattern consists of a 
first stage (13 months) of positive duration dependence  that turns negative, in 
line with matching theory predictions.  
Women who are more negatively affected compared to similar men in 
terms of job quality 95  are those with children, low level of education, 
immigrants, those working in the manufacturing industry, the private sector and 
large firms. Moreover, the negative associations of unemployment duration and 
subsequent initial wages and job tenure are larger for females.  
The possibly transitory equality of male and female unemployment rates 
should not be confused with absence of gender inequalities, so policy measures 
should be addressed at reducing them. The priority should be to reduce the 
time the unemployed need to find a job, because it seems to be the main 
source of inequality, by itself and affecting inequality in consecutive job stability 
and wage. To reach this aim, we propose measures addressed to increasing the 
likelihood of receiving a job offer, such as enhancing the level of skills and 
assistance in the process of job search. In addition, to increase the ability of 
                                                        
95 Considering job duration (better matches typically last longer) and the level of wages as indicators of 
the job quality. 
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women to accept the job, conciliating work and family measures is necessary, 
such as fostering flexible and continuous schedules, work from home, and 
improving conditions of part time jobs.  Finally, a direct measure to promote job 
stability and higher wages is to involve women in firm continuous training.   
From a policy point of view this study has the limitation that demand and 
supply factors were not disentangle, as a consequence,  we cannot distinguish 
the reasons behind the behavioural effects, such as discrimination, differences 
in productivity, motivation, as well as stigma effect and discouraged effect in job 
finding process. 
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Appendix A4 
Table A1. Definition of explanatory variables.  
Individual characteristics 
Age  It is a continuous time-varying covariate. Values between 16 and 55 years old.  
Native 1 if Spanish nationality. 
Spanish-speaking immigrants  1 if immigrant comes from a Spanish-speaking country. 
Non-Spanish speaking immigrants   1 if immigrant comes from a non-Spanish-speaking country. 
Children in the household younger than 4 years old 
1 if there are children younger than 4 years old in the household 
and difference in age between the individual and the children is 
more than 16 years. 
Children in the household between 4 and 15 years 
old 
1 if there are children between 4 and 16 years old in the household 
and difference in age between the individual and the children is 
more than 16 years. 
Primary education 1 if none and elementary education level. 
Lower secondary education 1 if lower secondary education level (middle school). 
Upper secondary  1 if upper secondary level (high school). 
Post-secondary 1 if post-secondary (or tertiary) education level.  
Macroeconomic variables 
Regional Unemployment rate 
Quarterly unemployment rate by region (time-varying); source: 
Economically Active Population Survey (EPA). The region of the 
individuals constructed as a time-varying covariate . 
Inhabitants>40,000 
1 if the number of inhabitants of the municipality where the 
individual is living is greater than 40.000. The municipality where 
the individual is living constructed as time-varying covariate. 
Year dummies Annual year dummies. 
Job characteristics 
Non-manual occupation  1 if non-manual occupation 
Industry Dummies for manufacturing, construction and services industries. 
High Technology 1 if sector of activity in high technology according with the classification of industries by technologic level. 
Type of contract Permanent, on-call temporary, temporary, open-ended.  
Part-time coefficient Hours worked as a fraction of full time work (1 is a full time job) 
Temporary Agency 1 if the employment is signed through a temporary help agency. 
Size of the firm  Dummies for 0 (missing), 1-19, 10-19,20-49,50-249, >250 
Daily wages 
Real annual wage (gross salary) divided by the number of days 
worked in the year by employer. For reliability we have applied 
a filter in 1st and 99th percentile to this variable. It is a time 
varying variable 
Public Sector 1 if the employer is Public Sector. 
Source: Own elaboration 
Note: Education level is constructed as a constant variable from the more recent LWLS given that from 
2009 LWLS information for education level is more reliable.  
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Figure A1. Evolution of unemployment rate by gender in Spain. 2002Q1 
2014Q3  
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5. Conclusions 
 
In this dissertation we have analysed from a microeconomic perspective 
the impact of the Great Recession on unemployment duration and the nature 
and stability of new job matches in the Spanish labour market. Using a large 
administrative data set from the Spanish Social Security Administration we 
estimated single risks and correlated competing risks models distinguishing 
different destination states. Applying non-linear Oaxaca decompositions we 
decomposed the changes in aggregate durations into changes in sample 
composition and residual changes induced by changing economic conditions or 
by different returns to the characteristics.  
To sum up, both flows out of unemployment and into unemployment 
help to explain the evolution of the unemployment rate and its gender 
differentials. As a consequence of the crisis (not because of the changes in the 
sample composition) the probability of leaving unemployment via finding any 
job is reduced substantially during the first year of unemployment (on average 
by 12 percentage points) and there is more mobility between primary and 
secondary jobs.  Moreover, the probability of becoming unemployed increases 
significantly, on average by 17 percentage points after one year in the job. 
Another consequence of the crisis is the convergence of the unemployment 
rates by gender, which were typically higher for females due to their larger 
unemployment durations and shorter job spells. This convergence seems to 
stem from the fact that men are allocated in more pro-cyclical occupations, 
explaining why the falls of unemployment exits and the increases of 
unemployment re-entries are more pronounced for men than for women. 
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In spite of the convergence in unemployment rates, gender differentials 
in unemployment duration and job quality (proxied by job duration and wages) 
remain. They are not explained by differences in observed characteristics. 
Instead, unobserved differences in workers (productivity, motivation, job search 
effort) or employers (discrimination, statistical discrimination) seem to be 
behind this, which unfortunately cannot be explored with the available data. 
Some women’s characteristics, such as level of education, firm size, actually 
reduce the gender disparity instead of explaining it. 
Individuals hit hardest (in relative terms) by the financial crisis, in terms 
of suffering a major decrease in the chances of leaving unemployment and an 
increase in the probabilities of losing the job, are those living in regions with 
higher unemployment rates, males, young and old workers, low educated 
individuals, immigrants (mainly Spanish speaking), workers in manual 
occupations and workers in the construction sector, in line with the sectorial 
character of this recession.    
Among the factors affecting unemployment incidence and job stability, it 
is worth to note that the level of education protects against unemployment, 
especially in the downturn and for women. Having children hampers women’s 
employment and wages. New job starters exhibit more stable jobs and higher 
wages in large firms, and this effect is stronger during the recession and for 
men.  New jobs in high technology firms appear more stable and pay better 
wages than in non-intensive technology firms, particularly for women.  
The main changes found in the Spanish labour market outcomes reveal 
that Spain is moving away from the Europe 2020 Strategy as far as the aims of 
employment, the fight against poverty and social inequality, and the quality of 
new jobs. This suggests corrective measures are necessary. 
Europe 2020 predicts an increasing trend in the demand for highly 
qualified workers and a decreasing demand for low skills, leading to a more 
disadvantaged position of low-educated workers, especially in the economic 
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downturn. This suggests the necessity of active labour market policies adjusted 
to the economic situation such as facilities for on the job training or training 
programs for demanding occupations. Doing this with a focus on a greater 
involvement of women, older workers and migrants would bring the Spanish 
economy closer to Europe goal. 
The gender dimension of Europe 2020 and the evidence of gender 
inequalities in labour market outcomes suggest the necessity of policy measures 
addressed at reducing them.  
This study also sheds light on the current Spanish policy debate of the 
necessity of stimulating the growth of Spanish firm size to increase the 
productivity and employment stability and boost firms to enter into new 
emerging sectors, in line with the Europe 2020 strategy of sustainable growth. 
According to the positive association between firm size and job stability, policy 
should not only focus on creating new (and small) firms but also on stimulating 
these firms to grow and stabilize. However, large firms also show higher gender 
differences in job stability and wages, so incentives to make firms grow in size 
should be accompanied by gender equality policies. Potential policies (given the 
limitation of disentangle supply and demand side) would consist on involving 
more women in decision making positions, offer them continuous training, and 
implement policies addressed to combine work and family such as a flexible 
work schedule, working from home, and improving part-time jobs.  
Our results also give support to the goal to boost firms to enter into new 
emerging sectors and increase the representation of women in ICT sectors in 
line with gender dimension of Europe 2020. Further policy measures in this 
direction are necessary, such as stimulating job seekers to enter the new 
emerging sectors, especially women, improve school and university training in 
ICT skills according to firm requirements, or supporting SMEs to enhance 
innovation and investments in ICT. 
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From a policy point of view this study has the limitation that demand and 
supply factors were not disentangled. As a consequence, we cannot always 
distinguish the reasons behind the job finding and job losing processes. A more 
structural analysis is necessary, probably also involving data on job search (that 
are not available in our administrative records), in order to suggest more 
specific policy measures. 
Further research on unemployment and employment dynamics for 
specific groups and over the business cycle will be addressed in the future, such 
as youth, low educated workers, or workers in construction.  This would also 
give insight in the challenging problem of youth unemployment in Spain. 
The European Union requires a supranational institutional framework in 
terms of labour market institutions, such as unemployment protection, 
minimum wages, labour market duality, flexi-security, gender equality, and 
barriers to mobility. In order to design the common system, cross-country 
studies on the differences in these labour market institutions and their impact 
on unemployment dynamics in different economic context are necessary.  
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